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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

8

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
9

*********

10
11

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual

12

13
14
15

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

)
)
)
)
)
)

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,

16

Defendants/
Counterclaimants.

17

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV27-18-00098

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF LORA ROBERTS

- - - - - -- - - -- -- - - )

18
STATE OF IDAHO
19

20

County of Twin Falls

)
ss:
)

21

LORA ROBERTS, first being duly sworn, deposes and states under oath as follows:

22

1.

23
24
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26

I make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and am competent to

testify to the matters stated herein.
2.

I am the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant in above-captioned matter.

3.

Exhibit "A" attached hereto is a letter sent by Jeff Rolig dated May 4, 20 17, in his

former capacity as the attorney for the Defendants. In the 4 th paragraph of his letter, he
acknowledged the existence of the ten-foot ditch easement across the Jensens' property.
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4.

1
2

Exhibit "B" attached hereto is a letter sent by Jeff Rolig dated May 15, 2017, in

his former capacity as the attorney for the Defendants. In the 2 nd paragraph of that letter, he
stated that his clients would bring in a backhoe to "cut a notch" in the ditch under their fence

3

4
5
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and "cut a way into their property that connects with the waste water ditch that is visible in their
field" .

5.

Despite the Jensens' commitment to open the ditch as set forth in Exhibit "B",

the Defendants have not undertaken any such work as of the date hereof.
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Further, sayeth your affiant naught.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the
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'.3:t

day of July, 2018, he caused a true and c01Tect

copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
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Robe1t L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50 130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
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_JEFFREY E. ROLIG, P. C.
Attorn ey at Law

195 Rivef·vista. fl ace, ·St.e 306

AO.BQx$45 5

1't!in, Falls; 1D 83303-54:55.

Tele.Pho~:

Facsimile:
E-Maii:

208--733-0075
208-·733-()7) 7

w.com
.jrolig@rol{gla
.
.

May4t 20·17
VIA.EMAIL

~ary p. Stette
F{O.8l;RT$ON 8c SLETTE, PLLC

P.Cf 'r:foi ·1·905. . . . .

, .

fwrn ·Falis, io·a3303-190 6
Re:

Tom and. OeAn.n J.~nseo ./ Lora Robert~

!:f¢pte$ent_TQ!"h. and DeAnn Jensen, who asked meto respond to _yout letter
of April. 27, 2017.
Fir.st, it ,i~ lmpooa,nt :to note :that th'e widespread flooding that occurred thi$
Spri'~g w~s an extremely.ra.te event,.p.e.rh~ps once in,a 5:ct- or 100-ye.ar cycle.

.S.£:lton.d, the culvert that conveys water ur1ders1.mnv~!¢ie Oriv~HiW~YJtom the

~o.berts··prop~rty only h~s ·a ·1" diarn.eter Joy my 'ciienfs' ·persorl'al . rneasuren;~n~); ·, We>ulq
be Clfrtou~.:to :K~9V(wh:$.t -~rn..QµOtQf. p.f,$i .of water·can :flow '.th.rOtiJgh:·th~t 'CUIV~rl. we· have

pictures to .show-:that ~ larg$ Vo!.um$ of- wat~r was ·flQ.wlng· a_cr~ss rpy.. cli_
eo.,t$.',. pr,op'.~f.ty; ··
includJng whrlE;?.. the Wc:>rst 6t the ',,fi_ooding ,W_
a~: ()p¢µ'rtin.~.• ·Ar·:!h~ :§a.ID.~ ti.rn~;
.b,~c~h,g µp :~md-: ~ct.o~Jly ov~_rflo.wlrm the 'suodiVr~ion··ro.adWay. As::with :many are~s;'in Jwin
i=all~_~nd. Jerqm~ ·counties;-tn_e r4noff wat~r ;simply overwnei.rned lhe .system_; 'Fyith~rr"the·
attached photos Indicate little or no effort to k~~P the· Cl!lv~rt; 9P$11ing q_le.qr pn ·YQL!~ c.ll~r:it's
side-of the road.
·
··
· ··
··
·

-~w~t~r,.:w~s

Third._
, t ackhoW,l~dgt;, the exist~nce of~ 10' ditch e~s~ment ~wross.my.90ents'
property. Of course, that- same·pla:tted easement l:ll~Q .runs ~cr9ss your cl.ieot'~ property.
The c;litch cle~rly $hows on the en·ctosed 199·3 Goog!e E;a!1h ph_
Qt~•. Hg.We.v~r; ~Y ~pg~·;~~~
ditch· ~cross your clients prop_e,rty had been ·compl"etely obliterated, as shown by the
enclos~d 2003 photo.
·
1

·we d.o not· koo.w what you ;are r~f~rring tQ wh.en.._ye:,µ t~lk. ~p,~t ~ -~betrn}
Th~re :is.no be.r,:n! There:•i_
i a pile of-dirt, butit-appeats to- be-ten.fe·et or mpr\e. fr<5m;tha'patli.
the runoff -wij~~r fQllO.WS aero$$
clients) property. For .the avcii,Qftnce. of' any d(jubt,_
however, my :clients will remove the··pue of dirt, prQbably PY the end of.thi$. w,ee~end; after .
Mr. ·Jensen r~turns ,tb town.
·
· •·
· · · --•e•x•H11111!!11!- ~
1811

my

t __A
__
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Gary D. Slette
May-4, 2017
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it is trµe that sever~I yea.rs -~go, 'my tlfents slightly covered the ro·cks ki. their'
portion of the aitch. However, theta is still a defined, visihle channel' through which the
water runs. Mt clients.have rturrieroui pidta.re$ ~
sho~Nir,g th~~w~tet'run.riin9 ·freely thJOU..Qh
the .easement, at a time When the runoff water had tQtally' fi11¢d the puJv~i't ·$rig actually
flooded the. ro~dw~y,

··

·

· ·

·

An additional f~ot.or is.th~l the n~igt)bor tC> ttie,south of Jensens' prop~rty has
filled in his ditch .. son is actually higher thah lhe.w~t~r course wher(:3 it l~~ve~'-tO~•Jf;3na:ens'

prqperty.

·

·

·

· _·· -· .. ·· ·, · ..

.w.~

· .. ·

··

-

·

_. · . . . l_n §jJprt;
~i.foply, ·g.o. :nqt lleUev.e. th~t any. ~cti_qns t~~en ·by- ,:ny: ~tiel)~s
c9ntr.ibuted in any way to the isoli,ted iii~ideht pf ·fl6Qdih9 Qf your cl.ient's. property ·m tht$
highly 1m.Yl>1J.~I w~ter ye~r.
·
· ·
·

JER/sgm
i2hclo$ures

ec;i tpm.anq O~A~·nJ~rj$en
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8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

9

10

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

11

*********

12
13

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual
Plainti ff/Counterdefendant,

14
15

Case No. CV27-18-00098

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. CHARLES G. BROCKWAY

V.

16

17

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,

18

Defendants/
Counterclaimants.

19
20
21

STATE OF IDAHO

22

County of Twin Falls

ss:
)

23

24

25
26

DR. CHARLES G. BROCKWAY, first being duly sworn, deposes and states under oath as
follows:
I.

l make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and am competent to

testify to the matters stated herein.

SUPPLEMENTAi. AFFrDI\ VIT OF DR. Cl IARLES G. BROCKWAY
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1
2

2.

on the subdivision plat of Sunnyside Acres.
3.

3

4
5
6

I instructed EHM Engineers to obtain a survey of the ditch casement area depicted

I have reviewed and analyzed the survey information prepared by EHM

Engineers. Experts in the field of hydrology would reasonably rely on the facts and data gathered
by a surveyor conducting a site survey.
4.

Based upon my review of that information, facts and data gathered by EHM

Engineers, I have prepared the report which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

7
8

Further, saycth your affiant naught.
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10

., P.E.

11

12

13

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~D day of July, 2018.
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16

BLIC FOR IDAHO
1

Residing at: I W\ n fu.~
CommissionExpires: C\- l-~('.) l~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the 3 D day of July, 2018, he caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
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Robert L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO !3ox 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
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Drainage Evaluation and Hydraulic Modeling
on Sunnyside Acres Subdivision
Charles G. Brockway, Ph.D., P.E.
July 30, 2018

A natural drainage way exists within Sunnyside Acres Subdivision in Jerome County,
Idaho. The drainage follows a northeast to southwest alignment within an easement
recorded on the subdivision plat, running through Lots 5 Block 1 (Roberts property), Lot
35 Block 2 (Jensen property), Lot 34 Block 2, and Lot 33 Block 2 of the subdivision.
The drainage crosses Sunnyside Road and 500S Road via culverts.
The drainage collects water from a natural basin which encompasses a portion of the
subdivision as well as land to the northeast (Figure 1). The extent of the basin was
delineated using topographic data prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey, and by
consulting the 2016 aerial photo to account for irrigation ditches which will intercept or
redirect the flow. The total catchment area is estimated to be 282 acres, of which 53
acres (19%) is rural residential development, 4 acres (1.4%) is paved roadway, and 225
acres (80%) is cultivated fields.

Figure 1. Drainage basin above Sunnyside Drive culvert.

Drainage evaluation - Sunnyside Acres
Brockway Engineering / July 30, 2018
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The drainage is normally dry but will flow when runoff from the basin is generated.
Runoff can be generated by rainfall, rain-on-snow, rain-on-frozen ground, or snowmelt
events. Due to the small size of the basin, runoff events will be of short duration but may
have considerable peak discharges. Peak discharge magnitudes and frequencies were
estimated using the NRCS TR-55 runoff model with precipitation durations and depths
from NOAA Atlas 2, a time of concentration of 1.4 hours, and a weighted curve number
of 74 reflecting the land use percentages within the basin. Estimated peak discharges at
the south boundary of the Roberts property {Lot 5, Block 1) are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Estimated peak flow frequencies.
Return Period
5-year
10-year
25-year
SO-year
100-year

Peak Flow (cfs)
2.0

5.9
14.5
22.8
32.8

A topographic survey of the drain ditch alignment and adjacent land was made by EHM
Engineers, Inc. on July 20, 2018 (Figure 2). Both the raw survey data and the
topographic ground contours at 0.5-foot intervals created by EHM were relied upon for
the analysis described herein.
Culverts across both Sunnyside Drive and 500S Road are 12-inch corrugated metal pipes
(CMP), and are about 50% blocked by sediment.
Prior to about 2013, the drainage through the Jensen property {Lot 35, Block 2) was a
defined ditch. Since then the ditch has been filled, creating a shallow swale rather than a
defined ditch. Based on the survey, the estimated depth of fill varies from zero to at least
2.0 feet compared to the estimated ditch grade prior to the fill. The high point of the fill
occurs about midway between the north and south lines of the Jensen prope1iy at crosssection 18 on Figure 2. At this point the bottom of the swale created by the fill is 3 .0 feet
higher than the invert of the Sunnyside Drive culvert at its outlet and 2.5 feet higher than
the invert of the original ditch at that same point.
The topographic survey data was used to create cross-sections and develop a hydraulic
analysis using the HEC-RAS 4.1 water surface profile model (Figure 2). The model
includes the two 12-inch culverts blocked 50%, as well as the top of road profile at both
culvert locations. A friction coefficient of 0.04 was used throughout the study reach.
The model was run for discharges ranging from 1 to 25 cfs both with and without the fill
on the Jensen property. To model the ditch without fill, the invert was assumed to vary
linearly from the existing ditch invert at the Sunnyside Drive culvert to the invert at the
south boundary of the Jensen property, and the estimated pre-fill ditch geometry of 2-foot

Drainage evaluation - Sunnyside Acres
Brockway Engineering/ July 30, 2018
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bottom width and 2:1 side slopes was programmed. The culvert across Sunnyside Road
was kept 50% blocked for this analysis. 1
The model shows that the fill creates a significant increase in water level on the Roberts
property at all modeled discharges. The increases in the water elevation on the Roberts
property are shown in Table 2.

N89'45'34"E
1326.70'

N89'4
Figure 2. Topographic survey and cross-section locations.

1

It is possible that the fill and subsequent ponding in 2017 may have exacerbated the culvert
sedimentation, but this could not be confinned; therefore, it was assumed that the culvert blockage prior to
the fill was the same as it is today.
Drainage evaluation - Sunnyside Acres
Brockway Engineering/ July 30, 20 18
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Table 2. Model results.

Flow rate
(cfs)

0.5
1
2
3
5
10
15
25

Computed water surface elevation of
pond on Roberts property (feet)
Existing
Pre-fill

Increase
(feet)

3586.90

3586.01

0.89

3586.98
3587.07
3587.14

3586.51
3586.80
3586.82

0.47
0.27

3587.24
3587.40
3587.49
3587.61

3586.85
3586.91
3586.97
3587.12

0.32
0.39
0.49
0.52
0.49

The model results are illustrated graphically for a flow rate of 15 cfs in Figure 3. This
figure shows a longitudinal profile along the centerline of the drainage way. The figure
shows the ground elevations (with and without fill), roadway embankments, and culverts.
The two computed water surface profiles illustrate the difference between the existing
and pre-fill cases for a flow rate of 15 cfs.
Based on photographic evidence of the extent of inundation during and immediately after
the February 2017 runoff event, the water level on the Roberts property during that event
likely rose to approximately 3587.5 feet, corresponding to a flow magnitude of 15 cfs.
The ground surface on the Roberts property in the area of the riding arena, house, and
barn is typically 3585.5 to 3587.5 feet in elevation. Water would need to rise to about
3586.6 feet before flooding of structures became imminent, and significant flooding
would occur with water at or above 3587.0 feet. The table above shows that flooding of
structures on the Roberts prope1ty will be a more frequent occurrence due to the fill on
the Jensen property.
Regardless of the magnitude of the runoff flow, once water has ponded, it cannot drain
because the fill on the Jensen prope1ty acts as a dam. The water elevation must rise
above elevation 3586.7 feet before any southward flow can occur. If the fill had not been
placed, water would drain to elevation 3585.2 feet after runoff ceased and standing water
would not persist on the Roberts property.
Because of the fill placed in the ditch on the Jensen property, water accumulating on the
Roberts property can now only dissipate by infiltrating into the soil over many days. This
is consistent with the observed dissipation of the ponded water after the 2017 event.

4

Drainage evaluation - Sunnyside Acres
Brockway Engineering/ July 30, 2018

Page 541

Roberts

Plan:

1)Existing

--

-0

---

ro - - - t - -

~

7/26/2018

OrcinReach1

-----~
Jensen property

-·- .......-·

c5., ·- -•

-~

_:2
>,

c::

C!bf51·

2)Fil1Remo~d~018

. ---·

--

·------·--

--·-

Roberts property

-------- ·,•·- - - ·-

L_!gend

VIS PF 7. E>osl.-g
1/113 PF7- F~I Rerro.e:1

Water surface with fill

Crit PF 7 - 8'stiog

--------• ----- --Crit PF 7 - Fil REITOiied

Water surface without fill

:5

en
_g

G<<>Jrd

G,"'"'

'!bl

~

w
'!bl

----~------~:--- ~

C!b84~ -

I,,,

I,,, ,,,i ,,,I ,,,~ ,,," ",,,
,,,j
C!bS)I+----~-- -- - - - -- - -~ - -- - --_;---~- ---+--- - - - - - - - - -o

m

C

~

~

C

C

C

.!Q

_g

~

~

,,,~

C

~

~

,~

C

C

.,

•--· - - N - -

1

"'

N -

I

--

0
" (")

c

---

..,..._ C"')
. ____

C"')
N

"'

- · (") ""

~
~
~
,,,~ i ,,,~
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
- -,w
~ - - - - -- -,~
~- - - -<n- - -- -<n-- - -~,~
,~
~

~

I

Mall Chand Oistalc&(tt)

Page 542

Figure 3. Model output showing longitudinal profile and computed water surface elevations for a flow of 15 cfs. Water flow is from right to left. Vertical
scale is exaggerated.

Drainage evaluation - Sunnyside Acres
Brockway Engineering / July 30, 2018

5

The fill of the ditch on the Jensen property has increased the hazard to users of Sunnyside
Drive, which is a public roadway. The computed depth of water over Sunnyside Drive
and the change in depth compared to the situation prior to the fill is shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Computed depth of water over Sunnyside Drive.

Flow (cfs)

0.5
1
2
3
5
10

15
25

Depth of water over center of road at low
point in road (feet)
Existing
Pre-fill
Difference

0.45
0.53
0.62
0.69
0.79
0.95
1.04
1.16

0
0.06
0.35
0.37
0.40
0.46
0.52
0.67

0.45
0.47
0.27
0.32
0.39
0.49
0.52
0.49

Without the fill, routine drainage flows less than about 1 cfs could be passed through the
culverts without overtopping the road. With the fill in its existing condition, both small
and routine drainage flows as well as larger runoff events will back up and inundate the
road and the Roberts property.
Regardless of the discing or flattening of the ditch on the Roberts property, all the water
from the drainage area above the Roberts property will flow to the low point on the
Roberts property just above the culvert under Sunnyside Drive. As long as the fill
material remains in place in the ditch on the Jensen property, that water will be
impounded because of the dam effect created by the fill.

Drainage evaluation - Sunnyside Acres
Brockway Engineering/ July 30, 201 8
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7/30/2018 11:42 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
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1

Gary D. Slette

5

gslette@rsidaholaw.com
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Telephone: (208) 933-0700
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
ISB # 3198

6

Attorneysfor Plaintiff

2
3

4

!rlm\gds\Robe11S\Alf_schwarz

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
8

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
9

*********
10
11

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual
Plaintiff7Counterdefendant,

12
13

Case No. CV27-18-00098

AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS J. SCHWARZ

V.

14
15
16

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

17

STATE OF IDAHO
18

County of
19
20

DOUGLAS J. SCHWARZ, first being duly sworn, deposes and states under oath as follows:
I.

21
22
23

Jw/lJ btu >

)
ss:

I make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and am competent to

testify to the matters stated herein.
2.

I am employed by EHM Engineers in Twin Falls, and work under the direct

supervision of a licensed land surveyor.
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1

3.
2
3

4

At the request and direction of Dr. Charles Brockway, I conducted a survey on the

property north and south of Sunnyside Drive in Jerome County. I went as far as north as the
northern boundary of Sunnyside Acres subdivision, and as far south as 500 South Road.
4.

The documents attached hereto are a reduced version of the survey info1mation I

prepared after I conducted that survey. I provided Dr. Brockway with a full size set of my
5

drawings for his review and analysis.

6
7

Fmther, sayeth your affiant naught.

8
9

10
11

12
13

Th
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN to before me this '?:J) day of July, 2018 ..
,

14

~ l0<-Lll<wvcQ,

:::::Twin
NO

15

UBLIC FOR IDAHO

Commission Expires:

16

Fo ils
q- \- ~6 \ ~

17

18
19
20

21
22

23
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1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
3

4
5
6

The undersigned certifies that on the

1 C day of July, 2018, he caused a tiue and conect

copy of the foregoing instrnment to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
Robert L. HaiTis
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Halm & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

7

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

[X]

Hand Deliver
U.S.Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission - 208-523-95 18
Efile - iCourt
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

8

9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
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Electronically Filed
8/13/2018 4:31 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Sandra Peterson, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
araw lings@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, move this Court to strike the Affidavit

ofLora Roberts in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Greg Thain in Support
ofMotion for Summary Judgment; Affidavit ofDr. Charles G. Brockway in Support ofMotion for
Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Ken Crane in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Mark Dekruyf in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Affidavit of John Root;
and the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Lora Roberts.

This motion is supported by the

Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits, submitted
contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 13 th day of August 2018.
Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13 th day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of
the following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by
the method indicated.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
Gary D. Slette

□ Mail

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile

P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
Email:
gslette@rsidaholaw.com

~
~

Email
Electronic Filing/Service

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

\\Law\data\WPDATA\RLH\20028-000 Jensen, Thomas & Deanna\Pleadings\Jensens renewed StrikeAffs MOT.docx
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit their Memorandum in

Support ofJensens' Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court should strike several of the affidavits submitted in support of the Motion for

Summary Judgment ("Roberts MSJ'') filed by Lora Roberts ("Roberts") because they provide
nothing material to the Roberts MSJ; they largely rely in implicit assumptions that are not
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supported; and they provide expert opinion from non-experts and rely on preliminary, unreliable
information from the one expert who has since provided a more reliable affidavit.
On April 30, 2018, the Jensens submitted Jensens' Motion to Strike Affidavits (the "Prior
Motion to Strike"), which asked the Court to dismiss four affidavits. (See Prior Motion to Strike,
p. 1). At the hearing on May 14, 2018, the Court granted Jens ens' Motion to Continue Proceedings
on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and continued the Prior Motion to Strike, along with
all of the other pending motions. Roberts has now (re-)asserted a motion for summary judgment
and submitted additional affidavits in support of the Roberts MSJ. For that reason, the Jensens
renew their motion to strike, updating it as necessary to address the additional affidavits to which
the Jensens object.
For the sake of brevity, the capitalized terms as used herein, unless otherwise defined, have
the same meaning defined in the Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
II. ARGUMENT

Before her prior motion, Roberts submitted four affidavits, and has since filed six more, all
of which are-to varying extents-used in support of the Roberts MSJ. These are:

Page 2

•

Affidavit of Lora Roberts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
April 11, 2018) (the "Roberts Affidavit");

•

Affidavit of Greg Thain in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
April 11, 2018) (the "Thain Affidavit");

•

Affidavit ofDr. Charles G. Brockway in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment
(filed April 11, 2018) (the "Brockway Affidavit");

•

Affidavit ofKen Crane in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (filed April 17,
2018) (the "Crane Affidavit");
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•

Affidavit of Mark Dekruyf in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
June 22, 2018) (the "DekruyfAffidavit");

•

Affidavit ofLarry Bos in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (filed June 22,
2018) (the "Bos Affidavit");

•

Affidavit ofJohn Root (filed June 22, 2018) (the "Root Affidavit");

•

Second Supplemental Affidavit of Lora Roberts (filed July 30, 2018) (the "Second
Roberts Affidavit");

•

Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Charles G. Brockway (filed July 30, 2018) (the
"Second Brockway Affidavit"); and

•

Affidavit ofDouglas J. Schwarz (filed July 30, 2018) (the "Schwarz Affidavit" and,
together with all of the preceding affidavits the "Roberts MSJ Affidavits").

The Jensens object to certain of these ten affidavits because they are inadmissible for
various reasons. The court should strike these affidavits, specifically: the Roberts Affidavit, the
Thain Affidavit, the Brockway Affidavit, the Crane Affidavit, the Dekruyf Affidavit, the Root
Affidavit, and the Second Roberts Affidavit (together, the "Ob;ectionable Roberts MSJ Affidavits").

Roberts has learned from the Jensens' prior motion to strike, and has cited to more of the Roberts
MSJ Affidavits than previously done. See Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (requiring a moving

party to "cit[ e] to particular parts of the materials in the record," to "show[] that the materials
cited" show an entitlement to summary judgment and only requiring a court to "consider ... the
cited materials"). However, this does not overcome the defects inborn in each of the Objectionable
Roberts MSJ Affidavits. Generally speaking, the Objectionable Roberts MSJ Affidavits are not

relevant (i.e., they add nothing to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact or
even present evidence that is in any way material). In addition to this general problem, there are
significant reasons to strike each of the Objectionable Roberts MSJ Affidavits, each of which is
addressed separately below.

Page 3

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

Page 563

A. This Court should strike the Roberts Affidavit in its entirety because it is immaterial to
the Roberts MSJ; Exhibits A, B, and C are unusable; and it improperly offers expert
testimony without proper foundation.

While there is nothing particularly objectionable in the foundational paragraphs of the
Roberts Affidavit, they add nothing relevant unless any of the substantive paragraphs are not

stricken. (See Roberts Affidavit, 11 1-2). Nevertheless, the Roberts Affidavit must be stricken in
its entirety precisely because all of the substantive paragraphs must be stricken. Accordingly, each
of the remaining paragraphs (and exhibits) are addressed in tum.
Paragraph 3 is cited to show that Roberts acquired the Roberts Property in 2001; that she
did not import material onto her property to fill in the Waste Ditch thereon; and that she used her
tractor to smooth her property. (See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(filed June 22, 2018) ("Roberts MSJ Memo"), p. 2). 1 This appears to mostly address one of the
J ensens' Counterclaims.
Counterclaims

(See Jens ens' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaims,

11 22-27 (Counterclaim Count 1)). However, the Jensens' Counterclaims are

nowhere put at issue in either the Roberts MSJ or the Jensens MSJ. Thus, in addition to not being
credible, these statements cannot be relevant.

It is worth noting that these factual assertions are self-contradictory and not sustainable. Roberts claims that the
Waste Ditch on the Roberts Property was "largely obliterated by the horses" on property prior to her acquisition
of the property. (Roberts Affidavit, ,i 3). Yet, the deed by which she took ownership of the Roberts Property
makes specific mention of the Waste Ditch as existing. (See Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Rawlings Deel."), ex. C, p. 1 (" ... subject to existing ditch
running through property to remain open for waste water from farm North of property")). Yet, Roberts somehow
claims that by "smooth[ing] the ditch area" she managed to "create[] a visible swale." (Roberts Affidavit, ,i 3).
Not only does this not make sense-how does one create a swale by using a tractor to smooth property?-but the
"visible swale" is not visible. (See Declaration ofDeanna Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Deanna Jensen Deel."), ,i,i 18.a., 28; ex. E, p. 1 (showing the area of the Roberts Property through
which the Waste Ditch would pass, but showing no visible swale therein); and ex. H, pp. 3-8 (also showing the
Roberts Property, with a notable absence of any visible swale)
Page4
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Paragraphs 4 and 5 discuss two prior events of flooding that occurred before the J ensens
purchased the Jensen Property. (Roberts Affidavit, ,-r 4). However, and despite averments of
"personal knowledge," Roberts-nor apparently any of her agents-can remember or even find
out any detail (even the years when the events purportedly occurred) about these prior flood events.
(See Second Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings ("Second Rawlings Deel."), ex. F p. 3 (Answer

No. 12, which, when asked to "describe in detail each and every 'similar flooding event"' provides
that Roberts "only recalls that there were two prior years during which flooding events occurred"
and provides no additional detail)). The lack of any "independent indelible recollection" regarding
more than just years (as this interrogatory requested "detail," not just years in which events
occurred), undermines the validity and admissibility of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Roberts Affidavit.
However, even more problematically, there is nothing demonstrating that the prior events of
flooding described by Roberts are in any way relevant to what happened in 2017. (See Roberts
Affidavit, 11 4-5). The implication is obviously that the only difference between these occasions

of flooding is the status of the ditch on the Jensens' property; but there is absolutely nothing to
indicate that there were not other differences. Was there as much snow? Was the melt as rapid?
Was there as much rain? Was the ground equally frozen? And numerous other questions-which
Roberts cannot answer-reduce these assertions to immateriality.
Exhibits A, B, and C are black-and-white, and so degraded (or altered) as to be unreliable
and unusable. (See Roberts Affidavit, exs. A, B, and C). While Roberts describes them, 2 she never
2

Further, it is worth noting that Roberts uses the term "largely obliterated" when describing the effect of the
Jensens' placement of fill within the portion of the Waste Ditch on their property. (Roberts Affidavit, ,i 6). This
is strikingly identical to how Roberts describes the Waste Ditch on her own property (see Roberts Affidavit, ,i 3)
and how Roberts' brother, Ken Crane, describes the Waste Ditch on his neighboring property and on the Roberts
Property (see Crane Affidavit, ,i 4 (noting that the ditch "has been obliterated over time" (emphasis added))).
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avers that the exhibits are correct depictions of the circumstances she describes or that they are
accurate at all. (See Roberts Affidavit, ¶ 6).
The events described in Paragraphs 7 and 8 are not material to the Roberts MSJ, but—in
keeping with Roberts’ approach, especially given the Thain Affidavit, described below—seem to
have the purpose of continuing Roberts’ strategy by somehow portraying the Jensens as bad
neighbors. (See Roberts Affidavit, ¶¶ 7-8). The Jensens strongly deny the efforts of Roberts’
approach.

But even more relevant to this motion, these assertions are not material to the

Roberts MSJ. Roberts has not pointed to a scienter requirement in any of her claims, meaning that
the mental state or intent of the parties is not at issue. The assertions Roberts states she made do
not affect the status of the ditch on the Jensens’ property or Roberts’ claims in this matter. Thus,
there is no reason to include or consider them.
Paragraph 9 and 11 contain opinions that are improperly included by Roberts. Roberts
claims that the Jensens actions caused the flooding on her property. (Roberts Affidavit, ¶ 9 (“As a
result of …”); id., ¶ 11 (“… which has the effect of …”)). These opinions are not “rationally based
on [her] perception,” because there is room for disagreement about why the flooding occurred in
the whole neighborhood and whether there is a dam. Idaho Rule of Evidence 701. These opinions
are not “helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a
fact in issue,” but merely re-affirm Roberts’ unfounded claims that her damages were caused by
the Jensens. Finally, these opinions are improperly “based on scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Causation in this case is a complicated
matter. Roberts has not laid any foundation regarding her expertise in hydrology, hydraulics,
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engineering, construction, or any other relevant discipline. She is not the right person to opine as
to causation.
Exhibit D is cited to contradict an immaterial assertion (i.e., that the Jensens had permission
from Jerome County to fill in the ditch on their property) that is not placed at issue in the pleadings.
In fact, the issue is only raised in the Roberts Affidavit itself, and has never been submitted by the
Jensens in this proceeding as a defense or justification. (Roberts Affidavit, ¶ 7). The status of the
ditch, Roberts’ interest in the ditch, the Jensens rights to their property, and all of the causes of
action are not—and cannot be—affected in any way by the position of Jerome County Planning
and Zoning. Nor does anything in this letter attached as Exhibit D have any bearing on the
County’s potential interest in the portion of the Waste Ditch that crosses public streets. Further,
the Jensens have explained that it was their understanding, based on a discussion with Nancy
Marshall (of which Art Brown would have no knowledge) that the County had no basis to prevent
the Jensens from filling in the ditch on their property. (See Deanna Jensen Declaration, ¶ 21).
Finally, Exhibit D is inadmissible heresay. Idaho Rule of Evidence 802. It is a statement, made
out of court, that has been offered by Roberts to prove the truth of the matter(s) therein asserted,
to which no exclusion or exception applies. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(c); see also Idaho Rules
of Evidence 801(d), 803, 804. Therefore, Exhibit D (and Paragraph 10 of the Roberts Affidavit)
must, in any event, be stricken because it “is not admissible in evidence at the hearing.” Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2).
Paragraph 12 offers some information that may be pertinent to damages, but the
Roberts MSJ does not address damages and this paragraph does not add anything to the amount of
damages Roberts claims to have suffered. As a result, this paragraph is also immaterial.
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B. This Court should strike the Thain Affidavit in its entirety because it is immaterial to the
Roberts MSJ, it only presents impertinent and scandalous material, it relies on
unsupported implicit inferences, and it provides improper expert testimony.
Were the Thain Affidavit a pleading, Jensens would be making a motion to strike under
Rule 12(f), because the main purpose of the Thain Affidavit seems to be “redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, [and] scandalous.”
Paragraph 3 relies on implicit inferences or assumptions that are not supported by the Thain
Affidavit or any other materials submitted by Roberts. Specifically, there is nothing demonstrating
that the prior events of flooding described by Mr. Thain are in any way relevant to what happened
in 2017. (See Thain Affidavit, ¶ 3 (“During previous years…”)). The implication Mr. Thain relies
on is obviously that the only difference between these occasions of flooding is the status of the
ditch on the Jensens’ property; but there is absolutely nothing to indicate that there were not other
differences. Was there as much snow? Was the melt as rapid? Was there as much rain? Was the
ground equally frozen? And numerous other questions reduce these assertions to immateriality.
Paragraph 4 is the only portion of the Thain Affidavit cited by Roberts. (See Roberts MSJ
Memo, p. 3). But Mr. Thain’s observations of “people using equipment filling in the ditch on the
Jensens’ property” (Thain Affidavit, ¶ 4) is not material because that fact has never been at issue.
(See Answer and Counterclaim, Answer ¶ 6 (“defendants admit they placed a quantity of dirt in
portions of the drainage waste ditch on their property”).
Mr. Thain’s opinions also stray into the realm of expert opinion without the necessary
prerequisite of providing expert qualifications. (See Thain Affidavit, ¶ 2 (“I … can attest to the
validity and accuracy of the flooding issues created by the blockage of the ditch on the Jensens’
property” (emphasis added)); id., ¶ 5 (“If the earthen dam and fill material had not been placed in
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the ditch by the Jensens, the water would never have ... ")). These opinions are not "rationally
based on [his] perception," because there is room for disagreement about why the flooding
occurred in the whole neighborhood and whether there is a dam. Idaho Rule of Evidence 701.
These opinions are not "helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the
determination of a fact in issue," but merely re-affirm Roberts' baseless claims that her damages
were caused by the Jensens. Finally, these opinions are improperly "based on scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Causation in this case is a
complicated matter. Mr. Thain has not laid any foundation regarding his expertise in hydrology,
hydraulics, engineering, construction, or any other relevant discipline. Like Roberts, Mr. Thain is
not the right person to opine as to causation.
Finally-and most offensively-Paragraph 6 is an improper swipe at Thomas Jensen's
character that is (1) denied (see Declaration of Thomas Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment (the "Thomas Jensen Declaration"), ,r 22 ("At no time have I ever called
Roberts, or anyone else, a "fucking dyke")); (2) not relevant or material to this matter in any way;
and (3) only serves to improperly portray the Jensens as bad people. This assertion is inappropriate
in every way as it serves no proper or relevant purpose. The Court must strike Thain Affidavit
entirely.

C. This Court should strike the Brockway Affidavit in its entirety because it is an expert
affidavit that is unreliable because it is based on preliminary estimates.
Three of the five paragraphs of the Brockway Affidavit are foundational. They establish
that Roberts has apparently retained Dr. Brockway as an expert witness. An expert may be
appropriate in this matter. However, it is inappropriate to rely on "preliminary information"
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(Brockway Affidavit, ¶ 3) as definitive expert opinion, particularly when the Second Brockway
Affidavit provides expert opinion, effectively supplanting the preliminary Brockway Affidavit. In
providing this same information to Roberts’ attorney months ago, Dr. Brockway stated: “This
analysis is very preliminary and should be considered approximate, at best. The numbers should
not be used for any purpose except general guidance.” (Thomas Jensen Declaration, ex. A, p. 2
(emphasis added)). There is nothing in the Brockway Affidavit explaining that Dr. Brockway is
any more certain of the numbers he provides now than he was in December 2017, when he
provided the same numbers. (Compare Brockway Affidavit, ¶¶ 4-5; with Declaration of Thomas
Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ex. A, p. 1). In fact, Dr.
Brockway himself indicates that these numbers are still “preliminary.” (Brockway Affidavit, ¶ 3).
The Court should exercise its discretion to strike the Brockway Affidavit, which only supplies
preliminary information deemed unreliable for anything but general guidance by the affiant, as
further demonstrated by the Second Brockway Affidavit.
D. This Court should strike the Crane Affidavit in its entirety because it is irrelevant to the
Roberts MSJ.
The Crane Affidavit adds absolutely nothing material to the consideration of the
Roberts MSJ. Mr. Crane’s property is not at issue in this case, nor is the flow of water over it.
(See Crane Affidavit, ¶¶ 4-5). The lack of detail other than the mere existence of flooding on
Roberts’ property and the ditch being filled in on the Jensens’ property likewise does not add
anything material. (See Crane Affidavit, ¶ 6). Finally, Paragraph 7 relies on implicit inferences or
assumptions that are not supported by the Crane Affidavit or any other materials submitted by
Roberts. Specifically, there is nothing demonstrating that the prior events of flooding described
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by Mr. Crane are in any way relevant to what happened in 2017. (See Crane Affidavit, ¶ 7 (“In
prior years…”)). The implication Mr. Crane relies on—like Roberts and Mr. Thain, above—is
again that the only difference between these occasions of flooding is the status of the ditch on the
Jensens’ property; but there is absolutely nothing to indicate that there were not other differences.
Was there as much snow? Was the melt as rapid? Was there as much rain? Was the ground
equally frozen? And numerous other questions reduce these assertions to immateriality.
E. This Court should strike the Dekruyf Affidavit in its entirety because it is irrelevant to the
Roberts MSJ and provides inappropriate opinion testimony.
After the foundational matters (Dekruyf Affidavit, ¶¶ 1-2), the Dekruyf Affidavit’s three
remaining paragraphs either add nothing to the Roberts MSJ or are inappropriate opinion
testimony.
Paragraph 3 provides vague testimony about driving on Sunnyside Drive and estimating
water depth on the road. (Dekruyf Affidavit, ¶ 3). While perhaps anecdotal, this provides nothing
relevant to the Roberts MSJ. There is nothing showing the relation between the water level on
Sunnyside Drive and the flood level at any point relevant to this matter, on either the Roberts
Property or the Jensen Property. The rough estimate is also vague enough to be useless, because
as little the flooding issue, taking Roberts’ position for the sake of argument, comes down to mere
inches, not feet. (See Second Brockway Affidavit, ex. A).
Paragraph 4 again discusses flooding in prior years. (Dekruyf Affidavit, ¶ 4). Again, there
is nothing demonstrating that the prior events of flooding described by Mr. Dekruyf are in any way
relevant to what happened in 2017. (See Dekruyf Affidavit, ¶ 4 (“During previous years…”)). The
implication Mr. Dekruyf (and Roberts) relies on (and, in fact, states) is obviously that the only
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difference between these occasions of flooding is the status of the ditch on the Jensens’ property;
but there is absolutely nothing to indicate that there were not other differences. Was there as much
snow? Was the melt as rapid? Was there as much rain? Was the ground equally frozen? And
numerous other questions again reduce these assertions to immateriality.
Finally, in paragraph 5, Mr. Dekruyf’s opinions also stray into the realm of expert opinion
without the necessary prerequisite of providing expert qualifications. (See Dekruyf Affidavit, ¶ 5
(“If the earthen dam and fill material had not been placed in the ditch on the Southside [sic] of
Sunnyside Drive, the water would never have … This is because …”)). It is troubling that, with
the exception of the last sentence, this opinion is almost a verbatim copy of Mr. Thain’s opinion.
(See Dekruyf Affidavit, ¶ 5; compare Thain Affidavit, ¶ 5). It appears that Roberts wants to settle
the issue of causation by public opinion poll (in which she would, of course, only select those
whose vote count in her favor), rather than though expert debate or other factual reasoning. This
is not acceptable. Mr. Dekruyf’s opinions are not “rationally based on [his] perception,” because
there is room for disagreement about why the flooding occurred in the whole neighborhood and
whether there is a dam. Idaho Rule of Evidence 701. These opinions are not “helpful to a clear
understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue,” but merely
re-affirm Roberts’ baseless claims that her damages were caused by the Jensens. Finally, these
opinions are improperly “based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.” Causation in this case is a complicated matter. Mr. Dekruyf has not laid any
foundation regarding his expertise in hydrology, hydraulics, engineering, construction, or any
other relevant discipline. Like Roberts and Mr. Thain, Mr. Dekruyf is not the right person to opine
as to causation.
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F. This Court should strike the Root Affidavit in its entirety because it is irrelevant to the
Roberts MSJ.
The Root Affidavit adds absolutely nothing material to the consideration of the Roberts
MSJ. As part of his foundational statements, Mr. Root notes that he "prepared the plat for
Sunnyside Acres in Jerome County, Idaho" (the "Plat").

(Root Affidavit,

,r

2).

But despite

spending "many hours of time walking the property" (i.e., the entire subdivision), he remains only
"somewhat familiar" with the area, which is understandable, since this took place more than 40
years ago. (Root Affidavit,

,r,r 3-4; see also Amended Complaint,

ex. A, p. 1 (noting a recording

date of June 27, 1978)). Rather than testifying from personal memory, Mr. Root relies on what is
"apparent," which any fact-finder can judge independently (Root Affidavit, ,r 4), or is so obvious
as to be useless in an affidavit (see Root Affidavit,

,r

5 (averring that "water . . . always flows

downhill")).
Finally, paragraph 6 of the Root Affidavit is irrelevant. Mr. Root was the surveyor who
conducted the survey and prepared the Plat. (Root Affidavit, ,r,r 2-3). He did not own the property
or execute the Plat on behalf of an owner of the property. (See Rawlings Deel., ex. A). Thus, his
intent behind the dedicatory language carries no weight. It would be like an attorney who drafted
a contract testifying-not about what intent the parties expressed-but directly as to the parties'
intent in the contract. Such testimony is obviously irrelevant, and the Court must strike the Root

Affidavit.
G. This Court should strike the Second Roberts Affidavit in its entirety because it is irrelevant
to the Roberts MSJ and any possible relevance is protected by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Paragraph 3 of the Second Roberts Affidavit and Exhibit A thereto are irrelevant. Roberts
inserts this into the record (without any citation in the Roberts MSJ or Roberts MSJ Memo, as
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required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)) to show that the Jensens' prior counsel
"acknowledged the existence of the ten-foot ditch easement across the [Jensen Property]." (Second
Roberts Affidavit,

,r 3). Prior counsel, Mr. Rolig, stated: "I acknowledge the existence of a 10'

ditch easement across my clients' property." (Second Roberts Affidavit, ex. A p. 1). From this, it
appears Roberts would like to draw the inference (somehow in support of the Roberts MSJ, despite
making no such argument and with no entitlement to such inferences in support of a motion for
summary judgment) that the Jensens have admitted that she has an easement across the Jensen
Property. However, even if Roberts were somehow entitled to such an inference or argued in favor
of it, the letter provides no support of basis therefor. First, the letter is incomplete, as it explicitly
includes "Enclosures" (Second Roberts Affidavit, ex. A p. 2), which are not included and could
potentially speak to the issues Roberts now tries to raise. Additionally, the use of the first person
singular "I" indicates that Mr. Rolig was expressing his opinion and not that of his clients, the
Jensens; nor is there any indication that Mr. Rolig's authority as the Jensens' agent included any
ability to make such a concession as Roberts seeks.

Further, by its terms, the statement

"acknowledge[s] the existence of a 10' ditch easement across" the Jensen Property. (Second
Roberts Affidavit, ex. A p. 1). This is not an admission that Roberts has any interest in the

easement, but acknowledges the reality that the Plat shows a 10-foot-wide easement across the
Jensen Property (and the Roberts Property and other lots shown on the Plat). The Jensens have
never contended that no such easement exists, but have argued that it is/was appurtenant to the
farm north of the Roberts Property (referred to as the "Van Beek Farm") and that Roberts has no
interest therein.
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Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Second Roberts Affidavit, together with Exhibit B thereto, are
also irrelevant and barred by Idaho Rules of Evidence 407 and/or 408. Roberts avers (or argues,
cutting a fine line between what is testimony and what is argumentative) that the Jensens intended
to “‘cut a notch’ in the ditch under their fence” to connect the culvert to the remnants of the Waste
Ditch on the Jensen Property, but that the Jensens has not done so. (Second Roberts Affidavit,
¶¶ 4-5). This was obviously part of a settlement offer. (See Second Roberts Affidavit, ex. B p. 1
(“my clients propose … [which] will sufficiently facilitate the waste water runoff; except perhaps
in the most extreme water years”)). It falls squarely within the scope of Rule 408. See Idaho Rule
of Evidence 408(a)(1)–(2). As such, it is “not admissible … to prove or disprove the validity or
amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408(a). Further, to whatever extent Roberts contends this is useful to
alleviate the situation, this is a remedial measure, protected by Rule 407. That rule provides:
“[w]hen measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a
defect in a product or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction.” Idaho Rule of Evidence
407 (bullets omitted, paragraphing altered). Thus, any relevance of the letter cited by Roberts is
protected by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. As this is all the Second Roberts Affidavit provides, and
the Court must strike it in its entirety.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because none of the Objectionable Roberts MSJ Affidavits add anything material to the

Roberts MSJ and each suffers from the above-described deficiencies, they should all be struck by
the Court.

DATED this 13 th day of August, 2018.

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
LORA ROBERTS,

Case No. CV27-2018-0098

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
JENSENS' RENEWED RULE 12(b)(7)
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, move this Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed in this
matter. This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Renewed Rule

12(b)(7) Motion

to

Dismiss for

Failure

to Join

Insidpensable

Parties,

submitted

contemporaneously herewith.

DATED this 13 th day of August 2018.
Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Electronically Filed
8/13/2018 4:34 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Sandra Peterson, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
araw lings@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
JENSENS' RENEWED RULE 12(b)(7)
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit this Memorandum in
Support of Jensens' Renewed Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable
Parties.
On April 30, 2018, the Jensens submitted Jensens' Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (the
"Prior 12 (b) Motion"), which sought dismissal of this matter pursuant to Rules 12(b)( 6) and
12(b)(7). (See Prior 12(b) Motion, p. 1). At the hearing on May 14, 2018, the Court granted
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Jensens' Motion to Continue Proceedings on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and

continued the Prior 12(b) Motion, along with all of the other pending motions. Given the progress
of discovery, the portion of Prior 12(b) Motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) has been subsumed
in Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed July 30, 2018). However, for the reasons
explained below, the Jensens reassert and renew the portion of the Prior 12(b) Motion based on
Rule 12(b)(7), because despite the J ensens' prior assertions and an intervening amendment,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Lora Roberts ("Roberts") has failed to include parties necessary to
Roberts' Third Cause of Action. For that reason, the Third Cause of Action must be dismissed.
I. INTRODUCTION

Roberts brought this case, claiming three causes of action: trespass, nmsance, and
declaratory judgment.
"Complaint")).

(See, generally, Amended Complaint (filed June 5, 2018) (the

These causes of action arise out of flooding that occurred in or about

February 2017 on property Roberts owns (described in detail in Complaint,

,r

1 and referred to

herein as the "Roberts Property") and out of the Jensens' actions filling in a ditch on their property
(which property is described in detail in Complaint,

,r 2

and referred to herein as the "Jensen

Property"). The ditch on the Jensen Property is part of a ditch that crosses the Jensen Property,
the Roberts Property, a public street, and three other lots in the Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the
full ditch is referred to herein as the "Waste Ditch"). The course of the Waste Ditch is depicted in
the plat of Sunnyside Acres subdivision. (See Complaint, ex. A).
However, the Waste Ditch runs through six properties other than the Roberts
Property. (Complaint, ex. A, p. 1). Northeast of the Roberts Property, the Waste Ditch begins

on the property north of the Roberts Property (referred to herein as the "Van Beek Farm") and
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Block 1, Lot 4 of the Sunnyside Acres Subdivision (referred to herein as "Lot 4"). Southwest of
the Roberts Property, the Waste Ditch crosses Sunnyside Drive (a public street dedicated to Jerome
County); the Jensen Property; Block 2, Lot 34 (referred to herein as "Lot 34"); and Block 2, Lot
33 (referred to herein as "Lot 33"). All of these properties are shown in the plat:
- LEGE/II) _- . ~ --:-- ·- . - --

hdfE/ybm -~
- _- PL~/ - :.; ~
ally bfq~_----· fir", JJ1ttl11;r o
~ .(afsttrt
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Eril/ief uM -- --

•.

.

(Complaint, ex. A, p. 1). Roberts' claim of right to the Waste Ditch, in her Third Cause of Action,

will affect all of these properties (and their owners): the Van Beek Farm, Lot 4, Sunnyside Drive,
the Jensen Property, Lot 34, and Lot 33. However, Roberts has only included the Jensens in this
action. The failure to include the other five property owners in this action-despite the issue being
pointed out in the Prior 12(b) Motion and Roberts' amendment of her Complaint in the
meantime-requires the dismissal of Roberts' Third Cause of Action.
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II. ARGUMENT

Under Rule 12(b)(7) a defense that must be brought by motion is the plaintiffs "failure to
join a party under Rule 19." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7). Rule 19 requires that a
"person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party in the action" under certain
circumstances. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(l). "The moving party has the burden to
demonstrate the indispensability of a party." Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments,
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008) (citation omitted). But the determination of
whether a person is an indispensable party is left to the trial court's discretion. See Utter v.
Gibbons, 137 Idaho 361,366, 48 P.3d 1250 1255 (2002) (reviewing the determination for an abuse
of discretion).
Under the relevant portion of Rule 19, a person must be added as a party if, "in that person's
absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties[.]" Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 19(a)(l). "Whether or not a party is indispensable to an action depends largely upon
the relief sought." Barlow v. Int'/ Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 896, 522 P.2d 1102, 1117 (1974)
(citation omitted). The "joinder of all parties with an interest in the subject matter of the suit is
not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit should be joined."
Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007) (citation
omitted). But, as a statutorily-authorized cause of action, declaratory judgment is strictly limited
to what is allowed by the statutes. See Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et seq. For that reason, whenever
"declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of

persons not parties to the proceeding." Idaho Code § 10-1211 (emphasis added). This statutory
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rule relating to declaratory judgments is mandatory. Paolini v. Albertson’s Inc., 143 Idaho 547,
549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006) (“The word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory” (citation
omitted)); Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) (“When used in a statute,
the word ‘may’ is permissive rather than the imperative or mandatory meaning of ‘must’ or
‘shall’”). Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
in Tomchak v. Walker, 108 Idaho 446, 700 P.2d 68 (1985), we addressed
the issue of the failure to join indispensable parties in a declaratory
judgment action. Idaho Code § 10-1211 provides, “When declaratory relief
is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.” In Tomchak,
this Court held that under § 10-1211 the failure to join an indispensable
party was an affirmative defense that must be raised in the declaratory
judgment action. This Court stated, “It is true that all property owners
of record to the road should be joined as indispensable parties.
However, defendants must raise the issue as an affirmative defense, I.R.C.P.
12(b)(7), after which the burden falls on the plaintiffs to join all ‘parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration.’
I.C. § 10-1211.” 108 Idaho at 449, 700 P.2d at 71.
Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 197–98, 108 P.3d 340, 344–45
(2005) (emphasis added).
Here, in her First Cause of Action and Second Cause of Action, Roberts seeks damages for
trespass and nuisance, respectively, against the Jensens. The Jensens readily admit that there are
no other indispensable parties as to those claims. However, in the Third Cause of Action, Roberts
seeks a declaratory judgment that the “Roberts Property is the dominant property of the [Waste
Ditch] easement” and that “[a]s the downstream owner of the property through which the platted
drainage ditch easement runs, the Jensen Property is the servient property of the [Waste Ditch]
easement” (Complaint, ¶¶ 27-28) or, in the alternative, that “the Jensen Property has a natural
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servitude or easement to the extent of the water naturally flooding off the Roberts Property and all
property situated above the Roberts Property." (Complaint, ,-r 31, see also id., ,-r 32). Roberts'
claims to the Waste Ditch-under either an easement or a natural servitude theory-will affect all
of the owners of the other properties through which the Waste Ditch passes, because, as described
below, all such owners are "parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by
[such a] declaration."

Hartman, 141 Idaho at 198, 108 P.3d at 345 (quoting Idaho Code

§ 10-1211). Just as the Hartman Court observed that it had previously required "all property
owners of record to the road" to be "joined as indispensable parties," id., here all of the property
owners of record of the ditch (an easement property right, similar in this respect to a road) must be
joined as indispensable parties. Having raised this as an affirmative defense, as supported herein,
the "burden falls on plaintiff[]" to join all of these parties. Roberts' failure to do so, despite having
opportunity, necessitates the dismissal of her Third Cause of Action. Id.
A.

The declaratory judgment sought by Roberts will affect the interest of the Van Beek
Farm and Lot 4 (and the owners of those properties) in the Waste Ditch.
Clearly, Roberts has a different theory of the case from the J ensens. While the J ensens

believe that the Waste Ditch was an easement appurtenant to the Van Beek Farm, Roberts asserts
that the Roberts Property has an interest in the Waste Ditch. When asked to "admit that the Waste
Ditch is an easement for the benefit of the farm located north of the Roberts Property," Roberts
responded: "Objection. There is no definition of the words 'the farm'." (Second Declaration of
D. Andrew Rawlings (the "Second Rawlings Deel."), ex. D, p. 15 (Response to Admission No.
10)). This despite Roberts' own description of the Van Beek Farm in similar terms. (See Second
Rawlings Deel., ex. D, p. 7 (Answer No. 12)). However, the Jensens provided a more specific
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definition to address this objection. (See Second Rawlings Decl., ex. E, pp. 2-3). With that
description, Roberts ultimately denied the request for admission and describes a cascading
easement situation:
The Crane property [which includes Lot 4] would be the servient easement
for the Van Beek property [referred to herein as the Van Beek Farm, after
the owner thereof]. The Roberts property [sic] would be the servient
easement for the Crane and the Van Beek property. The [Jensen Property]
would be the servient easement for the Roberts, Crane and Van Beek
property.
(Second Rawlings Decl., ex. F, p. 4 (Answer No. 15, relating to Request for Admission No. 10)).
While the Jensens believe that this cascading easement theory has no basis in law and no
foundation in the facts existing here, the Jensens’ Rule 12(b)(7) motion is supported by Roberts’
position, which the Jensens can accept for purposes of this argument. Roberts’ cascading easement
theory is an admission or assertion that the Van Beek Farm and Lot 4 (which, as described above,
is owned by Ken Crane, see also Affidavit of Ken Crane in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, ¶¶ 2-3 (filed April 17, 2018)) have some interest in the Waste Ditch.
That interest of the Van Beek Farm and Lot 4 in the Waste Ditch—admitted or asserted by
Roberts to exist—makes the owners of those properties “persons … who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration” sought in Roberts’ Third Cause of Action. Idaho
Code § 10-1211. Service of the owners of the Van Beek Farm and Lot 4 is feasible. In fact, Lot
4 is owned by a person who has already submitted an affidavit on Roberts’ behalf and who is
Roberts’ brother. Affidavit of Ken Crane in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 2-3; see
also Declaration of Thomas Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶
7-9). Likewise, the owner of the Van Beek Farm can be readily located through Jerome County’s
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parcel viewer system. Finally, the Court cannot accord complete relief among the existing parties
without these parties, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1), because Roberts’ claim to the Waste
Ditch will impact or affect the rights of others in the same portion of the Waste Ditch.
B.

The declaratory judgment sought by Roberts will affect the interest of Sunnyside
Drive, Lot 34, and Lot 33 (and the owners of those properties) in their own property.
In addition to the other persons who may have interests in the Waste Ditch, there are at

least three persons with interests in the allegedly servient estates that are not parties to this action.
While Roberts has chosen to enforce and have rights declared against just the Jensens, the Court
must not lose sight of everything that Roberts is actually claiming in relation to the Waste Ditch.
A ditch right is an easement. “The owner of an irrigation ditch has an easement right
in land upon which the ditch is located. See I.C. § 42–1102. The owner of the ditch is the dominant
estate holder, whereas the landowner where the ditch is located is the servient estate holder.”
Bratton v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, 536, 248 P.3d 1265, 1271 (2011) (additional citations omitted,
emphasis added); see also Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, ____, 408 P.3d 45, 49 (2017) (“a
ditch right for the conveyance of water is recognized as a property right apart from and independent
of the right to the use of the water conveyed therein. Each may be owned, held and conveyed
independently of the other” (citations omitted)). A ditch easement is, by statute, also afforded
additional secondary easement rights, meaning that, in addition to the right to convey water
through a ditch (the primary easement right), a ditchowner also has:
the right to enter the land across which the right-of-way extends, for the
purposes of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or
conduit, and to occupy such width of the land along the banks of the
ditch, canal or conduit as is necessary to properly do the work of cleaning,
maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with personnel and
with such equipment as is commonly used, or is reasonably adapted, to that
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work. The right-of-way also includes the right to deposit on the banks of
the ditch or canal the debris and other matter necessarily required to
be taken from the ditch or canal to properly clean and maintain it, but
no greater width of land along the banks of the canal or ditch than is
absolutely necessary for such deposits shall be occupied by the removed
debris or other matter.
Idaho Code § 42-1102 (emphasis added). Thus, Roberts claim to an easement not only implicates
rights to convey water (a primary easement), but will also (as part of the secondary easement)
afford Roberts rights (and duties) to enter on the servient estates; to clean, maintain, and repair the
ditch; keep space along the bank of the ditch clear of obstructions (up to 16 feet has been deemed
reasonable, see Morgan v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 156 Idaho 247, 253, 322 P.3d 980, 986 (2014)
(an easement that is “sixteen feet wide because [that is] the space needed to operate equipment” to
maintain the ditch)); and deposit debris from the canal along the banks on the property of the
servient estates. If the Waste Ditch is declared an easement in favor of Roberts, she will have
these rights with respect to all of the servient estates, who are not included in this action.
After crossing the Roberts Property, the Waste Ditch crosses (1) Sunnyside Drive (which
is dedicated to the public on the plat, and is held by Jerome County, Idaho), then (2) the Jensen
Property, before going on to (3) Lot 34 and (4) Lot 33 before crossing another public street, West
500 South, also held by Jerome County. (See Complaint, Ex. A, p. 1). Further, the Waste Ditch
goes on to other properties south of West 500 South, where the ditch terminates in a grove of trees,
but those properties are not depicted on the plat. (See Declaration of Deanna Jensen in Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 15-16 and ex. D; see also Declaration of Thomas
Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 17-18).
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Even assummg the flawed logic of Roberts' cascading easement theory, Roberts is
necessarily claiming an interest in, on, and across each of these properties. To whatever extent
Roberts has (or does not have) an easement right over the Jensen Property, the same will be true
with respect to the same easement under the same circumstances across Sunnyside Drive, Lot 34,
and Lot 33. In other words, the property interests of Jerome County and the owners of Lot 34 and
Lot 33 "would be affected by the declaration" sought by Roberts. Idaho Code § 10-1211. Service
of these persons is feasible. Jerome County is easily served. And the owners of Lot 34 and Lot 33
own these properties in the same subdivision as Roberts and the J ensens. Further, the Court cannot
accord complete relief among the existing parties without Jerome County and the owners of Lot 34
and Lot 33, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(l), because Roberts only claims a ditch easement
over the Jensen Property, she has no right (and does not claim) the ability to pool water on the
Jensen Property or flood it. (See Complaint,

,r,r

27-32). Particularly Jerome County must be

joined, because without any right to cross Sunnyside Drive, Roberts has no means of getting any
water from the Roberts Property to the Jensen Property. Unless Roberts adjudicates the entirety
of her claimed easement in the Waste Ditch, she has a conveyance to nowhere, that ends abruptly
on the Jensen Property-which overburdens even the easement Roberts claims. For these reasons,
Roberts must be required to join Jerome County and the owners of Lot 34 and Lot 33 as codefendants, at least as the Third Cause of Action in her Complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
Roberts has failed to join indispensable parties whose service is feasible by asserting alone
against the Jensens, without including other parties interested in the object of her claims in this
litigation. The properties northward along the Waste Ditch have the right to adjudicate how their
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rights to the Waste Ditch (which Roberts admits exist) interact with Roberts' claimed rights, if
any. Jerome County holds property between the Roberts Property and the Jensen Property and
without a right to cross the County's property, Roberts has no right to convey anything onto the
Jensen Property. Finally, Lot 34 and Lot 33 lie southward along the Waste Ditch from the Jensen
Property, and are necessary to adjudicate Roberts' interest in the Waste Ditch easement that also
crosses those properties. For these reasons, the Court must dismiss the Complaint's Third Cause
of Action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7).

DATED this 13 th day of August, 2018.
Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

JENSENS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO ROBERTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit Jensens' Memorandum in
Opposition to Roberts' Motion for Summary Judgment, which is supported by the Declaration of
Dr. Ryan T. Christensen (the "Christensen Deel."), submitted contemporaneously herewith, and
by the documents already on file with the Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Lora Roberts ("Roberts") brought this case, claiming three
causes of action: trespass, nuisance, and declaratory judgment.

(See, generally, Amended

Complaint (the "Complaint")). These causes of action arise out of flooding that occurred in or

about February 2017 on property Roberts owns (described in detail in Complaint, ,-r 1 and referred
to herein as the "Roberts Property") and out of the Jensens' actions filling in the portion of a ditch
on their property (which property is described in detail in Complaint, ,-r 2 and referred to herein as
the "Jensen Property"). The ditch portion on the Jensen Property is part of a ditch that crosses the
Jensen Property, the Roberts Property, a public street, and three other lots in the Sunnyside Acres
subdivision (the full ditch is referred to herein as the "Waste Ditch"). The course of the Waste
Ditch is depicted in the plat of Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the "Plat"). (See Complaint, ex. A).
Again, this case comes down to what right or interest Roberts has in the Waste Ditch.
Roberts' claims for trespass, nuisance, and declaratory judgment all ultimately come down to
whether or not Roberts has any right to the Waste Ditch, because Roberts can have no claim for
any damages or declaration if the Jensens prevented Roberts from using a ditch that she has no
right to use. Roberts has no basis for any interest in the Waste Ditch-either on the Jensen Property
or across any other property. The Roberts Property, like the Jensen Property and the other
properties, was a servient estate to the property benefitted by the Waste Ditch, the farm North of
the Roberts Property. Roberts has no basis for her claim to the Waste Ditch easement or, at the
very least, there are issues of fact regarding Roberts claims to the Waste Ditch easement.
For that reason, Roberts is not entitled to summary judgment as to her second and third
claims. Further, while Roberts claims that the flood constituted a trespass by the Jensens, the
Page2
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elements of common law trespass are not present, primarily because there is no evidence that the
Jensens caused water to enter or go onto the Roberts Property. The flood water came from sources
uphill from the Roberts Property. Because water does not flow uphill, the water could not have
gone from the Jensens or the Jensen Property onto the Roberts Property. Even accepting Roberts’
novel theory, there are issues of fact with respect to causation—whether Roberts herself is
comparatively at fault for her damages and whether there were other, intervening and/or
superseding causes of the flooding Roberts complains of. Further, Roberts has not addressed the
Jensens’ Counterclaim, affirmative defenses, or any of the elements of damages. Roberts is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and there are numerous genuine disputes of material fact.
The Roberts MSJ must be denied.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). In evaluating the facts underlying a motion for summary judgment,
the court “construes disputed facts, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record,
in favor of the non-moving party.” Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 690, 302 P.3d 26,
30 (2013). “A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
reasonably return a verdict resisting the motion.” Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 806,
229 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

However,

throughout the motion for summary judgment, “[t]he moving party bears the burden of proving
the absence of material facts . . . [relating to] the existence of an element essential to [the
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nonmoving] party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Cumis Ins.

Soc'y, Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942,945,318 P.3d 932,935 (2014) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Roberts' facts are based on "the Verified Complaint and the several Affidavits submitted
in this matter." Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 1. The Amended Complaint (filed June 5, 2018) (the

"Complaint") is an amendment to the original verified Complaint (filed January 29, 2018) (the
"Verified Complaint"), replacing it while relating back to the original filing of the Complaint.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a); see also Stipulation to Amend Complaint (filed June 5, 2018).
As such, the Verified Complaint has been replaced by the Complaint, which is not verified. Thus,
while a verified pleading may support a motion for summary judgment, Esser Elec. v. Lost River

Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 918, 188 P.3d 854, 860 (2008) (citing McCoy v. Lyons, 120
Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991)), the Complaint cannot support the Roberts MSJbecause it is not
verified.
In 1978, Donald E. and Lola Sonius, together with Agricultural Development, Inc. Pension
Plan, filed and recorded the Plat in Jerome County, Idaho. (Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings

in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("First Rawlings Deel."), ex. A and
ex. B, p. 13 and ex. C, p. 13). The 1978 Plat depicts the Waste Ditch as an already-existing ditch
passing through lots in the Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the "Subdivision"). (First Rawlings

Declaration, ex. A, p. 1). The Waste Ditch already existed because the farm directly north of the
Roberts Property (referred to as the "Van Beek Farm") used to flood irrigate, and the Waste Ditch
carried away the waste water resulting from the flood irrigation. (First Rawlings Deel., ,I 7 and
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ex E). It was necessary to have a ditch in this location because the low point of the entire area is
located where the culvert under Sunnyside Drive is now. (Affidavit of Larry Bos in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment ("Bos A(f"),

,r

4).

The ditch was necessary to drain water

southward. (Bos A.ff., ,r 4).
In 2001, Roberts purchased the Roberts Property. Her deed notes that she took the Roberts
Property "subject to [the] existing ditch [i.e., the Waste Ditch] running through property to
remain open for waste water from farm North of property," i.e., for the Van Beek Farm. (First

Rawlings Deel., ex. C, p. 1 (emphasis added)). However, Roberts did not keep the Waste Ditch
open, but "ran an arena groomer over the area" (Second Rawlings Deel., ex. D, p. 8 (Answer No.
15, relating to Request for Admission No. 1)), that "obliterated" the Waste Ditch, which was
allegedly replaced by "a depression or swale where the ditch previously existed." (Affidavit of

Ken Crane in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Crane A(f"), ,r 4; but see Declaration
ofDeanna Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Deanna Jensen
Deel."), ,r 18(a) and ex. E, p. 1 (showing pictures of the former location of the Waste Ditch on the
Roberts Property without any such depression or swale)).

The Waste Ditch was similarly

obliterated on the property above (up-ditch from) the Roberts Property and below (down-ditch
from) the Jensen Property. (See Crane A.ff., ,r 4 (stating that the Waste Ditch on his property, which
is up-ditch from the Roberts Property, has also been obliterated); see also Deanna Jensen Deel., ,r
18 and ex. F (showing the properties down-ditch from the Jensen Property)). Use of the Waste
Ditch was apparently no longer necessary because the Van Beek Farm was, by this time, now
being irrigated with sprinklers, which do not generate the same amount of waste water that needs
to be removed from the land under flood irrigation.
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By 2010, the only semblance of the former Waste Ditch that was still faintly recognizable
as such was the portion that crossed the Jensen Property. (See Deanna Jensen Deel., ,-r,-r 6 and 18;

see also Declaration of Thomas Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Thomas Jensen Deel."), ,-r 5). The Jensens purchased the Jensen Property in 2010. (Deanna
Jensen Deel., ,-r 3 and ex. A). Like their neighbors (including Roberts), the Jensens obliterated the
portion of the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property, choosing in 2013 to add soil to even it out with
the surrounding lands. (See Deanna Jensen Deel., ,-r,-r 22-23). There were no problems until years
later when Jerome County was struck with extreme weather and circumstances.
In February 2017, as Deanna Jensen explains:
the weather was very unusual. While there was still a large amount of snow
on the ground and the ground was still frozen, the temperatures raised
suddenly and, in February 2017, we experienced a heavy rain storm. These
circumstances produced large amounts of sheet flooding-where rainwater
and melting snow flow over the ground, which is still frozen (preventing
the water from soaking into the ground), leading to the accumulation of
flood waters on low points in the land.
The abnormal combination of snow, rapid warming, and heavy rain in
February 201 7, produced a flood that affected several properties in
Sunnyside Acres, including the Jensen Property and the Roberts Property.

(Deanna Jensen Deel., ,-r,-r 25-26 (paragraph numbering omitted)). The flooding in the Subdivision
affecting the Roberts Property and Jensen Property was extreme. (See Deanna Jensen Deel.,
,-r,-r 27-28 and exs. G, H). This extraordinary flooding was "unique and singular" and "could not

be entirely anticipated, guarded against, or resisted." (Deanna Jensen Deel., ,-r,-r 29-30, 39). In
fact, it triggered emergency declarations from both the State ofldaho and the Federal Government.

(See First Rawlings Deel., exs. G-K). From this extraordinary flooding event, which affected

Page 6

JENSENS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO ROBERTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 597

everyone in the neighborhood (including Roberts and the Jensens), Roberts has sued the Jensens
and now seeks summary judgment.
IV. ARGUMENT

Roberts is not entitled to summary judgment because there are many "genuine dispute[ s]
as to ... material fact[ s]" and, even if there were no such issue, Roberts cannot show that she is
"entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). In fact, the
evidence shows that the J ensens are entitled to summary judgment as to Roberts' Complaint and,
for that reason, the J ensens incorporate by specific reference all of the arguments made in the
Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed July 30, 2018) (the
"Jensen MSJ Memo"). But specifically, the Roberts MSJ cannot prevail because (A) it fails to
address the Jensens' counterclaims and affirmative defenses, meaning Roberts cannot bear her
burden of showing she is entitled to judgment; (B) Roberts cannot show the existence of an
easement interest or natural servitude across the Jensen Property or, at a minimum, there are issues
of fact as to the existence of any such interest; (C) Roberts seeks a complete-and not a partialsummary judgment, but fails to address all of the elements of her claims, meaning the Roberts MSJ
must be denied.
A. Roberts' failure to address the Jensens' Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses is fatal
to the Roberts MSJ, because Roberts has not made the requisite showing that she is
entitled to summary judgment as to the Counterclaims or Affirmative Defenses.

The Roberts MSJ Memo presents absolutely no argument with respect to J ensens'
Counterclaims and has not directly addressed any of the J ensens' affirmative defenses. Thus, the
Counterclaims cannot be dismissed. The Counterclaims seek to protect the J ensens' interest in the
Jensen Property in the event the Court somehow determines that Roberts has an interest in a Waste
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Ditch easement across the Jensen Property.

(Jens ens' Second Amended Answer and

Counterclaims ("2d Am. Answer"), Counterclaims ,r,r 10-21 (filed June 26, 2018)). If the Waste

Ditch easement remains valid and the J ensens are required to open the Waste Ditch across the
Jensen Property, then it only stands to reason that Roberts must likewise be required to open the
Waste Ditch across the Roberts Property. (See Declaration of Deanna Jensen in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Deanna Jensen Deel."),

,r 18 and ex. E (showing

the lack of a ditch across the Roberts Property)). This is primarily in the interest of ensuring that
the easement on the Jensen Property is not overburdened. The issues of fact regarding the overburdening of the Jensen Property (the servient estate) are abundant and, for this additional reason,
the Roberts MSJ must be denied with respect to the J ensens' Counterclaims.
Further, the Jensens have asserted numerous affirmative defenses applicable to the
consideration of the Roberts MSJ, specifically, the Jensens have alleged:
4. The negligence or other wrongful conduct of Roberts is equal to or greater than
the alleged wrongful conduct of the Jensens, thus barring Roberts from any
recovery against the Jensens.
5. Roberts has assumed the risk of flooding by building her home in a low point
of the Roberts Property and is not entitled to any damages therefor.
6. Roberts is not entitled to any equitable relief (e.g., an order requiring the
Jensens to restore any ditch) under the doctrine of unclean hands, because she
has filled in and/or obliterated that portion of the same ditch that is located on
the Roberts Property.
7. Roberts failed to mitigate her damages.
8. The Waste Ditch is not a natural servitude.
9. The Waste Ditch was an easement appurtenant to the farm North of the Roberts
Property and Sunnyside Acres (the "Van Beek Farm"). The Waste Ditch was
abandoned by the dominant estate, the Van Beek Farm.
a. Roberts has never acquired, either personally or appurtenant to the
Roberts Property, any interest in the Waste Ditch or any portion thereof.
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b. Roberts cannot have an easement to run water over the Jensen Property,
because she has no easement across Sunnyside Drive, a public street
lying between the Roberts Property and the Jensen Property, since there
is no express or implied easement and an easement cannot be obtained
against the State (or any subdivision thereof) by prescription.
10. The Waste Ditch also runs through the Roberts Property, but Roberts has caused
or suffered that portion of the Waste Ditch on the Roberts Property to be filled
in, thereby altering the Waste Ditch to the point of preventing effective drainage
of water through the Waste Ditch.
11. The flooding that occurred in 201 7 was so severe that the Waste Ditch, to
whatever extent the easement therefor still existed, was not adequate to
accommodate all of the water that accumulated on the Roberts Property. For
example, Roberts alleges that the 'normal' flooding of Sunnyside Drive was
"approximately four (4) inches for a lineal expanse of approximately 50 feet"
(Complaint, ,r 13), which yields a cross section area of 16.67 square feet (i.e.,
50 feet x 4 inches= 16.67 square feet). In contrast the Waste Ditch only ever
had a cross section area of 10 square feet at most (i.e., 10 feet x 1 foot= 10
square feet). The flooding events described by Roberts would simply not fit in
the Waste Ditch, meaning that flooding would have occurred no matter what.
12. The flooding and damage that occurred in 2017 was the result of an Act of God,
Act of Nature, Act of Providence, Superior Force, Irresistible Force, Force
Majeure, Vis Major, and/or Vis Divina, for which the Jensens are not liable.
13. The alleged damage caused to the Roberts Property by the flooding complained
of in her Complaint was caused by a series of events that were outside of the
J ensens' control.

(2d Am. Answer, Affirmative Defenses ,r,r 4-13).
The J ensens' affirmative defenses center around Roberts' comparative negligence and the
intervening, superseding causes of Roberts' claimed damages. (See Answer and Counterclaim, p.
3). Roberts' actions (e.g., filling in the Waste Ditch on the Roberts Property) and inactions

(e.g., not using sandbags or other means of protecting her property) create issues of fact with
respect to Roberts' comparative negligence. (Deanna Jensen Deel.,

,r,r 32-34, 39; Declaration of

Thomas Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Thomas Jensen
Deel."), ,r,r 32-34, 39). Additionally, Roberts fails to take into account that the 2017 flooding was
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umque. (Deanna Jensen Deel., ,I,I 25-26, 29-30, ex. I; Thomas Jensen Deel., ,I,I 28-30). In fact,
the 2017 flooding was of such a natural disaster of such a scale that both the State of Idaho and the
United States federal government declared it a disaster. (Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "First Rawlings Deel."), ,r,r 9-13, exs.

G, K; see also Second Declaration ofD. Andrew Rawlings (the "Second Rawlings Deel."), ,I 3 and
ex. A). For instance, Governor Otter called this event "one or our worst weather-related disasters
in recent memory." (First Rawlings Deel., ex. I p. 1). "President Trump declared that a major
disaster exists in the State of Idaho," specifically in Jerome County and other areas. (First
Rawlings Deel., ex. K p. 2; see also id., p. 6 (showing Jerome County and other areas declared

disasters by President Trump)). In fact, the Idaho proclamation declaring this a disaster has been
renewed and, as of the date of this memorandum, the disaster emergency is still in effect. What
both Governor Otter and President Trump have declared natural disasters Roberts lays solely at
the feet of the Jensens. There are genuine disputes of material fact with regard to the Jensens'
affirmative defenses, rendering summary judgment entirely inappropriate.
While the J ensens, as defendants, bear the burden of proving their counterclaims and
affirmative defenses, Roberts-as the movant seeking summary judgment-bears the burden of
addressing the scope of her motion and cannot force the Jensens to argue in a vacuum. See, e.g.,
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) ("The court must grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law" (emphasis added)); and 7(b)(l) ("A request for a court order must be made by
motion. That motion must ... (B) state with particularity the grounds for the relief sought
including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any; [and] (C) state the relief sought"
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(emphasis added)). For this reason alone, if for none of the other reasons described below, the
Roberts MSJ must be denied.
B. Roberts has absolutely no property interest in the portion of the Waste Ditch that crosses
the Jensen Property under either easement or natural servitude theories or, at a
minimum, there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding the existence of any such
interest.
This matter comes down almost entirely to a determination of what property interest, if
any, Roberts has on and across the Jensen Property. Roberts claims such an interest by either of
two alternative theories: as a natural servitude or an express easement. (Roberts MSJ Memo, pp.
4-5, 8-9). However, Roberts is not entitled to summary judgment under either theory. (See also
Jensen MSJ Memo, pp. 6-22 (argument, already incorporated herein, addressing these matters)).
1. Roberts has no easement across the Jensen Property.
Roberts bases her claim of an express easement on the dedicatory language of the Plat.
(Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 8). “At a minimum, a valid express easement must identify the land
subject to the easement and express the intent of the parties. Thus, while specific words are not
required to create an express easement, the writing must make clear the parties’ ‘intention to
establish a servitude.’” Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 218, 280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012) (citations
omitted).
Roberts bases her claimed easement on the following language: “the easements indicated
on said plat are not dedicated to the public, but the right to use said easements is hereby perpetually
reserved for public utilities and for any other use as designated thereon, and no structures other
than for such purposes are to be erected within the lines of said easements.” (First Rawlings Decl.,
ex. A, p. 1; see also Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 8 (quoting the same language from the Plat)). Roberts
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claims no utility, and so must base her easement as an "other use as designated thereon." (Roberts
MSJ Memo, p. 8). However, on the Plat, the Waste Ditch is marked as an "Existing Ditch" that

has a "10' Esmt." And "1' Bot. Waste Ditch." (First Rawlings Deel., ex. A, p. 1). While this
indicates that there is a 10-foot-wide, I-foot-deep easement associated with the Waste Ditch along
its entire course, nothing makes the Waste Ditch appurtenant to the Roberts Property or any other
property in the subdivision. The Plat does not "express the intent of the parties" to create an
easement for the Roberts Property. Machado, 153 Idaho at 218, 280 P .3d at 721. The Plat reflects
that the ditch already existed when the Plat was recorded and ran from the Van Beek Farm to the
southwest; the most reasonable inference (and thus, the inference to which the J ensens are entitled
in the context of the Roberts MSJ) is that the easement likewise already existed and was linked to
the already-extant Waste Ditch. (First Rawlings Deel., ex. A, p. 1).
Roberts attempts to recuperate this ambiguity by claiming that "[t]he intent of the plat and
the purpose of the Waste Ditch has been further clarified by the Affidavit of John Root." (Roberts
MSJ Memo, p. 8). However, John Root was the surveyor who "prepared the plat for Sunnyside

Acres in Jerome County, Idaho." (Affidavit of John Root ("Root Aff"), ,r 2). He did not execute
the Plat. (See First Rawlings Deel., ex. A (where the dedicatory language on page 1 was signed
by the owners of the property while Mr. Root signed the Surveyor's Certificate on page 2)). Thus,
his intention in drafting language does not necessarily correspond to the "intent of the parties,"
Machado, 153 Idaho at 218, 280 P.3d at 721, because he was not a party. Further, even his

asseveration does not support Roberts' position. Mr. Root uses the term "property" as a synonym
for Sunnyside Acres subdivision. (See, e.g., Root A.ff., ,r 3 ("In preparing the subdivision plat for
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Sunnyside Acres, I was required to physically be on the property…”)). As to the Waste Ditch,
Mr. Root averred:
The waste ditch easement was created for ensuring that water from any
source, including rain or melting snow, would be capable of being allowed
to pass through the property without impediment.
(Root Aff., ¶ 6 (emphasis added)). The “property” does not refer to anything but the entirety of the
Sunnyside Acres subdivision in the Root Affidavit. Thus, Mr. Root indicates that the Waste Ditch
easement was to allow water to pass through the subdivision—not to allow the accumulation of
water within the subdivision that would then be conveyed off the property. (See Root Aff.). This
does not resolve the ambiguity in Roberts’ favor, but supports the Jensens’ contention that the
Waste Ditch easement was appurtenant to the Van Beek Farm, and drained water from that farm
southward through the property of the Sunnyside Acres subdivision.
Roberts points to the Warranty Deed by which the Jensens received ownership of the
Jensen Property to tie the Jensens to the Plat. (Roberts MSJ Memo, pp. 8-9). That deed does
subject the Jensen Property to “all easements … of record.” (First Rawlings Decl., ex. B, p. 1).
The only “record” on which Roberts bases her easement claim is the Plat, which—as pointed out
above—does not support Roberts’ claim. On the other hand, Roberts’ 2001 deed notes that she
took the Roberts Property “subject to [the] existing ditch [i.e., the Waste Ditch] running through
property to remain open for waste water from farm North of property,” i.e., for the Van Beek
Farm. (First Rawlings Decl., ex. C, p. 1 (emphasis added)). This supports the Jensens’ version of
facts and negates Roberts’ claim to an easement. Further, this language also leads to the inference
that the ditch was “existing” on the Roberts Property when Roberts took possession of it. (First
Rawlings Decl., ex. C, p. 1 (“subject to [the] existing ditch running through the property…”
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(emphasis added))). Since the ditch on the Roberts Property has been “obliterated” (Crane Aff.,
¶ 4) and is no longer existing on the Roberts Property (see Deanna Jensen Decl., ex. E p. 1, ex. H
pp. 3-7), it is a reasonable inference that it was filled in (at least with Roberts’ consent) at some
point since 2001, when Roberts obtained the Roberts Property.
Further, the Roberts Property—like other properties in the subdivision—was a servient
estate crossed by the Waste Ditch. The Van Beek Farm was the dominant estate of the Waste
Ditch easement. As a matter of law, a servient estate does not acquire an interest in the
easement that crosses it. Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Hwy. Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 681, 249
P.3d 868, 874 (2011), overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,
277 P.3d 353 (2012). Likewise, a servient estate does not automatically acquire an interest in the
same easement across other servient properties.
Finally, the relief sought by Roberts exceeds the easement she claims. Beyond seeking a
declaration of the validity of the claimed easement, Roberts seeks declarations “that the dam or
dike created by the Jensens is a structure that interferes with the stated purpose of the ditch” and
“that the Jensens are required to restore the ditch to a width as shown on the Plat, and to a depth
that matches the bottom of the culvert under Sunnyside Drive.” (Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 9). The
fill placed in the ditch by the Jensens does not constitute a structure, like a garage or shed.
Additionally, the Plat specifies a one-foot-deep Waste Ditch, not a ditch “to a depth that matches
the bottom of the culvert under Sunnyside Drive.” This is broader than what the Plat grants.
Roberts’ request makes plain what is becoming obvious through the course of this litigation:
Roberts is not seeking to enforce an easement, but is working to expand whatever she thinks
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existed, regardless of the fact that no benefit was ever granted to the Roberts Property. In short,
Roberts cannot show any undisputed facts giving her an easement across the Jensen Property.
2. There is no natural servitude in favor of Roberts across the Jensen Property.
As to her theory of natural servitude, Roberts provides a partial summary of the applicable
law (omitting any discussion of how the Idaho Supreme Court has defined a natural watercourse),
and then focuses her analysis on the fact that the Roberts Property “is at a higher elevation” than
the Jensen Property, as if that was the only requirement of a natural servitude. (Roberts MSJ
Memo, pp. 4-5). This matter is further discussed in the already-incorporated Jensens MSJ Memo,
pp. 15-22. Roberts’ uncited-to expert report baldly asserts that “[a] natural drainage way exists,”
(Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Charles G. Brockway, ex. A, p. 1). However, this is a determination
of law, and Dr. Brockway’s report—like the Roberts MSJ Memo itself—provides no analysis of
this legal issue. For that reason, the conclusory statement is entitled to no weight.
The doctrine of natural servitudes does not provide any rights on the Jensen Property
because no natural servitude exists. As recently explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, a natural
servitude exists (a) between adjoining lands (b) where the lower land owner must accept the
surface water, (c) that naturally drains (d) through a natural watercourse, (e) while the upper
landowner can accumulate water, but not in unnatural concentrations that cause additional damage
to the lower land. Lemhi Cty. v. Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 411, 414 P.3d 226, 233 (2018); see also
Smith v. King Creek Grazing Ass’n, 105 Idaho 644, 647, 671 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. App. 1983)
(“an upper landowner had an easement of drainage across the land of a lower proprietor, to the
extent of water naturally flowing from the higher ground to the lower tract, but that this
servitude could not be augmented by acts of the upper landowner” (emphasis added)). Roberts
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has failed to address any of these elements of a natural servitude, instead attempting to simplify
the matter to which property is higher. But that is not the law.
The Roberts Property and the Jensen Property are not "adjoining lands" as required by

Moulton. See Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233. Adjoining means "touching at some
point or along a line; contiguous" and is synonymous with "adjacent." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 17 (5th ed. 2014 ). While the Jensen Property and the Roberts Property are both
"lands," they are not adjoining. (Deanna Jensen Deel., ,I,I 10-11 ). This is obvious from even a
cursory review of the Plat. (See First Rawlings Deel., ex. A, p. 1). Sunnyside Drive, a public road,
lies between the properties. At no point do the properties touch or border each other.
Additionally, Roberts cannot show that water naturally drains across the Jensen Property.
The Waste Ditch is, unsurprisingly, a ditch that is not a natural feature. On this both parties agree.

(See Complaint, ,r,r 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 (all referring to a "ditch"); Complaint, Prayer for Relief,

,r,r 2-3 (both referring to a "ditch"); see also Jensens' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim,
Answer

,r

8, Sixth Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim

,r,r

13, 17 (also referring to a "ditch")).

By its very character, a ditch alters the natural drainage of an area. See WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 427 (5 th ed. 2014) (providing, in the only definition of ditch as a noun, "a
long, narrow channel dug into the earth, as a trough for drainage or irrigation"). A natural servitude
must be natural-i. e., occur without artificial intervention. As explained by the Supreme Court:
Water seeks its level and naturally flows from a higher to a lower plane;
hence the lower surface, or inferior heritage, is doomed by nature to bear a
servitude to the higher surface, or superior heritage, in this: that it must
receive the water that naturally falls on and flows from this latter.
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Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 477, 162 P.2d 393, 396–97 (1945) (emphasis added). A ditch
alters (or, alternatively, expands) any drainage that would occur between two adjoining properties.
A ditch vitiates any claim to a natural servitude and relegates the matter to ordinary easement law
(addressed above) or, at the very least, is an “unnatural concentration[]” of surface water that
impermissibly “increase[s] the damage on the lower landowner” of any extant servitude. Moulton,
163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233. Roberts’ inability to show natural drainage from the Roberts
Property onto the Jensen Property is fatal to her claim to a natural servitude, which can only exist
as to “the ‘surface’ water which naturally drains onto [the lower] land.” Id.
Further, the Waste Ditch—as it crosses the Jensen Property or elsewhere—cannot be the
natural watercourse giving rise to a natural servitude. Every case that has considered a natural
servitude in Idaho has, for more than a century, considered the existence of a natural watercourse.
See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059, 1060 (1909) (finding
Watson Slough, the watercourse at issue, to be natural); Scott v. Watkins, 63 Idaho 506, ____, 122
P.2d 220, 223 (1942); Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 105, 524 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1974)
(finding “Goose Creek” to be a natural watercourse); Loosli, 66 Idaho at 481, 162 P.2d at 398–99;
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 305, 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1991) (finding
Salmon Falls Creek was a natural watercourse because it “flowed unimpeded to the Snake River,”
and had a “channel” with “a substantial and constant flow of water in the original creek bed” even
after being dammed); Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (finding “Hartvigson Draw [the
watercourse at issue] is a natural watercourse”).

The definition of a natural watercourse,

reaffirmed in Moulton in 2018, is taken from the 1945 Loosli case, which was in turn quoting a
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jury instruction approved by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hutchinson in 1909; this long-standing
definition provides:
a stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides or
banks, and discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. The
flow of water need not be constant, but must be more than mere surface
drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes; there must be substantial
indications of the existence of a stream, which is ordinarily a moving body
of water.
Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (quoting Loosli, 66 Idaho at 481, 162 P.2d at 398, in
turn quoting Hutchinson, 16 Idaho at 488, 101 P. at 1061). Thus, for the Court to find a natural
watercourse, there must be (i) “substantial indications of the existence of a stream, which is
ordinarily a moving body of water,” (ii) flowing, not necessarily constantly, but more than “mere
surface drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes” (iii) in a “definite channel, having a bed and
sides or banks,” (iv) that “discharg[es] itself into some other stream or body of water.” Moulton,
163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (citations omitted). Roberts has not addressed any of these
points and that failure to bear her burden is fatal to her motion. (See Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 5).
Further, as explained in the Jensen MSJ Memo, pp. 18-22, (i) there are no substantial indications
of the existence of a stream (a moving body of water) within the Waste Ditch; (ii) Roberts has
made no showing of any flow through the Waste Ditch that is any more than “mere surface
drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes”; (iii) the channel has not naturally created a bed,
sides, or banks; and (iv) the Waste Ditch does not discharge into some other stream or body of
water. While Roberts’ claim of a natural servitude fails as to all of these points describing a natural
watercourse, the last point may merit further discussion.
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Perhaps in an attempt to address this last requirement—i.e., that a natural watercourse of a
natural servitude must discharge into some other stream or body of water—Larry Bos has averred
that “[t]he water [in the Waste Ditch] would ultimately drain into the Snake River Canyon.” (Bos
Aff., ¶ 4). First, this is deficient to address this point, as draining into the Snake River Canyon is
not draining into the Snake River (or some other stream or body of water). Second, the requirement
is not that water “ultimately” discharge into a stream or other body of water; such an interpolation
would reduce the requirement to meaninglessness as all water eventually ends up in another body
of water, be it the ocean, an aquifer, or otherwise. Thus, the discharge must be a direct discharge
of the stream in question into another stream or body of water. The Waste Ditch does not do so.
(Deanna Jensen Decl., ¶ 16 and ex. D; Thomas Jensen Decl., ¶ 18). And for that reason, the Waste
Ditch cannot qualify as a natural watercourse sufficient to give rise to any natural servitude.
C. The Roberts MSJ must be denied because Roberts is not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law and there are genuine disputes of material fact as to each of Roberts’ claims.
1. The First Cause of Action in Roberts’ Complaint: Trespass must be dismissed
because she cannot show all of the elements of Trespass and there are genuine
disputes of fact regarding the requisite causation.
In contrast to her prior motion for summary judgment, Roberts has now specified the basis
for her trespass claim, specifically alleging that the “Jensens have committed a trespass quare
clausum fregit because they have interfered with [Roberts’] possession of the land.” (Roberts MSJ
Memo, p. 6). Roberts also provides a list of three elements necessary to show a trespass, based on
a federal district court case, rather than any binding Idaho authority. (Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 6
(citing Mock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 F.Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Idaho 1992))). However, not only are
there genuine disputes of fact with respect to each of these three elements, it also omits any
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discussion of damages, without which no tort is actionable. Roberts provides no argument with
respect to the amount of damages she is seeking. For that reason alone, the Roberts MSJ must be
denied.
Two of the three elements actually addressed by Roberts are discussed in the alreadyincorporated Jensen MSJ Memo, pp. 22-25.

That discussion also suffices for purposes of

demonstrating additional reasons why the Roberts MSJ cannot be granted. Simply, the Jensens
did not invade or cause water to invade the Roberts Property. Roberts has admitted that the flood
water did not come from the Jensens. (Second Rawlings Decl., ex. D, p. 16 (Response to
Admission Nos. 19 and 20)). Roberts cannot show that the invasion (or entry) of the water onto
the Roberts Property was caused by the Jensens. Further, Roberts has not shown that any acts of
the Jensens interfered with Roberts’ right of exclusive possession of the Roberts Property. Finally,
the Jensens—with the benefit of every contested fact and every reasonable inference granted them
in opposition to the Roberts MSJ—will discuss the third element: whether the damages claimed
by Roberts are caused by wrongful acts of the Jensens.
First, the Jensens have committed no wrongful act. For the reasons explained above, see
Section IV.B., supra, Roberts has not made any showing of her right to use the portion of the
Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property. Roberts has no right, under either an easement theory or
a natural servitude theory, to convey water onto or across the Jensen Property. As described
elsewhere, because Roberts has no right to send water onto the Jensen Property, the Jensens could
hypothetically construct a crystalline wall around the Jensen Property to prevent anything
(including water) from entering the Jensen Property without any liability to Roberts for water that
remained on the Roberts Property. (Jensens MSJ Memo, p. 2). Because Roberts has no right to
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send water onto the Jensen Property, the Jensens' actions to prevent Roberts from doing so are not
actionable. In fact, while Roberts may have previously drained water through the Jensen Property
with the acquiescence of the property owner (the Jensens or their predecessors), once the Jensens
decided to withdraw that authorization, any attempt by Roberts to drain that water onto the Jensen
Property would constitute trespass (at least under Roberts' reasoning, and in a situation that would
be much closer to other flooding trespass cases 1)-since there would be ( 1) an invasion of water
from the Roberts Property to the Jensen Property (2) that, at least under Roberts' logic, would
constitute an interference with the Jensens' possession of their property and (3) would have been
a direct result of Roberts' wrongful actions to place water on the Jensen Property without any right
to do so. The Jensens are not liable for actions taken to preserve their property rights from Roberts'
machinations and imaginary interests in the Jensen Property or to prevent a possible trespass by
Roberts.
Second, there are genuine disputes of material fact about if the J ensens' act( s) caused
Roberts' alleged damage. For instance, the expert report prepared by Dr. Brockway indicates that
"[w ]ater would need to rise to about 3586.6 feet before flooding of structures becomes imminent,
and significant flooding would occur with water at or above 3587.0 feet." (Supplemental Affidavit
of Dr. Charles G. Brockway, ex. A, p. 4). However, in that same paragraph, Dr. Brockway

points out that the elevation of the "riding arena, house, and barn" (i.e., the areas Roberts claimed
were damaged, see Complaint,

,r 13) lie at "3585.5 to 3587.5

feet in elevation." (Supplemental

See Utter v. Gibbons, 137 Idaho 361, 48 P.3d 1250 (2002) (where upper landowners trespassed by diverting
water onto lower landowners' land without authorization); see also Bradford v. Simpson, 98 Idaho 830, 573
P.2d 149 (1978); Kirby v. Scotton, 163 Idaho 551,415 P.3d 960 (Ct. App. 2018).
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Affidavit of Dr. Charles G. Brockway, ex. A, p. 4). If "significant flooding" occurs with water at
or above 3587.0 feet, the elevation of the areas at issue is noteworthy: "3585.5 to 3587.5 feet."

(Supplemental Affidavit ofDr. Charles G. Brockway, ex. A, p. 4). How can the Jensens be liable
for flood damage when all of the area (except the top-most 0.5 feet) allegedly damaged by the
2017 flood lies at or below the elevation at which Roberts' own expert indicates that
"significant flooding would occur"-particularly in the unique circumstances caused by the
extraordinary events of February 2017? (See Christensen Deel., ex. A p. 2 ("The HEC-RES
modeling showed that even with no fill on the Jensen side, the water would have reached a state
of flooding")). In addition to implicating several of the Jensens' affirmative defenses, see Section
IV.A., supra, this absolutely undermines Roberts' attempt to show that the Jensens' actions caused
any damage to the Roberts Property.
Further, another professional engineer, Dr. Ryan T. Christensen, has pointed to some issues
with the Brockway report. (See, generally, Christensen Deel.). Specifically, Dr. Christensen notes
that the "TR-55 runoff model is not applicable" to the situation here, because of the conditions that
all parties agree existed when the flooding occurred in February 201 7. (Christensen Deel., ex. A
p. 1). Further, Dr. Brockway has no rational basis to determine the depth of fill placed on the

Jensen Property. ( Christensen Deel., ex. A p. 1). Since, "it appears that no maintenance had been
performed on the ditch for many years[ 2J

•••

the pre-fill condition of the ditch is very difficult to

determine." (Christensen Deel., ex. A p. 1). Yet, Dr. Brockway has provided no information

2

Roberts has admitted that no maintenance had been performed on the ditch for many years, as the only
maintenance she ever conducted on the Waste Ditch not located on the Roberts Property amounts just to:
"clean[ing] debris away from the north end of the culvert which is located under Sunnyside Drive." (Second
Rawlings Deel., ex. D p. 6 (Answer No. 10)).
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regarding how he determined the natural state of the Waste Ditch (which could also be useful to
sustain Roberts’ burden in establishing a natural servitude). Likewise, Dr. Brockway provides no
information on how he selected a friction coefficient, which would affect the modeling done by
the HEC-RAS software. (Christensen Decl., ex. A p. 2). Finally, a 2-dimensional analysis of
water flow would have been more appropriate that Dr. Brockway’s 1-dimensional analysis of the
Waste Ditch, and could also have addressed the flooding that occurred on other subdivision
properties. (Christensen Decl., ex. A pp. 1-2).
“Roberts does not contend that water flowed uphill to her property” (Roberts MSJ Memo,
p. 7), but somehow attempts to contort the Jensens’ rightful actions to prevent water from crossing
the Jensen Property (as to a person/property that has absolutely no interest in the Jensen Property
or the Waste Ditch) into a trespass. There is no invasion, no interference with Roberts’ possession
of her property, no showing of causation or damage, and so there is no trespass.
2. The Second Cause of Action in Roberts’ Complaint: Nuisance must be
dismissed because Roberts has no right in the Waste Ditch, meaning that the
Jensens’ actions with respect to the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property are
not actionable by Roberts.
The starting point in the nuisance analysis is the recognition that:
Generally, “every man may regulate, improve, and control his own
property, may make such erections as his own judgment, taste, or interest
may suggest, and be master of his own without dictation or interference by
his neighbors, so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in
violation of the rights of others, however much damage they may
sustain therefrom.”
McVicars v. Christensen, 156 Idaho 58, 62, 320 P.3d 948, 952 (2014), as corrected (Feb. 20, 2014)
(quoting White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 669–70, 241 P. 367, 368 (1925)) (emphasis added).
Here, Roberts bases her nuisance claim entirely on Idaho Code § 42-1207. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 22Page 23
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25). However, the Roberts MSJ Memo, pp. 7-8, multiplies this claim into (a) an alternative to
Roberts' trespass claim (i.e., that the J ensens caused "an obstruction to the free use of [the Roberts
Property]"); (b) an alternative to that alternative (i.e., interference with Roberts' use of the Waste
Ditch); and (c) a statutory claim (i.e., "the Jensens' blockage of the Waste Ditch is legally
impermissible under Idaho Code § 42-1207"), which happens to be the only form of the claim
actually pled in Roberts' Complaint. (See Complaint, ,r,r 22-25).
The Complaint alleges facts (applicable to all claims) and the "Second Cause of Action,"
subtitled "Nuisance" (Complaint, p. 4), reincorporates those facts (Complaint, ,r 22) and essentially
quotes Idaho Code§ 42-1207 (Complaint, ,r 23). Roberts then alleges that the "Jensens' placement
of fill in the [Waste Ditch] has impeded the flow of water therein which [sic] has led to the damages
claimed by Roberts" (Complaint, ,r 24), and claims that these actions constitute a private nuisance
for which Roberts is entitled to an injunction and an order "compelling the J ensens to restore the
[Waste Ditch] to its previous condition." (Complaint,

,r 25).

That is all that is in the Complaint

relating to Roberts' claim of nuisance. Even the low standard of notice pleading requires "a simple
concise and direct statement fairly apprising the defendants of claims and grounds upon which
the claims rest." Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 439, 757 P.2d 695,

702 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added); see also Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) (stating that
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim"
(emphasis added)). Simply, Roberts' Complaint has only provided notice of a nuisance claim
based on an alleged violation ofldaho Code§ 42-1207, and Roberts' efforts to tum this claim into
a multi-headed hydra, generating more claims as unmeritorious nuisance claims are threatened,
cannot be countenanced and accepted by this Court.
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For that reason, the Jensens will only address Roberts’ statutory claim. In this regard,
Roberts’ entire argument is:
Although the Jensens are permitted to change the ditch (e.g., pipe and bury
the ditch), they are not permitted to change the ditch by impeding the water
or injuring any person using the ditch. Ms. Roberts was using the ditch to
move accumulated upstream water off her property, and was then injured
when the Jensens impeded the water’s flow.
(Roberts MSJ Memo, p. 8). In actuality, a landowner may change their property in any manner not
in derogation of the rights of any other person. Thus, a servient estate may make use of the area
of their property subject to an easement, as long as such use does not interfere with the easement’s
use. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 272, 985 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1999) (“Where the grant of
an easement is general in nature, the owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the estate in any
manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use of the easement
by the owner of the dominant estate”). Idaho Code § 42-1207, cited by Roberts, protects
legitimate interests in ditches; it presumes that anyone invoking it has an actual easement interest
in the ditch. See, e.g., Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 549, 808 P.2d 1289,
1294 (1991) (“In Idaho easements for irrigation laterals are also subject to the servient estate
owner’s right to move the lateral at his own expense. Idaho Code § 42-1207 allows such a change
when it does not impede the flow of water or injure any person using the lateral ditch” (emphasis
added)).
Here, Roberts has no interest on the Jensen Property. See Section IV.B., supra. Thus,
Roberts has no right or basis to object to the Jensens’ modifications of their property. Idaho Code
§ 42-1207 does not create a new substantive right for anyone who happens to be using a ditch (at
sufferance, adversely, or otherwise), but merely protects the already existing rights of a ditchowner
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vis-à-vis the owner of the land underlying the ditch. Because that is not the situation here, Roberts
has no basis to claim nuisance, and summary judgment with respect to her Second Cause of Action
must also be denied.
3. The Third Cause of Action in Roberts’ Complaint: Declaratory Judgment
must be dismissed because Roberts has no interest in the Waste Ditch on the
Jensen Property.
The status of Roberts’ interest in the Waste Ditch lies is the crux of this entire matter. As
previously addressed, Roberts claimed bases for an interest in the Waste Ditch—by express
easement or natural servitude (Roberts MSJ Memo, pp. 4-5, 8-9)—are invalid. See Section IV.B.,
supra. The Roberts Property was (and is) nothing more than another servient estate crossed by the
Waste Ditch. A servient estate does not acquire an interest in the easement that crosses it.
Zingiber, 150 Idaho at 681, 249 P.3d at 874. Likewise, a servient estate does not acquire an interest
in the same easement across other servient properties. The Roberts Property has no express
easement over the Jensen Property and the Doctrine of Natural Servitudes cannot grant Roberts an
interest across the Jensen Property because the properties are not adjoining, a ditch is not (and
cannot be) a natural drainage, and the Waste Ditch here is not a natural watercourse. For these
reasons, Roberts is not entitled to summary judgment as to her Third Cause of Action.
V. CONCLUSION
Roberts has no interest in the Waste Ditch easement. The resolution of that key issue leads
to the conclusion of this entire matter. Roberts cannot show that the Plat provides the Roberts
Property with any interest in the Waste Ditch. Roberts cannot show that the Waste Ditch
constitutes a natural servitude. Because Roberts has no interest on the Jensen Property, she cannot
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require the Jensens to handle their property in any specific way, and her ill-conceived attempts to
do so here should be denied by this Court.
Additionally, Roberts has not addressed the J ensens' Counterclaims or Affirmative
Defenses. Roberts cannot show the elements of trespass, or show that Idaho Code § 42-1207
applies to this situation (or that such applicability sounds in nuisance), nor is Roberts entitled to
the declaratory judgment she seeks. There are numerous facts (and reasonable inferences) that
genuinely constitute material disputes-precluding summary judgment for Roberts. For all of
these reasons, there are genuine disputes of material fact with respect to Roberts' claims to the
Waste Ditch easement and, as a result, Roberts MSJ must be denied.

DATED this 13 th day of August, 2018.

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
LORA ROBERTS,

Case No. CV27-2018-0098

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

DECLARATION OF
DR. RYANT. CHRISTENSEN

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
I, Dr. Ryan T. Christensen, state that the following is made on my personal knowledge,
and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
1.

I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify to the matters contained
herein.

2.

I am a licensed Professional Engineer ("PE") in the State of Idaho, and I possess a Ph.D.
in the field of Civil and Environmental Engineering.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of letter of today's date, re:
Technical Review of 'Drainage Evaluation and Hydraulic Modeling on Sunnyside Acres
Subdivision (the "Report"), which I authored in reference to this matter.
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4.

I authored the Report, based upon my expertise and after reviewing the Supplemental
Affidavit of Dr. Charles G. Brockway (including the Drainage Evaluation and Hydraulic
Modeling on Sunnyside Acres Subdivision attached thereto), the Affidavit of Douglas J
Schwarz (including the attachments thereto), and other materials referenced in the Report
to understand the facts and circumstances relevant to the situation.

I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that
the foregoing is true and correct. Idaho Code § 9-1406; Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2. 7.

13 August 2018
Date
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7103 SOUTH 45TH WEST , IDAHO FALLS , ID 83402
OFFICE : (208) 522-1244 FAX: (208) 522-9232

August 13, 2018
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Subject: Technical Review of "Drainage Evaluation and Hydraulic Modeling on Sunnyside Acres
Subdivision"
Dear Andrew:
The purpose of this letter is to provide technical review of the report "Drainage Evaluation and Hydraulic
Modeling on Sunnyside Acres Subdivision" prepared by Brockway Engineering (Brockway). Principal
findings are summarized as bullet points with additional explanation provided in the ensuing paragraph. The
items are addressed in roughly the same order as they appear in the original report by Brockway, with some
limited out of sequence references in order to tie corroborating ideas together.
•

TR-55 runoff model is not applicable to runoff generated from snowmelt or rain on frozen ground.

Peak discharges were estimated using the NRCS TR-55 runoff model. However, the TR-55 runoff model is
not applicable to runoff generated from snowmelt or rain on frozen ground (refer to Urban Hydrology for
Small Watersheds, TR-55, Second Ed., pg. 2-11). Criteria that contributed to the 2017 flooding include:
rapidly rising temperatures, heavy rain on snow covered ground, and frozen ground that did not allow for
infiltration. In addition, the curve number of 74 that was used within the TR-55 runoff model was also not
representative of conditions during the period of the flooding. A higher curve number should have been used
to account for the impervious, frozen ground.
•

Depth of fill estimations for the Jensen property are based on limited empirical data.

The depth of fill on the Jensen property was estimated by assuming a grade between the Sunnyside Drive and
property located on the southern boundary of the Jensen property. Prior to any involvement from the
Jensens, it appears that no maintenance had been performed on the ditch for many years. As a result, the prefill condition of the ditch is very difficult to determine.
•

HEC-RAS modeling was performed using a 1-D analysis. A 2-D analysis would have been more
appropriate based on the flow conditions.

The HEC-RAS modeling was performed using a 1-D analysis. A 1-D analysis is particularly appropriate for
flows with well-defined banks and situations without excessive changes in depth or spreading of flow.
Figure 2 of the Brockway report shows the expansion and contractions in breadth that occurred through the
model reach, and Figure 3 shows the changes in depth. A 2-D analysis is better able to model the complex
flow patterns associated with these flow hydraulics.
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August 13, 2018
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•

No explanation given on the selection of friction coefficient.

It is stated within the Brockway report that a friction coefficient of 0.04 was used throughout the study reach.
However, no explanation is given as to the basis for this selection. HEC-RAS calculates losses due to
friction via Manning's n friction coefficients. Selection of an appropriate friction coefficient is a critical step·
in using the HEC-RAS software. Without supporting data, it is not possible to evaluate the suitability of the
selected n value.
•

Fill added on the other subdivision properties was only peripherally addressed.

Within the Brockway report, only cursory consideration was given to fill added on other properties within the
Sunnyside Acres subdivision. Historical aerial imagery (August 1993) shows that the original drainage ditch
traversed the full extent of the subdivision in a general northeast to southwest direction. The ditch originally
crossed the Jensen and Roberts properties along with others. More recent imagery suggests that some degree
of channel degradation, whether due to intentional filling or natural .sedimentation, has occurred on all
properties that the original ditch traverses. Recent images of the Roberts property show no trace of the
original ditch. Fill added to the Roberts property has the potential to negatively impact the routing of flood
water about the property, particularly high intensity, short duration flows. High intensity flows that exceed
the capacity of the Sunnyside Drive culvert will tend to pond at that location. Fill added within the Roberts
property decreases the ponding volume that can be retained prior to flooding occurring. In addition, the
deeper channel that previously existed on the Roberts property was more efficient for passing flow than the
current condition of the property. With no defined channel, runoff water will flow over the ground in
shallow sheets. More friction losses occur in shallow sheeting flow versus deeper flow in a defined channel.
As a result, the same magnitude of flow will reach a higher flood depth elevation if passed in a shallow
overland flow versus a well-defined channel.
•

The HEC-RAS modeling showed that even with no fill on the Jensen side, the water would have
reached a state of flooding.

The Brockway report states that the water elevation would need to reach 3586.7 feet before any flooding of
structured becomes imminent and that significant flooding would occur with water at or above 3587.0 feet.
Table 2 of the Brockway report indicates that at 15 cfs, the modeled Pre-fill water surface elevation was
3586.97. Therefore, even without fill, a flood level of 3587.0 feet is predicted by the Brockway analysis.
This concludes my analysis of the Brockway report.

Sincerely
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Gary D. Slette ISB# 3198

3
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4

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906

5

Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906

6

Telephone: (208) 933-0700

7

Facsimile: (208) 933-0701

8
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9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

10

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

11

***********
12
13

Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

14
15

vs.

16
17

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN
Husband and Wife,

18

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

LORA K. ROBERTS
RESPONSE BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO JENSENS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

19
20
21

COMES NOW the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Lora K. Roberts, by and through her

22

undersigned attorney, and submits this response brief in opposition to the Jensens' Motion for

23

Summary Judgment.

24
25

FACTS

Notably, Roberts disputes portions of the "Statement of Undisputed Facts" as asserted
26

by the Jensens. Roberts believes the court will be able to discern the facts from a reading of the
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pg_ 1

1

2
3

4

pleadings and affidavits on file in this case. The Jensens' Memorandum omits the fact that the
ditch which crosses their property was designated as a 10 foot wide Ditch Easement across the
platted subdivision. Rawlings Declaration, Exhibit "A" at p.

1. Additionally, their

5

Memorandum fails to acknowledge that " [n]o permanent structures shall be constructed on any
6
7

easements as shown and recorded." Id. at 2.

The Jensens have omitted the fact that they

8

previously acknowledged filling in the ditch, and that their prior attorney expressly informed

9

Roberts in a letter that his clients would open the ditch with a backhoe to facilitate runoff. See

10
11

Exhibit "B" to Second Supplemental Affidavit of Lora Roberts.
Ms. Roberts does not agree with any characterization that she has failed to keep the

12
waste ditch open across her property. While it is true that she ran an arena groomer over the
13
14

ditch to allow her and her horses to train in that area, she has not impaired the flow of water that

15

goes into the culvert under Sunnyside Drive. What Ms. Roberts did with the arena groomer is

16

certainly not the same as filling of the waste ditch with imported material such as the Jensens

17

have admitted. See paragraph 22 of Declaration of Deanna Jensen.

18

Contrary to their

representation in the Memorandum, what the Jensens did is very much unlike what Roberts or

19
the other neighbors have done to the portions of the ditch on their properties. See Memo in
20
21

Support of Jensens' MSJ at 4. There is no indication or evidence that Roberts or any of the

22

other neighbors have ever imported fill or added anything into the ditch as it crosses their

23

properties.

24

25

The Jensens claim that " By 20 I0, the only semblance of the former Waste Ditch that
was still faintly recognizable as such was the portion that crossed the Jensen Property." Memo

26
in Support of Jensens' MSJ at 4. That statement is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the
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pg. 2

1
2
3

ditch on the Jensens Property is plainly visible in the 2011 satellite imagery which is attached as
Exhibit " A" to Affidavit of Lora Roberts.

4
While the 2017 flooding may have been "extreme" as contended by the Jensens, it is
5

also clear that the flooding which affected the Roberts Property was exacerbated by the Jensens
6
7

when they filled in the ditch and prevented the discharge of the accumulated water.

8

Unquestionably, the events that led to the flooding, i.e., rain and snow melt, were natural

9

events, and nothing more than that.

10
11

ARGUMENT
A. Nuisance

12
In their brief, the Jensens' have suggested that they might want to construct a

13

14

"crystalline wall" around their property to preclude the intrusion of anyone or anything

15

("including water") from entering their property. They would apparently embrace the "common

16

enemy" rule which has never been applied as controlling law in Idaho. In support of their

17

contention in that regard, the Jensens' have cited this court to Mc Vicars v. Christensen, 156

18

Idaho 58, 320 P.3d 948 (2014) for the proposition that, "Generally, ' every man may regulate,

19
improve and control his own property, may make such erection as his own judgment, taste, or

20
21

interest may suggest, and be master of his own without dictation or interference by his

22

neighbors, so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in violation of the

23

rights of others, however much damage they may sustain therefrom." (Emphasis added). The

24

Mc Vicars case sited the Idaho Supreme Court case of White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 241 P.

25

367 ( 1925) as support for that proposition. In both of the referenced cases, the Court was

26
dealing with a neighbor who did not like the appearance of structures that had been erected, and
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1

2
3

which they claimed to be not aesthetically pleasing. The tor1 of private nuisance applies to the
wrongful interference with the use and enjoyment of real property, facts of which are apparent

4

as a result of the Jensens' construction of their earthen dike or levee created by the fill that they
5

placed in the ditch. Roberts has no quarrel with the idea of the Jensens building their crystalline
6

7

wall around the totality of their property, and in fact, would encourage such a structure provided

8

that water from snowmelt, rainwater and wastewater was allowed to pass through the Jensen

9

Property as had historically occurred. lf their crystalline wall fails to provide for such drainage,

10
11

the parties will most assuredly be back in front of this court making the same claims. There can
be no question but that the dike constructed by the Jensens' wrongfully interfered with the use

12
13

14

and enjoyment of the Roberts Prope11y as a result of the accumulated flood waters that were not
allowed to drain. According to the Se<.:ond Restatement of T011s, where a landowner, such as

15

the Jensens, knows that an invasion of a neighbor's property is resulting from such landowner's

16

activity, the invasion is treated as " intentional", and may represent a nuisance. The affidavit of

17

Lora Roberts clearly evidences that the Jensens' actions were intentional in this situation. In

18

paragraph 24 of Deanna Jensen's Declaration, she acknowledged that Lora Robe11s had advised

19
them not to fill in the ditch at the time they were doing their construction work. In paragraph 21

20

21

of her Declaration, Deanna Jensen acknowledged that Lora Roberts told her in the spring of

22

2017 that her barn and corrals were flooding, and that her house was going to flood. Ms.

23

Jensen's somewhat callous response was to the effect that she was sorry, but that they could do

24

nothing about it because they had no obligation to do anything about it. Stated otherwise, the

25

Jensens were aware that the water had invaded the Roberts Property as a result of their activity,

26
but they had no interest in helping their neighbor escape the effects of their construction
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1
2
3

activity.

The nuisance should be abated by an injunction enJommg the Jensens from

maintaining the blockage created by the fill which they deposited in the ditch.

4

B. Trespass
5
6
7

8

9
10

11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18

As stated in Mock v. Potlatch Corporation, 786 F.Supp. 1545 (D. Idaho 1992):
The traditional common law requirements for recovery for
trespass to land include ( l) an invasion (2) which interferes with
the right of exclusive possession of land, and (3) which is a direct
result of some act committed by the Defendant. Historically, an
invasion must constitute an interference with possession in order to
be actionable as a trespass. This requirement still persists today,
and forms the basis of the distinction between the tort of trespass
and the tort of private nuisance. The tort of trespass applies to
wrongful interference with the right of exclusive possession of real
property, while the tort of private nuisance applies to wrongful
interference with the use and enjoyment of real property.
Generally, an interference with the exclusive right of
possession involves an entry onto the land. An entry may take the
form of the defendant personally intruding on the land, causing
another to intrude upon the land, or causing some tangible thing to
intrude upon the land See Restatement (Second) of Torts § J58(a)
(1965). 76 F.Supp at 1548.

It is apparent in this case that an invasion of the Roberts Prope1ty has occurred as a
result of backwaters being forced into Ms. Roberts' barn and the crawl space of her home. It

19
also flooded her horse arena and rendered it unusable. That invasion of water unquestionably

20
21

interfered with her right of exclusive possession to her property which she holds in fee simple.

22

It is likewise unquestionable that such invasion was a direct result of the Jensens' actions in

23

placing fill material in the ditch which created a dike or levee that prevented the natural

24

passage of water. On this issue, there is no material issue of fact, because it is apparent that

25

water, as a substance, was forced to back up onto the Roberts Prope1ty, and that constituted an

26
infringement of Ms. Roberts' right of exclusive possession. In such instances, the law will
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1

2
3

4

presume damages. 786 F.Supp at 1550. The impoundment caused by the defendants did indeed
cause damages to Roberts, and in addition to monetary damages, an injunction should issue
from this court to prevent future recurrence of flooding.

5

C. Natural Servitude
6
7

The Roberts and Jensen properties are considered adjoining lands under Idaho case law.

8

In Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho 376, 304 P.2d (1956), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that

9

although the lands of the parties in that case were separated "by the county highway and also

10
11

the right of way of the Union Pacific Railroad," "[t]he parties to this action are adjoining
landowners." Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho at 377. That opinion is particularly instructive in

12
this case not only for the "adjoining land" issue now asserted by the Jensens, but also the

13
14

nuisance claim asserted by Roberts. Just as in the instant case, the defendants in Langley

15

constructed an earthen structure (a driveway) which acted as a levee that prevented water from

16

flowing down a ditch that carried both surface run-off water and waste irrigation water. Id.

17

The drain ditch ran underneath both the county highway and the UPRR railroad. Id. The

18

plaintiffs claimed that the structure was a nuisance, and testified that the structure built by the

19
defendants caused water to back up and flood their pasture lands. In finding a nuisance, and
20

21

rejecting the defendants' claim of a prescriptive easement, the trial court required the defendant

22

to "abate the nuisance by installing a 24-inch culve11 under their roadway", and assessed

23

damages in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 378-79.

24
25

The Court's interpretation of "adjoining landowners" in the Langley case clearly applies
to the fact situation in this case. Just as in Langley, the water drains across the Roberts'

26

property and underneath Sunnyside Drive before entering the Jensens' property.
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3

The Nevada Supreme Court case of Boynton v. Longley, 19 Nev. 69, 6P.437 (1885) is
admittedly an old case, but one that apparently still has relevance given its frequent citation in

4
Idaho case law. In discussing what in effect is the law of natural servitude, the Nevada Supreme
5

Court stated :
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

In a dry and arid climate, where irrigation is necessary in
order to cultivate the soil, the question as to the rights of the
proprietors of upper and lower lands in regard to the waste water
has seldom arisen, because, as a general rule, the lower land-owner
is willing to receive, dispose of, and profit by the use of all water
flowing from the upper lands of another in irrigating his own land.
It is seldom that any land-owner in this state has occasion to
complain of too much water. The cry is, usually, not for less but for
more. As to the flow of water caused by the fall of rain, the melting
of snow or natural drainage of the ground, the prevailing doctrine
is that when two tracts of land are adjacent and on is lower then the
other, the owner of the upper tract has an easement in the lower
land to the extent of the water naturally flowing from the upper
land to and upon the lower tract, and that any damage that may be
occasioned to the lower land thereby is damnum absque injuria.
Water seeks its level and naturally flows from a higher to a lower
plane: hence the lower surface, or inferior heritage, is doomed by
nature to bear a servitude to the higher surface, or superior
heritage, in this: that it must receive the water that naturally falls
on and flows from the latter. The proprietors of the lower land
cannot complain of this, for aqua currit et debet currere ut currere
solebat. But this rule-this expression of the law-only applies to
waters which flow naturally from springs, from storms of rain or
snow, or the natural moisture of the land. Wherever courts have
had occasion to discuss this question they generally declared that
the servitude of the lower land cannot be augmented or made more
burdensome by the acts or industry of man. 6p. at 438.

23
For a reasoned treatise on the issue, the court is urged to read Burnett, Surface Water

24
25
26

and Nuisance Law, A Proposed Synthesfa·: 20 Idaho L. Rev. 185 (1984). The author of that
article is none other than the Honorable Donald L. Burnett Jr., a former Idaho Court of Appeals
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1

2
3

Judge, a former Dean of the University of Idaho Law School, and a former President of the
University of Idaho. Judge Burnett's credentials are impeccable, and his scholarly writing on the

4
topic is no less impeccable. In discussing the distinction between nuisance and trespass, Judge
5

Burnett stated:
6

7

8
9

10
11

12

13
14
15

Surface water is both an ally and an enemy of land use. When
water flows regularly in defined channels, it may be diverted and
applied beneficially. But when the flow is irregular, or is not
confined to definite channels, it may impose a burden upon the use
of property. Surface water litigation usually arises when one
landowner alters a natural drainage pattern and causes flooding of
another's property. Depending upon the circumstances, the surface
water invasion may be characterized as a nuisance or as a trespass.
[N]uisance and trespass have common roots in
property law, and occasionally it is difficult to
distinguish between them. But where an invasion of
property is merely incidental to the use of adjoining
property, and does not physically interfere with
possession of the property invaded, it generally has
been classified as a nuisance rather then as a trespass.

16

17
18

19
20
21

22

Thus, were a flow of surface water is altered specifically for the
purpose of redirecting it from one' s own property to that of a
neighbor, effectively depriving the neighbor of the land flooded,
the invasion has been termed a trespass. In contrast, where flooding
is simple incidental to another purpose for altering the flow, and
the flooding diminishes the neighbor's use and enjoyment of his
prope11y rather than wholly depriving them of it, the invasion has
been termed a nuisance. 20 Idaho L. Rev at 185-86.

In discussing the " civil law" rule, Justice Burnett observed as follows:

23

24
25
26

In Loosli v. Heseman, the Supreme Court expressly
approved the "civil law" rule. The court held that an upper
landowner had an easement of drainage across the land of a lower
proprietor, to the extent of water naturally flowing from the higher
ground to the lower tract. However, this servitude could not be
augmented by acts of the upper landowner. Notably, the surface
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4
5
6

7

water at issue in Loos/; had flowed from the upper ground to the
lower tract not though an established watercourse, but through an
irregular swale. Thus, by adopting the "civil law" rule and applying
it to surface water outside a watercourse, the Supreme court
broadened the rule of noninterference earlier applied to owners of
riparian lands along watercourses. 20 Idaho L. Rev. 189.
Continuing, Judge Burnett considered the importance of the "civil law" rule in terms of
societal values, and stated the following:

8
9

10

11
12
13

14

15
16
17

However, our economic system is concerned not only with
efficiency but also with distributive justice. The "civil law" rule
embodies important societal values. The "civil law" rule is based
upon a principal expressed in the ancient maxim aqua currit et
debet curre, ut currere solebat -- Water flows and should be
allowed to flow, in its natural channel. The principle is anchored
by philosophical and pragmatic values. Philosophically, it reflects a
view that man's best interests are served by retaining nature's
system watershed serving his area, and to act accordingly. " [E)ach
successive owners takes with whatever advantages or
inconveniences natural has stamped upon his land. A standard of
reasonableness affords no such protection to watersheds, no such
predictability to land use patters. 20 Idaho L. Rev. at 193 .

In his concluding remarks about the importance of embracing the "civil law" rule in

18
Idaho, Judge Burnett stated:
19
20
21
22
23
24

But the "civil law" rule embraces values which are too
important - and too deeply rooted in decades of Idaho decisions in
surface water cases - to be wholly discarded in the pursuit of
efficiency, if a standard of reasonableness ultimately is adopted for
greater efficiency, it should retain -- so far as possible - the
principles underlining the "civil law" rule which preserve natural
fl ows and watercourses, and which minimize disruptions in land
use arrangements. Id.

25
26

Regardless of whether the Jensens' conduct in blocking the ditch across their property
is perceived by the court as a nuisance or a trespass, or both, the result is the same. This court
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2
3

should enjoin the continued maintenance of the fill in the ditch by compelling the Jensens to
remove it in order to prevent future damage to the Roberts Propetiy.

4

D. Appurtence of Easement
5
6

7
8
9

10

The Waste Ditch does not appear to have been expressly made an easement appmienant
to the Van Beek farm. The plat of Sunnyside Acres notes:
[T]he easements indicated on said plat are not dedicated to the
public, but the right to use said easements is hereby perpetually
reserved for public utilities and for any other use as designated
thereon, and no structures other than for such purposes are to be
erected within the lines of said easements.

11
Rawlings Dec. Ex "A" at I. There is no indication that the ditch easement was solely for the
12
Van Beek farm, if at all. The Jensens assert that the warranty deed by which Ms. Robe11s took
13

14

title to her property created an appmienant easement in which the Van Beek farm is the

15

dominant estate and the Roberts Property is the servient estate. Jensens' MSJ Memorandum at

16

8. However, third parties do not obtain an estate or interest in property by virtue of a grantor' s

17

reservation in a deed.

18
19
20
21
22

Appellant's said contention poses a question as to what right, if any,
did appellant (being a stranger to the conveyance) acquire under or by
virtue of the reservation referred to in said deed of April 30, 1952?
The answer to this question is found in the generally accepted rule
that no estate or interest is created in a stranger to a deed by a
reservation therein. If in a conveyance any reservation is made in the
property conveyed, the part reserved remains in the grantors therein,
and does not inure to the benefit of a stranger to the instrument.

23

Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 209- 10, 360 P.2d 403, 406 (1961).
24
25
26

Even if it were deemed possible for the Roberts' deed to have created an express
easement across the Robe11s Property for the benefit of the Van Beek farm, there is nothing on
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1

2
3

the plat to indicate that Ms. Roberts and her up-stream neighbor, Mr. Crane, do not also possess
an easement for drainage of their property across the platted property of downstream

4

landowners who would be servient owners.
5
6

E. Inclusion of Police Report in Rawlings' Second Declaration

7

The lay opinion of Deputy Spencer is not appropriate evidence to consider in this case.

8

The Jensens have attempted to cite to the police report as a professionally conducted

9

hydrological survey. In reality, Deputy Spencer was only on the premises for a limited amount

10
11

of time and his observations are not supported by any kind of scientific knowledge. The Jensens
appear to have included the police report in an attempt to cast Ms. Roberts in a negative light.

12
F. Affidavits

13

14

All of the affidavits that have been filed by Roberts in this case bear on the fact that the

15

fill the Jensens imported onto their property caused flood waters from rain and melting snow to

16

back up and flood the Roberts Property. Larry Bos attested to the fact that when his family

17

farmed the entire area of what became the Sunnyside Acres Subdivision, water would naturally

18

drain to the low point of the property where the culvert is now located under Sunnyside Drive.

19
The report attached to Dr. Brockway's Supplemental Affidavit clearly establishes that the fill
20

21

placed in the ditch on the Jensens' property acted as a dam which prevented water from

22

draining across their prope11y. Regardless of what Lora Roberts or her neighbor, Ken Crane, did

23

in terms of flattening the ditch that traverses their respective properties, water still flowed

24

across their prope11ies to the lowest point of elevation, i.e., the culvert on Sunnyside Drive.

25

Dr. Brockway was able to determine from the survey information that the lowest point on the

26

Roberts' Property was indeed the point at which the culvert crosses under Sunnyside Drive.
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G. The need to name other parties

4
In this case, there is no evidence that Ken Crane, Lora Roberts, or a landowner whose
5

property lies below the Jensen Property has ever imported fill into the ditch such as the Jensens
6

7

did. In Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho IO 1, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974), Mr. Dayley apparently

8

advanced the same arguments regarding activities of the lower land owners. In Justice

9

McQuade's dissenting opinion, he stated:

10

11

12
13

14

The respondents argue that the natural drainage course has
been abandoned because lower landowners have filled in the creek
bed. What the lower landowners do is of no concern to the city
unless the natural drainage is inhibited. The only requirement is
that the drainage be maintained. The respondents claim that the
city's drainage stagnates on their property, but there [sic-their]
remedy is against lower obstructing landowners, not the city. 524
P. 2d at 1077.

15
In this case, the Jensens have had ample opportunity to file third-pa11y claims against
16
17

18

any downstream owner who they felt had impeded the flow of water in the ditch. While the
topography of the area may be minimally sloped, that cannot lead to the conclusion that a

19

downstream owner has ever imported fill material into the ditch. The injury to Roberts in this

20

case was caused by none other than Jensens. If the Jensens had excavated the ditch in May of

21
22

2017 as their former attorney agreed they would do, this needless expenditure of time and
money could have been avoided. The Jensens have no basis in fact or law to seek a summary

23
judgment in their favor in this case. The facts which are truly undisputed show that it was their
24

25

conduct in filling the ditch that has created the nuisance, and which also resulted in a trespass.

26

LORA K. ROBERTS RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO JENSENS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 637

pg 12

1

2
3

4

CONCLUSION

Roberts requests that this court deny the Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment.

5
6

DATED this _l1_ day of August, 2018.

7

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

8

~

9

10
11

12
13

14
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

16
17

The undersigned cettifies that on the

3

1

day of August 2018, he caused a true and

18

correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following

19

manner:

20
21
22
23

Robert L. HatTis
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLL
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

[X]

Hand Deliver
U.S.Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission
Efile - iCourt
rharris

24

nlcgal.com
Iden legal.com

25
26
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Electronically Filed
8/13/2018 4:48 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Shelly Creek, Deputy Clerk

1
2
3

4

Gary D. Slette ISB# 3198

gslelle@rsidaholaw.com
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

5

P.O. Box 1906

6

Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906

7

Telephone: (208) 933-0700

8

Facsimile: (208) 933-070 I
H:\GDS\Roberls. Lora\v. Jensens\1110/ion to slrike

9

10

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

11

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

12

**** *******

13
14

Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA K. ROBERTS , an individual,

15

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

16

MOTION TO STRIKE

vs.
17
18
19

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN
Husband and Wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

20
21
22

23

COMES NOW the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, by and through her counsel of record, and

24

moves this court for an order striking those portions of Paragraphs 7(a) and (b) of the Declaration

25

of D. Anderson Rawlings that purport to establish a basis for him to form a conclusion about past

26

or present irrigation practices on the Van Beek Farm located north of the Sunnyside Acres

Page JI

MOTION TO STRIKE

Page 639

1

2

Subdivision. In accordance with Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, "affidavit[s] used to support or

3

oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that

4

would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on

5

the matters stated." IRCP 56(c)(4).
6

The Jensens claim that the Van Beek farm was previously flood irrigated and is now

7

8

irrigated with a pivot. Jensen Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at pg. 3.

9

They support these asse11ions with the Declaration of their attorney, D. Andrew Rawlings.

10
11

Mr. Rawlings has not established that he has personal knowledge of the current irrigation
practices on the Van Beek farm, and he certainly does not have personal knowledge of the

12

irrigation of the Van Beek farm dating back to the early l 990's. Because he is not sufficiently
13

14
15
16

17
18

knowledgeable regarding the prope11y in question, he is not competent to testify on the matters
stated.
Because Mr. Rawlings has not shown that he is competent to testify to the past or present
irrigation practices on the Van Beek property, those portions of Paragraph 7(a) and (b) of the
Rawlings Declaration related thereto should be stricken from the record, and any arguments citing

19

the stricken testimony should be ignored.
20
21
22

Oral argument is requested.
DATED this _l_3_ day of August, 2018.

23

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
24
25
26

Ga~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3

4

The undersigned certifies that on the
5
6

I 3 day of August 2018, he caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following
manner:

7
8
9

10

Robe1t L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

11

Hand Deliver
U.S . Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission
Efile - iCourt
rharris@ho ldenlegal.com
ar wlings@holdenlegal.com

12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22

23
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25
26
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Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Karen Wood, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
araw lings@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF JENSENS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit this Reply Memorandum
in Support of Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the sake of clarity and brevity, all of
the capitalized terms used herein will have the same meanings as defined in the Memorandum in
Support ofJensens 'Motion for Summary Judgment (filed July 30, 2018).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Waste Ditch is central to this case. Roberts has no interest, under any of the theories
she has posed, in that portion of the Waste Ditch that crosses the Jensen Property. There is no
Page 1
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easement. There is no natural servitude. In short, Roberts has no right to convey water across the
Jensen Property or to put water on the Jensen Property. Roberts has no right to dictate (or ask the
Court to direct) how the Jensens use or shape their land. Roberts cannot show trespass, because
there was no invasion of the Roberts Property caused by the Jensens. Roberts cannot show
nuisance per Idaho Code § 42-1207-the only pleaded basis for her nuisance claim-because she
has no interest in the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property that could be protected by Idaho Code
§ 42-1207.
Lora K. Roberts Response Brief in Opposition to Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment

(filed August 13, 2018) (the "Roberts Response") attacks part of the J ensens' arguments, asserts
issues that don't matter, and relies on the emphasis of stating that things are "clear" or
''unquestionable"-rather than actually supporting Roberts' claims.

It is for the reason that

Roberts relies on these inconsequential points instead of making her claims, that the Jensens'
Motion for Summary Judgment (filed July 30, 2018) (the "Jensen MSJ'') must be granted. As a

matter of law, the Jensens are entitled to judgment as to all of Roberts' claims, and so summary
judgment must be entered in their behalf and the Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
II. MATERIAL FACTS

The Roberts Response contains a description of facts that Roberts believes relevant to the
Jensen MSJ. (See Roberts Response, pp. 1-3). However, these facts are not material because
(1) Roberts has failed to oppose all of the fatal arguments posed by the Jensens, as described below,

and (2) the facts presented by Roberts do not have any bearing on the arguments posed in support
of the Jensen MSJ.
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In summary, Roberts notes that the Plat "designated" (a carefully chosen, but correct word)
a ditch easement across the Subdivision and that, per the Plat, "[n Jo permanent structures [are
allowed to] be constructed on any easements as shown and recorded." (Roberts Response, p. 2).
Roberts also emphasizes the fact that the Jensens filled in a portion of the Waste Ditch on the
Jensen Property and how that stands in contrast to Roberts' own obliteration (to borrow a word
from Roberts herself, see Affidavit of Lora Roberts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,

,r 3 (filed April 11, 2018) (the "Roberts Affidavit"), and her brother, Ken Crane, see Crane A.ff., ,r
4) of the Waste Ditch on the Roberts Property or other properties. (Roberts Response, p. 2; see

also id., p. 12). Next, Roberts appears to take issue with the description of the Waste Ditch on the
Jensen Property as being "faintly recognizable," by appealing to Exhibit A to the Roberts

Affidavit-a photographic image that is so poorly reproduced as to be unusable and could have
been manipulated through reproduction by use of altered contrast, sharpness, and other features.

(See Roberts Response, pp. 2-3). Finally, Roberts points out that the flooding and the events
leading up to the flooding "were natural events, and nothing more than that." (Roberts Response,
p. 3).
However, none of these facts are at all material to the Jensen MSJ. The dedicatory language
on the plat (and the prohibition on permanent structures within easements) does not provide
Roberts with any interest in the easement. Any differences between filling in a ditch and plowing
it under just do not matter-if Roberts has no interest in the portion of the Waste Ditch on the
Jensen Property (and she does not), then she has no ability, despite her most fervent wishes
otherwise, to dictate how the J ensens use the Jensen Property and whether they fill in the ditch.
Whether the Waste Ditch was faintly recognizable or otherwise in 2010, likewise has no bearing
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on Roberts' interest in the Waste Ditch. Finally, it is difficult to make heads or tails of what
Roberts intends by asserting that the events surrounding the 2017 flooding "were natural events,
and nothing more than that" (Roberts Response, p. 3); but given Roberts' previous unwillingness
to accept the legal doctrine of what constitutes an Act of God, it may be Roberts' attempt to address
that particular affirmative defense. But even this is insufficient, as explained below. See Section
III.C., infra. In sum, the material facts presented by the Jensens are not actually contested by
Roberts. Robert presents some additional facts to bring the discussion back to her themes and to
muddy the issues. The Court must cut through this attempt-and whatever unwritten associated
arguments will undoubtedly join Roberts' contentions at oral argument of this motion-and
conclude that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that the J ensens are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
III. ARGUMENT

The Roberts Response ventures far afield from addressing the Jensen MSJ. In fact, the
three points addressed on pages 11-12 have no bearing to the Jensen MSJ. Roberts addresses
whether the "lay opinion of Deputy Spencer" is appropriate evidence; makes a general defense of
the affidavits she has submitted; and briefly addresses the need to name other parties (with the
only citation to authority being to a dissenting opinion). (See Roberts Response, pp. 11-12).
Despite their extraneous nature, Jensens feel the need to briefly address these points in the interest
of being thorough.
Roberts' challenge to the police report (see Second Rawlings Deel., ex. B) goes to the
weight of evidence (an inappropriate topic for summary judgment), mischaracterizes the Jensens'
use of the report, and is not the subject of a motion to strike (that Roberts could have filed, and
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which she did file as to another declaration). Roberts calls the police report an "attempt[] to cite
to the police report as a professionally conducted hydrological survey" (Roberts Response, p. 11 ),
when it was used to support statements of lay witness Larry Bos submitted by Roberts with the
observations of "a third party unfamiliar with the area" (Jensen MSJ Memo, p. 21 ). She also claims
that it is "an attempt to cast [her] in a negative light" (Roberts Response, p. 11), which it cannot
be, since it is solely used for the purpose described above and even the report itself only portrays
the parties as being in a quarrel (which they obviously are).
Roberts' vouching for all of the affidavits she has submitted is nothing more than an oddlyplaced restatement of her assertions, even in the face of contravening facts.

Several of the

affidavits are subject to the Jensens' Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed August 13, 2018)
and more discussion of their merits can be expected in opposition and reply to that motion.
Likewise, Roberts' discussion of the need to name additional parties is the subject of the Jensens'
Renewed Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties (filed August

13, 2018) and, again, more discussion of that issue can be expected in opposition and reply to that
motion.
Ultimately, in their original Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed July 30, 2018) (the "Jensen MSJ Memo"), the Jensens posited three reasons why

dismissal of Roberts Complaint is appropriate. (See Jensen MSJ Memo, pp. 5). Specifically, (A)
Roberts has no interest in any portion of the Waste Ditch located on the Jensen Property; (B) there
are no "genuine dispute[ s] of material fact" as to any of Roberts claims against the J ensens, who
are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)); and (C) as a
matter of law, all of the damages claimed by Roberts were the result of an Act of God (also known
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as an Act of Nature, Act of Providence, Superior Force, Irresistible Force, Force Majeure, Vis
Major, and/or Vis Divina) for which the Jensens cannot be held liable. Roberts “may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of that party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 54, 383 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2016)
(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)).
She has not done so. The Roberts Response did not bear Roberts’ burden of addressing each of
these three points; although, we anticipate that Roberts will likely present new and additional
arguments at the hearing on the Jensen MSJ, which will deprive the Jensens of the ability to reply
thereto. Nevertheless, it is Roberts’ failure to bear her burden and show that there are triable issues
on the three points raised by the Jensens that requires the Court to grant the Jensens summary
judgment and dismiss the Complaint.
A.

Roberts has absolutely no property interest in the portion of the Waste Ditch that
crosses the Jensen Property under either easement or natural servitude theories.
Roberts spends time undermining the Jensens’ contention that the Waste Ditch easement

was appurtenant to the Van Beek Farm. (Roberts Response, pp. 10-11). The Jensens agree that
“third parties do not obtain an estate or interest in property by virtue of a grantor’s reservation in
a deed.” (Roberts Response, p. 10). However, the Jensens’ have not contended that Roberts’ deed
granted anything to the Van Beek Farm; the Jensens have asserted that the Waste Ditch easement
that was recognized on the Plat was an already-existing easement appurtenant to the Van Beek
Farm. (Jensen MSJ Memo, pp. 7-8). That conclusion is merely “supported by the language of the
deed by which Roberts took possession of the Roberts Property.” (Jensen MSJ Memo, p. 8). In
the end, in this case, there is no burden on the Jensens to establish who the Waste Ditch easement
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belongs to (although the facts do seem to indicate that the Waste Ditch was appurtenant to the Van
Beek Farm and was both depicted on the Plat as required by statute and referenced in Roberts’
deed). It is sufficient for the Jensen MSJ that the Waste Ditch easement is not appurtenant to the
Roberts Property. And on that point, Roberts submits no argument. Throughout all of her
response, Roberts does not submit any basis by which she has an interest in the Waste Ditch. (See,
generally, Roberts Response). For that reason, the Jensens are entitled to summary judgment as
to the easement issue.
As to the natural servitude theory, Roberts has written much but said little. The Jensens
have squarely placed three of the five elements of a natural servitude at issue, specifically whether
Roberts can show that the natural servitude she claims across the Jensen Property “exists
(a) between adjoining lands … (c) [as to surface water] that naturally drains (d) through a natural
watercourse.”

(Jensen MSJ Memo, p. 16; see also id., pp. 16-22 (developing these three

arguments)). In response, Roberts has addressed one, the adjoining issue, but has not addressed
the other two issues. That alone is fatal to Roberts’ claims, as it is her burden to support her factual
position where she will bear the burden of proof. See Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). In
other words, because Roberts has not made any showing that there is a “genuine dispute of material
fact” with regard to whether water “naturally drains” across the Jensen Property through a “natural
watercourse,” the Jensens are entitled to “judgment as a matter of law” regardless of whether the
properties are “adjoining lands.” Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).
However, even what the Roberts Response does argue is not sufficient. Roberts cites the
Langley case to show that properties separated by a county highway and a railroad right-of-way
are adjacent. (Roberts Response, p. 6 (citing and discussing Langley v. Deschazer, 78 Idaho 376,
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304 P.2d 1104 (1956))). However, while the Langley case does state what Roberts quotes, such
statements are taken entirely out of context. The “principal question involved [in Langley was]
whether or not defendants have acquired a prescriptive right to maintain their roadway, levee and
dike in its present condition, and thereby to flood plaintiffs’ land.” Langley, 78 Idaho at 378, 304
P.2d at 1105. The case actually assumes—and the parties appear not to have contested—that the
properties are “adjoining” (despite the later-described interest between them) and that “there is a
natural drain that runs from” plaintiffs’ property onto defendants’ property. Id. at 377-78, 304
P.2d at 1104-05. The circumstances are not explained. See id. The county road and the railroad
right-of way could have been mere easements across property; especially as it is common for older
county roads to be acquired by prescription and for railroads in Idaho to have been granted in the
second wave of railroad development, which gave railroads easements, rather than fee simple title.
If the road and railroad were in fact easements, the parties’ properties would have been adjoining
and yet separated—just as described by the Court. Id. at 377, 304 P.2d at 1104-05. Regardless of
the actual facts, the parties did not dispute that conclusion, so the Court did not determine anything
precedent-setting, but accepted the facts and conclusions the parties agreed to.
The uncontested assumption that “a natural drain” exists is also significant. That means
that the plaintiffs in Langley had some right across defendants’ land. That right was not
contested by the defendants, who instead countered that they had their own prescriptive right that
impinged the plaintiffs’ right, allowing them to flood the plaintiffs’ land. See id. at 378, 304 P.2d
at 1105. This was easily dismissed by both the trial court and the Idaho Supreme Court, since only
three years had passed from the time defendants’ claimed prescriptive ‘right to flood’ first accrued.
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Id. at 379, 304 P.2d at 1105. Thus, the Langley Court spent most of its short analysis focused on
the issue of the measure of damages. Id. at 379-80, 304 P.2d at 1105-06.
Here, the existence of a natural servitude is contested, while it was assumed in Langley.
Roberts is attempting to enforce rights that do not exist and for which she provides no basis.
Further, in Langley, the “adjoining” nature of the properties was not at issue, but it is here. While
the case is silent as to specifics, it could be that the road and railroad right-of-way at issue there
were mere easements that would have no effect on the contiguity of the underlying estates (which
would very deftly explain how the Court characterized them as “adjoining landowners” while in
the very next sentence explaining how the “lands … are separated” from each other). Again,
Roberts’ assumption of rights without establishing their existence is erroneous.
Roberts also cites and quotes a 133-year-old case from Nevada, without providing any
argument showing its relevance. (See Roberts Response, p. 7 (quoting Boynton v. Longley, 19
Nev. 69, ____, 6 P. 437, 438 (1885))). The Boynton case was primarily about the “enlargement of
use” of a water right. See, e.g., McGlochlin v. Coffin, 61 Idaho 440, 103 P.2d 703, 705 (1940)
(“There is here no question of enlargement of use, and therefore the Boynton v. Longley case is not
in point”). But Roberts quotes a lengthy discussion of water policy in an arid state, like Idaho, in
the context of the Doctrine of Natural Servitudes. (Roberts Response, p. 7). It is indeed an unusual
situation Roberts and the Jensens are in, as the “cry is, usually, not for less but for more” water.
Boynton, 19 Nev. at ____, 6 P. at 438. But such reversals from the norm are common in the case
of natural disasters that constitute legal Acts of God (as was the event here, see Section III.C.,
infra), especially in the event of flooding. In any event, the Boynton exposition is largely still an
accurate description of the law. And it supports the Jensens, particularly where it notes that “the
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servitude of the lower land cannot be augmented or made more burdensome by the acts or industry
of man.” Boynton, 19 Nev. at ____, 6 P. at 438. A man-made ditch (as the Waste Ditch was) is
much more burdensome to a servient estate than a natural watercourse. This goes back to the other
elements of a natural servitude—that are not addressed by Roberts—of whether the surface water
naturally drains through a natural watercourse. See Lemhi Cty. v. Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 411,
414 P.3d 226, 233 (2018). The Waste Ditch was not natural. It was created by the “acts or industry
of man,” and therefore cannot be the basis of a natural servitude.
Finally, Roberts quotes extensively from the admittedly laud-worthy judge, dean, and
lawyer Don Burnett. (Roberts Response, pp. 7-9). Without argument from Roberts after the
lengthy block quotes from Judge Burnett, it is difficult to reply to the statements of law and
descriptions of policy, but there are some points relevant to the non-existence of Roberts’ claimed
natural servitude. The Jensens particularly point to the “ancient maxim aqua currit et debet curre,
ut currere solebat – Water flows and should be allowed to flow, in its natural channel.” (Roberts
Response, p. 9 (quoting Donald L. Burnett, Jr., Surface Water and Nuisance Law, A Proposed
Synthesis, 20 Idaho L. Rev. 185, 193 (1984) (emphasis added))). Roberts has failed to show any
dispute of fact as to whether the Waste Ditch could be a natural watercourse and cannot make such
a showing because a man-made ditch is not a natural watercourse (or a natural channel in Judge
Burnett’s terminology).
There is no dispute about whether there is a natural servitude across the Jensen Property.
In fact, if Roberts’ extreme position were adopted, no landowner could modify their land, because
there is some area uphill from almost every property, and without the satisfaction of all of the
previously-described elements of a natural servitude, no landowner could know if any of their
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neighbors have an interest in any particular area of land. This radical position must be rejected
and the Jensens granted summary judgment as to the natural servitude issue.
B.

Roberts’ three claims in her Complaint must each be dismissed because they present
no genuine disputes of material fact and the Jensens are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
The resolution of the key issue in this litigation (the absence of any interest of Roberts in

the Waste Ditch) still simplifies the consideration of the remaining issues. Each of Roberts’ three
claims are addressed separately below.
1.

Roberts’ allegation of trespass is flawed as a matter of law and the Jensens
are entitled to summary judgment.

In opposing the Jensen MSJ as to her trespass claim, Roberts repeats that “[i]t is apparent”
and “unquestionable” that the Jensens invaded her property and deprived her of the possession
thereof. (Robert Response, p. 5). The Jensens have explicitly conceded that “there are genuine
disputes of material fact with regard to the third element—whether the damages claimed by
Roberts are caused by acts of the Jensens.” (Jensen MSJ Memo, p. 23). However, Roberts asserts
this point, asserting that “an invasion … occurred as a result of …” and “such invasion was a direct
result of the Jensens’ actions.” (Roberts Response, p. 5). Roberts has not addressed the Jensens
arguments that “Roberts cannot show an invasion of the Roberts Property” (Jensen MSJ Memo,
p. 23) or that “the invasion (or entry) of the water onto the Roberts Property was caused by the
Jensens” (Jensen MSJ Memo, p. 25). Roberts instead asserts conclusory allegations that are
purportedly “apparent” and “unquestionable.” (Roberts Response, p. 5). These are insufficient.
Path to Health, 161 Idaho at 54, 383 P.3d at 1224 (a party opposing summary judgment “may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is
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a genuine issue for trial” (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c))). Roberts has admitted that the floodwater did not come from the Jensens
or the Jensen Property. (Second Rawlings Decl., ex. D, p. 16 (Response to Admission Nos. 19 and
20)). Nor has Roberts provided any support for her novel theory that the Jensens’ alleged
prevention of water from leaving the Roberts Property constitutes an invasion or entry or that such
was caused by the Jensens. In fact, even the Langley case (first cited by Roberts) did not include
a count for trespass. Langley, 78 Idaho at 377, 304 P.2d at 1104 (“This is an action to have a
private driveway declared a private nuisance”).
Because Roberts cannot show the basic elements of any cause of action for trespass, the
Jensens are entitled to summary judgment as to Roberts’ first cause of action.
2.

There is no legal basis for Roberts’ allegation of nuisance and the Jensens
are entitled to summary judgment.

In stating her opposition to the Jensen MSJ as to her nuisance claim, Roberts provides only
two citations—those provided in the first paragraph of the Jensen MSJ Memo. (See Roberts
Response, pp. 3-5). Instead, Roberts again resorts to asserting that it is “apparent,” “[t]here can be
no question,” and “clearly” she should prevail. (Roberts Response, p. 4). Roberts does not even
provide a citation to the “Second Restatement of Torts” that may provide the crux of her argument.
(Roberts Response, p. 4). Further, despite the fact that with the Jensen MSJ, the Jensens pointed
out that “Roberts has failed to even address the elements of nuisance, and the Jensens [have refused
to] do so on Roberts’ behalf” (Jensen MSJ Memo, p. 27), Roberts has still not made any effort to
address any of the elements of nuisance other than intent. These failures to address a motion for
summary judgment with legal authority are fatal to Roberts’ claims.
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But even more problematic is the fact that Roberts’ arguments completely miss the issue.
Roberts focuses on the question of intent, in an apparent bid to crescendo to the assertions of “Ms.
Jensen’s somewhat callous response” and how the Jensens “has no interest in helping their
neighbor.” (Roberts Response, p. 4). While the Jensens categorically deny these statements, they
are not relevant to the Jensen MSJ. Again, Roberts’ claim for nuisance is solely based on Idaho
Code § 42-1207. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 22-25). Roberts has not addressed that statute at all. Again,
this statute protects legitimate interests in ditches; it presumes that anyone invoking it has an actual
easement interest in the ditch and because Roberts has no interest in the Waste Ditch easement,
she cannot invoke Idaho Code § 42-1207. There can be no nuisance because Roberts has no
interest in an easement on the Jensen Property. See Section III.A., supra. Accordingly, there are
no genuine disputes of material fact and the Jensens are entitled to summary judgment as to
Roberts’ second cause of action.
3.

Roberts is not entitled to the declaratory judgment she seeks and that claim
must also be dismissed.

As previously addressed, Roberts has no basis to claim any interest—by easement or
natural servitude—in the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property. See Section III.A., supra. The
Roberts Property was (and is) nothing more than another servient estate crossed by the Waste
Ditch. A servient estate does not acquire an interest in the easement that crosses it. Zingiber Inv.,
LLC v. Hagerman Hwy. Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 681, 249 P.3d 868, 874 (2011), overruled on other
grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). Likewise, a servient
estate does not automatically acquire an interest in the same easement across other servient
properties. The Roberts Property has no easement—express, implied, or prescriptive—over the
Jensen Property and the Doctrine of Natural Servitudes cannot grant Roberts an interest across the
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Jensen Property because the properties are not adjoining, a ditch is not (and cannot be) a natural
drainage, and the Waste Ditch here is not a natural watercourse. For these reasons, the Jensens are
entitled to summary judgment as to Roberts' third cause of action.

C.

The Jensens cannot be liable for any damages Roberts claims to have suffered,
because all such damages are, as a matter of law, the result of an Act of God.
Idaho has a legal doctrine called an Act of God, which cuts off liability for "those events

and accidents [including a flood] which proceed from natural causes and cannot be anticipated or
guarded against or resisted." Harper v. Johannesen, 84 Idaho 278,286, 371 P.2d 842, 846 (1962);

see also Rice v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 33 Idaho 565, _ _, 198 P. 161, 164 (1921); see also
Curtis v. Dewey, 93 Idaho 847, 849, 475 P.2d 808, 810 (1970); Willson v. Boise City, 20 Idaho
133, _ _ , 117 P. 115, 118 (1911). Despite being provided with Harper's definition of "Act of
God" specifically in association with a request for admission (Second Rawlings Deel., ex. C, p. 11,
fn. 1) and now through the Jensen MSJ (see Jensen MSJ Memo, pp. 30-34), Roberts has never
actually addressed this affirmative defense raised by the Jensens. (See Jensens' Second Amended

Answer and Counterclaims, p. 7 (Affirmative Defenses,

,r 12) 1).

The Jensens, like Idaho courts,

ascribe no religious meaning to this term, but Roberts still remains unable to de-couple the stated
definition from the religious implication of the term itself.
The only portion of the Roberts Response that may possibly be pertinent to addressing this
issue is in Roberts' description of the facts:

That affirmative defense asserts:

l 2.

The flooding and damage tmt occurml in _01 7 was the result of an Ad of God, Act of

Natul'e Ad of Provideooc Superior Foroe hcsistible FOfCC .F or~·Majmre Vu Maj or
and/or V-u Dillma for which the Jemcos 3!fe not liable.
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While the 2017 flooding may have been “extreme” as contended by the
Jensens, it is also clear that the flooding which affected the Roberts Property
was exacerbated by the Jensens when they filled in the ditch and prevented
the discharge of the accumulated water. Unquestionably, the events that led
to the flooding, i.e., rain and snow melt, were natural events, and nothing
more than that.
(Roberts Response, p. 3). However, this is insufficient. The 2017 flooding was extreme—it seems
unlikely that Governor Otter and President Trump would have signed disaster declarations
otherwise (which, in Idaho, continue to be renewed every month, now being 18 months later).
There is no provision in the Act of God doctrine for a contributory negligence issue; meaning, that
in any event, if the flooding was an Act of God, that is (essentially) a superseding cause that
absolves the Jensens of any liability to Roberts, regardless of whether their acts “exacerbated” the
matter or not. Further, “the events that led to the flooding … were natural events.” (Roberts
Response, p. 3). That is all that is required in this case—despite Roberts’ misunderstanding, no
deity is required for the legal doctrine of an Act of God to apply. See Harper, 84 Idaho at 286,
371 P.2d at 846 (an Act of God is event or accident that “proceed[ed] from natural causes and
cannot be anticipated or guarded against or resisted” (emphasis added)).
What has been declared an extraordinary disaster by the Governor of the State of Idaho
(and is still an ongoing disaster) and the President of the United States is an Act of God. In other
words, the flooding in February 2017 was an Act of God, which—regardless of the Court
determination of the other points of the Jensen MSJ—provides an absolute defense to all of
Roberts’ claims for damages. The Jensens have borne their burden in showing the application of
this particular affirmative defense. Roberts has chosen not to address and not to oppose it. Thus,
the Jensens are entitled to summary judgment and Roberts’ Complaint must be dismissed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Roberts' property rights end at the border of the Roberts Property. She has no interest in
or across the Jensen Property (not to mention having no interest as against the owners of the other
properties crossed by the Waste Ditch, i.e., Sunnyside Drive, Lot 33, or Lot 34). There is no
easement or natural servitude through the Jensen Property benefitting the Roberts Property. This
means that Roberts has no right to dictate how the Jensens use their property-either prospectively
or reactively. Like every other unencumbered landowner, the J ensens have the unabridged right
to use and change the Jensen Property as they see fit and to prevent Roberts from using a ditch that
she has no right to use. The J ensens' rightful actions cannot cause a trespass or nuisance against
Roberts.
Roberts has not shown (and cannot show) a no genuine dispute of material fact that could
indicate an easement interest in the Waste Ditch or that Roberts has a natural servitude across the
Jensen Property. Further, all of the damages claimed by Roberts were the result of an Act of God
(also known as an Act of Nature, Act of Providence, Superior Force, Irresistible Force, Force

Majeure, Vis Major, and/or Vis Divina) for which the Jensens cannot be held liable. For these
reasons, as a matter of law, the Jensens are entitled to judgment as to all of Roberts' claims, and
so summary judgment must be entered in their behalf and the Complaint must be dismissed in its
entirety.

DATED this 20 th day of August, 2018.

r./&Jklings, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

JENSENS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO ROBERTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit Jensens' Memorandum in

Opposition to Roberts' Motion to Strike. For the sake of clarity and brevity, all of the capitalized
terms used herein will have the same meanings as defined in the Memorandum in Support of

Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed July 30, 2018).
Roberts seeks "an order striking those portions of Paragraphs 7(a) and (b) of the

Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings [in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
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(filed April 30, 2018) (the "Rawlings Deel.")] that purport to establish a basis for him to form a
conclusion about past or present irrigation practices on the Van Beek Farm." (Motion to Strike,
p. 1 (italics added)). This strangely worded Motion to Strike is, perhaps, attempting to be targeted,
but only manages to descend into confusion. If Roberts is seeking to strike the conclusions about
irrigation practices on the Van Beek Farm, that is not what the Motion to Strike says. There,
Roberts clearly states that she is moving to strike the portions that "purport to establish a basis"
for Mr. Rawlings to form any conclusion. But should the basis be disturbed when the conclusion
is apparently being left untouched?
Context only deepens this confusion. Paragraph 7 of the Rawlings Declaration provides:
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imgan.m

(Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7). It appears that the body of Paragraph 7 itself, which introduces the images
attached in Exhibit E, is not objected to, as Roberts only asks that the Court strike certain parts of
Paragraphs 7(a) and –(b). But what parts of Paragraphs 7(a) and –(b) “purport to establish a basis
for [Mr. Rawlings] to form a conclusion about past or present irrigation practices on the Van Beek
Farm”? (Motion to Strike, p. 1). Parsing each portion of these paragraphs illustrates the ambiguity.
The first sentence of Paragraph 7(a) describes “Page 1 of Exhibit E,” its date, and the
striations (running in different directions) that are on the Van Beek Farm. (Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7(a)).
Mr. Rawlings is competent to describe an image. The second sentence states that “[t]his visual
pattern is consistent with flood irrigation, which produces significant runoff or waste water.”
(Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7(a)). Mr. Rawlings’ statement is that the striations shown on the image are
consistent with flood irrigation and that flood irrigation produces significant waste water. Again,
Mr. Rawlings is competent to testify what a visual pattern is consistent with and the effects of
flood irrigation. The third sentence provides additional support for the conclusion that the Van
Beek Farm was flood irrigated due to “the absence of any apparent pivot or other means of
irrigation in the image.” (Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7(a)). This is a far cry from making a conclusion.
These assertions describe the image and what the patterns mean. Here, Mr. Rawlings has provided
facts, based on an image, that are—of course—subject to refutation or alternative explanation.
While the conclusion is inescapable, that conclusion is made on the basis of the facts from the
Rawlings Declaration and is not itself asserted by Mr. Rawlings. (See Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7(a)).
Paragraph 7(b) is a single sentence: “Beginning with the image on Page 2 of Exhibit E,
showing the area in or about June 2003, the striations previously visible in the Van Beek Farm are
replaced with a circular pattern that is consistent with pivot irrigation.” (Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7(b)).
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This does not purport to have any knowledge of the past or present irrigation practices on the Van
Beek Farm. It again asserts what the images show. The “circular pattern” shown on pages 2, 3,
and 4 of Exhibit E (showing the area in 2003, 2006, and 2009, respectively) “is consistent with
pivot irrigation.” (Rawlings Decl., ¶ 7(b)).
Roberts contends that:
Mr. Rawlings has not established that he has personal knowledge of the
current irrigation practices on the Van Beek farm, and he certainly does not
have personal knowledge of the irrigation of the Van Beek farm dating back
to the early l 990’s. Because he is not sufficiently knowledgeable regarding
the prope11y in question, he is not competent to testify on the matters stated.
(Motion to Strike, p. 2). However, the Rawlings Declaration never asserts that Mr. Rawlings
personally knows what was occurring on the Van Beek Farm in 1993, 2003, 2006, 2009, or at any
other time. (See, generally, Rawlings Decl.). Paragraphs 7(a) and –(b) provide information about
and an interpretation of the images attached as Exhibit E. The familiar concept of circumstantial
evidence explains the purpose of the Rawlings Declaration. As the Idaho Supreme Court has
described:
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is
evidence that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence
that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or more facts from which the
fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as
to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of
proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.
(Idaho Civil Jury Instructions, 1.24.2). Again, on the basis of direct evidence (the images), the
Rawlings Declaration provides circumstantial evidence (explaining the striations and circular
patterns on the images). Thus, Mr. Rawlings does not have to have personal knowledge of the
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irrigation practices on the Van Beek Farm at any time. Mr. Rawlings has stated that he has
sufficient knowledge to explain what is on the images. Yet, even if the Court were to (somehow)
parse through the ambiguous request in Roberts' Motion to Strike, the Court could-based on its
own common sense-take judicial notice of the changing irrigation practices evident on the Van
Beek Farm (as shown in Exhibit E to the Rawlings Declaration) and that the Van Beek Farm
appears to have gone from flood irrigating in 1993 to pivot irrigating by 2003, because given the
images, that conclusion is obvious (that is, it "is not subject to reasonable dispute") and is
"generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction."

Idaho Rule of Evidence

201(b)(l). The described images (which are not challenged in the Motion to Strike) show:
Area Map - August 1993
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(Rawlings Deel., ex. E pp. 1-2). To whatever extent the Court grants the Motion to Strike, the
Jensens invite the Court to take judicial notice of the well-known realities of irrigation in Idaho,
self-evident to her resident who have prior experience or knowledge of irrigation practices, which
are that pivots sprinkle water in an even, circular pattern and flood irrigation does not evenly
distribute water, which results in the striations visible on aerial photographs. That the 1993 image
shows what appears to be flood irrigation (and has not been challenged by Roberts), while the
2003 image (and the images showing later years) shows what appears to be pivot irrigation on the
Van Beek Farm (located on the right side of the above images).
Perhaps depriving the J ensens of an adequate opportunity to respond completely in writing
to the Motion to Strike (and taking the opportunity to address any issues the Jensens may raise on
reply or at oral argument) is a reason behind the vague request to strike, but the Court should not
countenance this request, since it cannot even clearly "state the relief sought." Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 7(b)(l)(C). In any event, the Court should deny the Motion to Strike.

DATED this 20 th day of August, 2018.

D.~

rei

lings, Esq.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

8

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
9

10

*********
)
)

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual

)

11

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

)
)

12

13
14
15

Case No. CV27-18-00098

V.

)

)

)
)
)

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,

ROBERTS ' MEMORANDUM IN
REPLY TO JENSENS' OPPOSITION
TO ROBERTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

16

17
18

Defendants/
Counterclaimants.

____________ ___

)
)
)

LORA K. ROBERTS, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant herein ("Roberts") by and through her

19
attorney of record, Gary D. Slette, hereby submits this Memorandum in reply to Jensens'
20

21
22

23
24
25

Opposition to Roberts Motion for Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
It appears to Roberts that the case of Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho 376, 304P.2d1104
(1956) presents this court with a fact situation and analysis that is virtually identical to the fact

situation of the instant case. In the Langley case, the obstruction which caused water to back up

26

and upon and across the Plaintiffs' lands was a driveway. The Idaho Supreme Court determined
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1

that the "parties to this action are adjoining land owners" despite the fact that they were separated

2

from one another by both a county highway and a railroad right of way. In the instant case, there

3

is a public road between the parties' properties, but the Langley case holding makes it clear that

4

the Roberts Property and the Jensen Property are still considered to be adjoining properties. The

5

only rationale that the Jensens have ever advanced for filling in the ditch was to bring it up to the
6

elevation of the surrounding property. The very same result could just as easily have been
7

8
9

accomplished by them if they had simply installed a pipeline or culvert through the portion of the
ditch they filled, and then placed fill on top of the pipe. Alternatively, the Jensens could have

10

created a swale through their property as upstream and downstream landowners have previously

11

done by utilizing the entire ten ( 10) foot width of the easement to create a depression, the bottom

12

of which would necessarily be at the elevation of the bottom of the culvert under Sunnyside

13

Drive. Instead, they simply opted to fill the ditch with dirt so that no water could ever get through
14
15

the earthen structure they built which acts as a dam. Just as the Idaho Supreme Court has found

16

that roadways and cart paths are structures, so too is an earthen dam, because it is "something

17

that is constructed or built" . See Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157

18

Idaho 600, 338 P.3d 1204 (2014). The construction of such a structure within the confines of the

19

platted easement was expressly prohibited by the language on both pages 1 and 2 of the plat of

20

Sunnyside Acres. See pages 00 I and 002 of Exhibit "A" to Rawlings Declaration.
21
22

Idaho Code § 52-10 I defines a nuisance, in part, as anything that obstructs the free

23

passage or use of a basin. A " basin" is a watershed or drainage area. Dr. Brockway stated that

24

the size of the drainage basin above the culvert on Sunnyside Drive is approximately 256 acres

25

based on USGS data. Brockway Affidavit at paragraph 4. The USGS data is attached as page 1 of

26

Exhibit "D" to the Rawlings Affidavit. Idaho Code § 52-107 states that "Every nuisance not
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1

defined by law as public nuisance or a moral nuisance, is private. The Langley case was brought

2

by the Plaintiffs to declare a driveway to be a private nuisance which prevented the drainage of

3

water that backed up onto the Langleys' pasture lands. The Defendants claimed a prescriptive

4

easement, but the trial court disagreed and found that the construction of the driveway created a

5

private nuisance which resulted in an award of monetary damages, as well as an order requiring
6

the Defendants to abate the nuisance by installing a larger culvert under their roadway. In
7

8
9

applying the law and logic of that case, the result should be a finding by this court that the
Jensens' action in blocking the ditch created a private nuisance, i.e., it obstructed the free passage

10

or use of the basin, and it also precipitated a trespass as a result of the backwaters that

11

accumulated on the Roberts Property.

12

None of the affirmative defenses asserted by the Jensens can serve as the basis for

13
avoidance of Ms. Robe1ts' claims against them. None of the Jensens' counterclaims likewise

14
15

have any merit. The scope of the easement is defined by the plat. In terms of the cross-motions

16

for summary judgment, the court need only look at the subdivision plat of Sunnyside Acres to

17

determine the scope of the easement that exists. The plat expressly states that the easement is ten

18

(10) feet wide with a bottom width of one (1) foot. Water coming from the land above the

19

Roberts Property naturally flows to the lowest point on the Roberts Property which is the location

20
of the culve1t underneath Sunnyside Drive. See page 6 of Exhibit " A" to Brockway's
21
22

Supplemental Affidavit. Roberts does not augment the flow of water that naturally drains onto

23

her prope1ty from the basin area above her property which Dr. Brockway estimated to be

24

approximately 256 acres in size. See initial Affidavit of Dr. Charles Brockway at paragraph 4.

25

The Jensens have asserted no basis for their claimed relief that Roberts must be ordered to

26

improve the ditch on her property or the culvert under Sunnyside Drive. On the one hand, they
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1

have asserted that it is a culvert under a public highway, and on the other hand, they have

2

claimed some sort of obligation for Roberts to maintain a county-owned facility. Besides being

3

inconsistent, that suggestion is nonsensical. If the Jensens' argument made any sense from a legal

4

perspective, then presumably the Jensens would be obligated to improve the culvert that lies

5

beneath 500 South Road which is downstream from their property. Roberts, however, has never
6

advanced that as being an obligation of the Jensens.
7

8
9

In his treatise in the Idaho Law Review, Judge Donald Burnett approvingly cited a case
from North Carolina as a leading case adopting the Second Restatement's treatment of

10

" intentional" invasions by surface water. In Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 NC 201, 236 SE. 2d 787

11

(1977), the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed its long adherence to the "civil law" rule,

12

and stated that a landowner could not raise a dike or barrier by which water would be intercepted

13

and thrown back on the land of the higher owner. 236 S.E. 2d at 793. Such water, as the court
14
15

noted, applies to diffused surface water, such as melting snow and rain water. In addressing a fact

16

situation alleging a private nuisance arising as a result of the interference with the flow of surface

17

water, the courts stated:

18
19
20

Most nuisances of this kind are intentional, usually in the
sense that "the Defendant has created or continued the
condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the
harm to the Plaintiff's interests is substantially certain to
follow. 236 S.E. 2d at 797.

21
22

Undoubtably, the Jensens' placement of the fill material in the ditch, and the creation of

23

the dam or levee, was an intentional act that caused injury and damage to Roberts and her

24

property interests. Interestingly, both Mr. and Ms. Jensen have acknowledged in their

25

Declarations that Roberts specifically advised them against filling the ditch in 20 13. See

26

paragraph 24 of Deanna Jensen's Declaration and paragraph 26 of Thomas Jensen's Declaration.
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1

According to Lora Roberts she explained to the Jensens that filling in the ditch would impede the

2

flow of water that came across her property from upstream properties in the basin. See paragraph

3

7 of Lora Roberts' Affidavit. When the actual flooding began, and her barn and corrals were

4

being flooded with the backwaters starting to move into the crawl space of her home, Roberts

5

asked her neighbors to help by reopening the ditch. See Deanna Jensen's Declaration at
6

7
8

paragraph 31. However, she was told by Deanna Jensen that the Jensens did not want a ditch
going through their property and they could not do anything about it. See Paragraph 31 of

9

Declaration of Deanna Jensen and Paragraph 8 of Lora Roberts' Affidavit. Without a doubt, the

10

Jensens created and perpetuated the conditions that caused the nuisance with full knowledge of

11

12

the harm that would be visited upon Roberts and her property. After all, Deanna Jensen
acknowledged that she had previously seen water flowing in the ditch after instances of a large

13
storm or rapid snow melt. See paragraph 17 of Deanna Jensens Declaration.

14
15

In their Memorandum, the Jensens continue to cling to the notion of constructing a

16

crystalline wall around their property to prevent anyone or anything from ever entering it. See

17

page 20 of Jensens Memorandum in Opposition. Notwithstanding their desire in that regard, they

18

must still deal with the natural servitude which exists.

19

Although the Jensens appear not to like the cascading easement theory advanced by

20
Roberts, the trial court judge in the Pendergrast case seemed to have embraced the concept in his

21
22

23
24
25
26

jury instructions:
The water first comes to Mr. Pendergrast's property and
then goes to the Aikens' property. So the Pendergrasts own
what is known as the upper estate, and the Aikens own the
lower estate. Each of the lower parcels along the driveway
are servient to those on the higher level to the extent that
each is required to receive and allow passage of the natural
flow of surface water from the higher land. As servient to
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1

2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9

the upper estate, the defendants are not permitted by law to
interrupt or prevent the natural passage of the water in the
event it causes damage to the upper estate. Where a lower
estate, such as the Aikens' in this case, presumably for their
own convenience and for the better enjoyment of their
property, closed the natural depression and channel through
which the water from the upper dominant tenement had
been accustomed to flow and installed in lieu thereof an
underground culvert or conduit, the law imposed upon the
defendants' ownership the burden of installing a pipe of
sufficient size to accommodate the natural flow of surface
water from the upper tenement across the defendants' land
without injury to the upper tenement's property.
236 S. E 2d at 799.

10

Though Roberts contends that the Jensens' "act of God" defense has no legal merit in this

11

case, it is at least worthy of discussion to show why it is inapplicable. The Jensens acquired their

12

property in 2010. Mrs. Jensen has candidly acknowledged that she observed water flowing in the

13
ditch in the instances of a large storm or rapid snow melt. See paragraph 17 of Declaration of

14
15

Deanna Jensen. In other words, it could reasonably be foreseen by the Jensens that in those

16

events, the ditch would carry a flow of water because they had previously observed it. Having

17

observed that in those "instances" (i.e., more than once), and having been advised by Lora

18

Roberts not to fill the ditch because it was necessary for the passage of water that flowed down to

19

her property from upstream properties, the Jensens cannot reasonably contend that the events of

20
2017 were truly an act of God. Not only could water flowing in the ditch be reasonably foreseen,

21
22

it is obvious that the Jensens, by their wrongful act of filling in the ditch, caused the two week

23

period of flooding of the Roberts Prope1iy to occur. While the water generated by rainfall and

24

melting snow were nothing more than events of nature which had admittedly caused water to

25

flow in the ditch on the Jensens' Property, it was the filling of the ditch by the Jensens which

26

created the harm visited upon Roberts.
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1

The Jensens have gone to great lengths to criticize Roberts for failing to recall the two

2

flooding events that occurred prior to 2010 as referenced in Lora Roberts' Affidavit at paragraph

3

4. As she explained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of her Affidavit, the water quickly drained away

4

across the Jensens' property after going over Sunnyside Drive, and it never reached anywhere

5

near her barn or corrals, and certainly the water never reached anywhere near the crawl space of
6
7

8

her home. Having her property flooded for approximately two weeks in 2017 was clearly a
memorable and distinguishable event, but recalling with precision the years when water

9

overtopped Sunnyside Drive and quickly drained away through the ditch were simply regarded

10

by her as natural events that caused her no damage. Having informed the Jensens of the need to

11

12

leave the ditch open in order to discharge those flood waters, the Jensens cannot now escape
liability on the basis of any of their affirmative defenses.

13

CONCLUSION

14
15

Based upon the evidence in this case, and the law of Idaho regarding natural servitudes

16

together with the application of the "civil rule", Roberts' Motion for Summary Judgment should

17

be granted. The Defendants have not shown that any upstream actions by Roberts impeded or

18

enlarged the natural flow of water that drained through the ditch, and as such, the Defendants'

19

Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. Deanna Jensen has admitted that during the six

20

(6) years that she has resided on the Jensen Property prior to 20 17, she actually observed flowing

21
22

water in the ditch in instances of a large storm or rapid snowmelt. The Jensens knew those events

23

had naturally occurred, and that they were likely to happen again. Instead of allowing the status

24

quo to remain, they insisted on filling in the ditch over the objections of their neighbor. When

25

Lora Roberts asked for her neighbors ' help to abate the nuisance during the 2017 flood, the

26

Jensens told her there was nothing they could do because they did not want a ditch going through
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1

their property, and they were not obligated to have a ditch on their property. See Declaration of

2

Deanna Jensen at paragraph 31. They were well aware of the invasion of the water on the Roberts

3

Property, and as a result, their intentional act must be regarded as having a constituted a private

4
5

nuisance. Because the Jensens effectively deprived Roberts the use of those po11ions of her
property that were flooded, including the barn and corrals, the court should also find that the

6

Jensens' action constituted a trespass, and summary judgment should be granted to Roberts as
7

8

sought in her prayer for relief.

9

DATED this

~ 'D

day of August , 2018.

10
11

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

12

~~

By:__r
--=-------"'
i\
;.,+
1---+-'-~ - - - - - - - -
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18
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20
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22
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D. Andrew Rawlings
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23
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U.S. Mail
Overnight Courier
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21

22

LORA K. ROBERTS, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant herein ("Roberts") by and through her

23
attorney of record, Gary D. Slette, hereby submits Roberts' Memorandum in Opposition to

24

25
26

Jensens' Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits.
Based on a fair reading of the Jensens' Motion, they would apparently contend that if a

ROBERTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITIN TO JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS - I
Page 674

1

fact witness doesn' t agree with their version of the facts, all of their affidavits are irrelevant and

2

should be stricken. With regard to Lora Roberts Affidavit, paragraphs 3-12, inclusive, are factual

3

in nature, and she attested to them under oath. Given the courts admonition for the parties'

4

counsel to cooperate with one another, it is indeed unfortunate that counsel for the Jensens

5

haven't previously contacted Roberts' attorney to obtain better copies, and only now contend
6

after four (4) months that Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" attached to the Roberts ' affidavit are, in
7

8

their opinion, unusable. Presumably they do not like Exhibit "A" because it contradicts an

9

assertion made by them that the ditch was largely nonexistent in 2010 when Jensens acquired

10

their property. That 2011 aerial photograph clearly shows the existence of the ditch a year after

11

the Jensens acquired their property. In the spirit of cooperation as suggested by the courts,

12

Counsel for Roberts has now provided digital photos of those exhibits to Jensens' counsel. They

13
are clear and usable.
14

15

With regard to the letters sent by Mr. Rolig, the Jensens' prior counsel, it is obvious that

16

neither of them constituted settlement discussions. Rather, Mr. Rolig expressly stated that his

17

clients would bring in a backhoe to open the ditch to connect the "ditch that is visible in their

18

field" . That was clearly an affirmative declaration that was apparently intended to avoid future

19

liability. There was no quid pro quo for which Robe11s was to agree or perform as part of any

20

settlement. As such, the letters should remain as part of the evidence in this case. The statement

21
22

was merely a declaration made by the agent of a party during the course of litigation. The content

23

of the Rolig letters do not fall within the scope of either I.R.E. Rule 407 or Rule 408. The

24

declaration that the Defendants were going to open the ditch was a measure that had not yet taken

25

place, and as a consequence, I.R.E Rule 407 could not be implicated. I.R.E Rule 408 (a)(l) and

26

(2) were not implicated because the declaration by the Defendants' agent was not made in the
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1

course of compromise negotiations and was not made in an attempt to compromise the claim.

2

'"The relationship between an attorney and his client is one of agency in which the client is

3

the principal and the attorney is the agent." Caballero v. Wilkse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P.3d

4
5

1076, 1079 (2004) (quoting Munsey v. Children's Home Finding and Aid Soc. of Lewiston, 84
Idaho 147, 151 , 369 P.2d 586, 588(1962))1. Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 6.40.1 defines Agency

6

as follows: "The term 'agent' refers to a person authorized by another, called the ' principal,' to
7

8
9

act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within
the agent's scope of authority."

10

The Idaho Civil Jury Instructions also provide a definition for the scope of authority.

11

"Conduct is within the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the agent is engaged in the

12

duties that the agent was asked or expected to perform and relates to those duties." IDJI 6.43.1.

13
"It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by the
14

15

principal to bring it within the scope of the agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the

16

principal that is incidental to, customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the

17

performance of such duties is within the scope of the agent's authority." Id. (citing Landvik v.

18

Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P .2d 697, 702, (Idaho App. 1997), emphasis added). This language is

19

directly in line with the present matter. The Jensens did not have to directly oversee every

20
statement made by Mr. Rolig, but gave him authority to participate in the communications
21
22

themselves. Mr. Rolig obviously derived no personal benefit from the communications, and

23

given his reputation in the legal community, its apparent that he was operating as his clients had

24

instructed.

25

"Litigants freely choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of the

26
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1

attorney's actions." Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass'n., 107 Idaho l, 3, 684

2

P.2d 978, 980 (1984) (citations omitted).

3

4

The affidavits of Crane, Bos, Root and Dekruyf are based upon factual observations that
each of them made over the course of time. Far from being opinion testimony, these individuals

5

have all been able to observe what transpired (a) prior to the fill material being deposited by the
6
7
8

Jensens and (b) after that time. Roberts submits that this needless motion has been submitted for
the simple purpose of creating additional expense. The decision to admit relevant evidence is a

9

matter of the court' s discretion. All of the affidavits which Roberts has submitted are relevant to

10

the court's consideration of the pending cross-motions for summary judgment. The affidavits

11

12

were provided to both support Roberts' Motion for Summary Judgment and to provide evidence
to defend against the Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment. The affidavits all set forth such

13
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and each of them shows that the affiant was competent
14
15

16

to testify to the matters stated therein. IRCP Rule 56 (c). Jensens Motion to Strike should be
denied.

17
18
19

DATED this ..'.l. \)

day of August , 2018.

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

20
21

By

~

22

G.sle

23

24
25
26

ROBERTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITIN TO JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAV ITS - 4

Page 677

1
2
3

4
5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned ce11ifies that on the

~a

day of August, 2018, he caused a true and

6

conect copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following

7

manner:

8
9

10

Robert L. HatTis
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

11

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission - 208-523-9518
Efile - iCourt
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
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Electronically Filed
8/20/2018 4:43 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Karen Wood, Deputy Clerk

1
2
3

4
5

Gary D. Slette
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Telephone: (208) 933-0700
Facsimile: (208) 933-070 l
ISB # 3 198
!rlm\gds\Roberts\MSJ_memo

6

Attorney for Plaintiff

7
8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

9

STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

10

*********

11
LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual

12
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

13
14

V.

)

15
16
17

18
19

20

)
)
)
)
)

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants/
Counterclaimants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV27-18-00098

ROBERTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO JENSENS'
RULE 12 (b)(7) MOTION

- - - - - - - -- - -- - - - )
LORA K. ROBERTS, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant herein (" Roberts"), by and through her

21

attorney of record, Gary D. Slette, here by submits thi s Memorandum in Opposition to Jensens'

22

Rule l 2(b)(7) Motion.

23

24
25

As Roberts has attested to in her most recent affidavit filed contemporaneously herewith
(wherein she verified her Amended Complaint), she is unaware that anyone else in the Sunnyside
Acres Subdivision has filled in the ditch as the Jensens did. While other owners both upstream

26
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1

and downstream of Roberts have graded the ditch and created a swale, and she is not aware that

2

the ability to move water across their property has ever been unimpeded. As such, Roberts has no

3

basis to assert a claim or cause of action against any of those other owners, whether upstream or

4
5

downstream

from her property. Obviously, causation would have to be shown if Roberts

contended that someone else had impacted the passage of water in the ditch. However, Roberts

6

contends that the only thing which caused the water that flowed onto her property to accumulate
7
8

and pond was the dam constructed by the Jensens, and no one else. While Roberts does not

9

believe that she has a claim for relief against any other party, the Jensens are certainly free to

10

pursue third party practice if they felt a downstream owner had violated their rights. Notably, the

11

Jensens have not seen fit to do that, and this court should deny the Jensens' motion brought

12

pursuant to IRCP Rule 12 (b)(7). Simply stated, there are no indispensable parties to this action.

13
14
15

DATED this

J_.p

day of August, 2018.

16

17

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

18
19

By

~

~

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
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Page 12

1
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
3

4
5

The undersigned ce11ifies that on the Rt>

day of August, 2018, he caused a true and

conect copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following
manner:

6

7

8

Robe1t L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

9

[ ]
[ ]
[ )
[ )
[ ,-{'

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission - 208-523-95 18
Efile - iCourt
rharris@holdenle al.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

10

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
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25
26
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Electronically Filed
8/20/2018 4:43 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Karen Wood, Deputy Clerk

1

Gary D. Slette
2
3

4
5

gslette@rsidaholaw.com
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Telephone: (208) 933-0700
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
ISB # 3198

6
!rlm\gds\Roberts\Aff_Roberts_opp_ 12(b)(7) motion

7

Attorney for Plaintiff
8
9

10

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

11
12

STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

13

*********

14
15

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual

16

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

17

)

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,

)
)
)

20

Defendants/
Counterclaimants.

21

AFFIDAVIT OF LORA ROBERTS
IN OPPOSITION TO J ENSENS'
RENEWED RULE l 2(b)(7) MOTION

)
)
)

22

- - - - -- - - - - - -- - - )

23

STATE OF IDAHO

)
ss:

24

County of Twin Falls

)

25

Case No. CV27-18-00098

)
)
)

V.

18
19

)
)

LORA ROBERTS, first being duly sworn, deposes and states under oath as follows:

26

I.

I make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and am competent to

testify to the matters stated herein.
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-I

1

2.

I am the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant in the above-captioned matter.

3.

Prior to the filing of my Amended Complaint on June 5, 2018, I reviewed it

2
3

4

thoroughly. I swear and affirm under oath that I know the contents of the Amended Complaint, and

5

that the statements contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

6

7

4.

The only people I know who have done anything to impede the flow of water that

comes onto my property from upstream properties are the Defendants. Until the time they filled in

8

the portion of the ditch on their property, the water that flowed onto and through my property from
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

areas above my property was always allowed to drain away from my prope11y through the ditch.
5.

I have never observed the ditch on the property of anyone lying either upstream or

downstream of the Jensen Prope11y being altered by filling in the ditch as the Jensens did.
6.

The water that ponded on my property in 2017 was not "my water" as contended by

the Jensens. I did not produce or discharge the water, but rather, it naturally flowed down onto my
property from properties upstream of my property.

16

17
18

7.

My interest in this case is having the water that ponded, or that will pond, on my

property being discharged through the length of the ditch on the Jensen Property after which time it

19

always flowed over or under 500 South Road. If the Jensens believe that a downstream owner has

20

impaired their ability to have such water discharged away from their prope11y through the ditch, I

21

believe they have every right to independently pursue such action as is necessary to resolve that

22

issue with their neighbors. I am not aware of any downstream owners, other than the Jensens, who

23

are responsible for the damages I suffered during the 20 17 flooding of my prope1ty.
24
25
26

Further, sayeth your affiant naught.

Gi~
ORoBRTs

AFFIDAVIT OF LORA ROBERTS IN OPPOSITION TO JENSENS' RENEWED RULE 12(b)(7) MOTION

Page 683

-2

1
2
3

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i ~ day of August, 2018.

~

4
5

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residingat:
Commission Expires:

----rpv;w Ht/5

6

/2-/¥·23

7
8
9

10
11

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the

a_ l:l day of August, 2018, he caused a true and

13

correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following

14

manner:

15
16
17

18

Robert L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

19

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile
[v'f Efile - iCourt
rhatTis@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

20
21
22

23
24
25
26
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Electronically Filed
8/24/2018 3:01 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Shelly Creek, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
araw lings@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
LORA ROBERTS,

Case No. CV27-2018-0098

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit their Reply in Support of
Jensens' Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits. For the sake of clarity and brevity, all of the
capitalized terms used herein will have the same meanings as defined in the Memorandum in
Support of Jensens' Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed August 13, 2018) (the "Renewed
Strike Memo") and/or the Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment
(filed July 30, 2018).
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Giving the Renewed Strike Memo a "fair reading," Roberts summarizes that the Jensens
"contend that if a fact witness doesn't agree with their version of the fact, all of their affidavits are
irrelevant and should be stricken." (Roberts Memorandum in Opposition to Jensens' Renewed

Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed August 20, 2018) (the "Strike Opposition Memo"), pp. 1-2). This
summary is an obvious mischaracterization. While Roberts is attempting to be persuasive, the use
of hyperbole and misstatement provides no benefit to the Court and is unmoving once the Jens ens'
actual arguments are considered.
As a starting point, the J ensens have asked the Court to strike seven of the affidavits
submitted by Roberts in this case. (Renewed Strike Memo, p. 3). These Objectionable Roberts

MSJ Affidavits are: the Roberts Affidavit, the Thain Affidavit, the Brockway Affidavit, the Crane
Affidavit, the DekruyfAffidavit, the Root Affidavit, and the Second Roberts Affidavit. (See Renewed
Strike Memo, p. 3). Roberts has not submitted any argument opposing the portions of the
Jensens' motion addressed to striking the Thain Affidavit or the Brockway Affidavit, meaning
the Court should strike those documents, as there is no objection thereto. Thus, far from being a
"needless motion," it appears that Roberts can provide no argument to support consideration of
these two affidavits; one of which is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous; the other
of which is based on preliminary estimates that the affiant stated "should not be used for any
purpose except general guidance"; and neither of which should have been submitted by Roberts
into the record. For the reasons explained by the Jensens-and not challenged by Roberts-both
the Thain Affidavit and the Brockway Affidavit must be stricken. (See Renewed Strike Memo,
pp. 8-10).
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Most of Roberts’ Strike Opposition Memo defends the two affidavits submitted by Roberts
herself in support of her motion for summary judgment. But nothing advanced now by Roberts
shows why either the Roberts Affidavit or the Second Roberts Affidavit should not be stricken.
First, with regard to the body of the Roberts Affidavit, Roberts explains that “paragraphs
3-12, inclusive, are factual in nature, and she attested to them under oath.” (Strike Opposition
Memo, p. 2). Yet, this does not address the Jensens’ challenge to the relevance of many of these
paragraphs. (See Renewed Strike Memo, pp. 4-7). While the facts asserted may be true (although
many are contested), but if they are irrelevant to the matter at hand—i.e., they do not matter to
either of the cross-motions for summary judgment—they should be stricken by the Court. Further,
Roberts’ one-sentence response does not address the challenges to the opinions provided by
Roberts in paragraphs 9 and 11—which are not “factual in nature.” (See Renewed Strike Memo,
pp. 6-7).
As to the exhibits attached to the Roberts Affidavit, in addition to not addressing Exhibit D,
the objection (despite what Roberts may presume) is not about what the Jensens do or do not like.
The issue is whether Roberts has submitted usable materials. (See Renewed Strike Memo, pp. 56). Roberts states “it is unfortunate that counsel for the Jensens haven’t previously contacted
Roberts’ attorney to obtain better copies, and only now contend after found (4) months that [the
exhibits] are, in their opinion, unusable.” (Strike Opposition Memo, p. 2). But this issue was
previously raised. Roberts’ counsel should review the Memorandum in Support of Jensens’
Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed April 30, 2018), which stated:
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Exrubd:s A, B, and C are black-and-whi e and so degraded (or altered) as to be unreliable

and! unl!lSafule_ (S~e Roberts .Affidavit, exs_A B, and q_ While Rotoerts describes them, he never
;ni·ei:

that tbe exfuibits are correct depictio:m of the cirolltllStances h e describ

or that they are

accurate at all (&e Roberts 4ffidm,it, 6)_

(Memorandum in Support ofJensens 'Motion to Strike Affidavits, p. 7). This is, with the exception
of a footnote added in the Renewed Strike Memo, identical to what the Jensens have asserted in
the Renewed Strike Memo. (See Memorandum in Support ofJensens 'Motion to Strike Affidavits,
p. 7; compare Renewed Strike Memo , pp. 5-6). This identical assertion repeats exactly the issues
the Jensens had with the exhibits four months ago. Further, while Roberts' counsel has attempted
to remedy this issue by providing better copies of the exhibits (which, despite the use of the past
tense in the Strike Opposition Memo , did not occur until the day after that memorandum was filed) ,
that neglects the larger issues of whether the Court has a usable copy and, if so, questions remain
as to why the J ensens were provided with sub-standard copies and whether the Court can use
documents not submitted until less than a week before the hearing on the cross motions for
summary judgment.

For these reasons, and because Roberts has not provided any counter-

argument, the Court should strike the Roberts Affidavit in its entirety.
As to the Second Roberts Affidavit, Roberts defends her use of two letters from the J ensens'
prior counsel-Jeffrey E. Rolig. That is all the Second Roberts Affidavit is about-introducing the
two Rolig letters. However, Roberts has not cited to these letters, either in support of her own
motion for summary judgment or in opposition to the Jensens' motion. Thus, there is nothing
showing its relevance or applying it to the case. Roberts is asking the Court to connect the dots
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for itself, which Courts have refused to do. See Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 221, 384
P.3d 975, 985 (2016); see also Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3).
In any event, Roberts’ assertion that the Rolig letters did not “constitute[] settlement
discussions” is absurd. (Strike Opposition Memo, p. 2). The first letter, dated May 4, 2017, and
attached as Exhibit A to the Second Roberts Affidavit, was written within weeks of the flooding at
issue in this case and appears to have been written in response to Roberts’ initial demand letter.
The Jensens have raised the issue of Mr. Rolig’s agency capacity to provide a binding statement
on their behalf, to which Roberts has provided an extensive response (see Strike Opposition Memo,
pp. 2-4). However, while the Jensens continue to dispute Mr. Rolig’s agency to bind them in this
regard (or whether the statements actually speak on behalf of the Jensens rather than personally),
the fact remains that the quoted portion of the second Rolig letter is irrelevant. (Renewed Strike
Memo, p. 15 (“Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Second Roberts Affidavit, together with Exhibit B thereto,
are also irrelevant…”)). The Jensens have never contended that there is no easement across their
property, although they have left open the possibility that the easement holder (the ditch owner)
has abandoned the Waste Ditch. (See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, pp. 3-4, 7-10 (explaining that the Waste Ditch easement was appurtenant to
the Van Beek Farm)). Instead, the Jensens have consistently asserted that Roberts and the
Roberts Property have no interest in the Waste Ditch easement across the Jensen Property.
Thus, Mr. Rolig’s acknowledgement (in whatever capacity) of “the existence of a 10’ ditch
easement across [the Jensen Property]” is not material to the dispute in this case and is, therefore,
irrelevant and should be stricken.
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The second Rolig letter, dated May 15, 2017, is obviously a settlement offer.

The

paragraph from which Roberts is selectively quoting just part of one sentence states:
As ·you. probamly _nqttced, Ule. pipe_. that r~ns und~r the rO'-dWijY I~. ~bout half
full of dirtt•Ht and wh4) k.n.9W$ w~ ~(~._ 1li~ can't; ti.~1p •tti~ sibJ~toni T~e~o~ my
ct~nts propQse that we -find a prmeulona_l comp!llny who can ,Clean oot-the pipe so that-_ It
at least runs-freew.;·_ .and that eiach of o.ur- eliants will pay one. Mlfof·the eost Qf the cleanout
In.addition-, my clients are. gQing :to !)ring in a backJ'IQe outa notM in. tha an:,a under.th_elr
fence.hi.the $re~where.th,e p!pe·¢om_$8 out from under the)'gad. ~nd c_ut a w~y:lriJ9 th~eir:
ptQjJ~rty JH•t conner;Js with the wa$te Wajeir· <!Itch ·that: Is vl~!bl~ lh their fle1d. V'i/r:J b~lieve
this will sufficiently- facilitate the waste water runoff; except·perheps 'in the most extreme
water-years, when there Is so much water"that.it overflows.the 1"()$.dway.

to

(Second Roberts Affidavit, ex. B p. 1). The quoted portion is part of what the Jensens are

"propos[ing] ... [i]n addition" to each paying half the cleaning costs of the culvert, which would
presumably have settled the matter. (Second Roberts Affidavit, ex. B p. 1). In any event, it is an
"affirmative declaration" (Strike Opposition Memo, p. 2) in that it is not a question or exclamation,
but it is obviously predicated on Roberts accepting what the Jensens "propose." (Second Roberts
Affidavit, ex. B p. 1). Roberts never says she accepted that proposal, and nothing ever occurred.

Once more, there is no probative value and the letter is irrelevant and is not cited anywhere.
For these reasons, the Second Roberts Affidavit must also be stricken in its entirety.
Additionally, Roberts defends other affidavits in two sentences. Roberts' opposition
includes a defense of the Bos Affidavit, which was not challenged by the Jensens. As to the other
affidavits, Roberts' entire defense of the Crane Affidavit, the Dekruyf Affidavit, and the Root
Affidavit is that they "are based upon factual observations that each of them made over the course

of time. Far from being opinion testimony, these individuals have all been able to observe what
transpired (a) prior to fill material being deposited by the Jensens and (b) after that time." (Strike
Opposition Memo, p. 4). Roberts' arguments address personal knowledge and the improper

opinion testimony arguments posed against these affidavits, but not the remainder of the J ensens'
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arguments. Thus, on the basis of their unobjected-to arguments, the Jensens request that the Court
strike the Crane Affidavit, the DekruyfAffidavit, and the Root Affidavit in their entirety.
Beyond that, as far as they can be taken, Roberts' arguments are deficient. The J ensens
have not challenged the testimony of Mr. Crane, Mr. Dekruyf, or Mr. Root on the basis that they
lack personal knowledge. The J ensens have challenged the Crane Affidavit, the DekruyfAffidavit,
and the Root Affidavit inasmuch as they present irrelevant matters, matters so vague as to be
irrelevant, or improper expert opinion testimony for which they have not laid the foundation for
these individuals as experts in an applicable discipline. These affidavits do not contain "facts that
would be admissible in evidence," and so they should be stricken.
The Court should not accept Roberts' conclusory argument that "[ a ]11 of the affidavits
which Roberts has submitted are relevant to the court's consideration of the pending cross-motions
for summary judgment." (Strike Opposition Memo, p. 4). Rather than explaining the relevance,
as required in opposition to a motion, Roberts again relies on conclusory statements. Because
Roberts has failed to address the bases raised by the Jensens to strike each of the Objectionable

Roberts MSJ Affidavits, they must be stricken.

DATED this 24 th day of August, 2018.

D.~J~;lings,Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of
the following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by
the method indicated.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF JENSENS' RENEWED MOTION
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
Gary D. Slette
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
Email:
gslette@rsidaholaw.com

□

Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
~
~

Email
Electronic Filing/Service

_J.tfl

D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
\\Law\data\WPDATA\RLH\20028-000 Jensen, Thomas & Deanna\Plead ings\Jensens renewed StrikeAffs REPLY v02.docx
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Filed: 09/27/2018 09:05:55
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Creek, Shelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
)
JENSEN, husband and wife,
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D_eu_e_n_da_n_t_s._ _ _ )
LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

Case No. CV27-18-00098

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: (1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; (3) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS; (4)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS; (5) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS, I.R.C.P. 12(b )(7)

On August 27, 2018 the plaintiff and defendant respective motions came on regularly for
hearing. Counsel, Gary D. Slette appeared and argued on behalf of the Plaintiff. Counsel, Robert
L. Harris and D. Andrew Rawlings appeared and argued on behalf of the Defendants. 1
The Court having reviewed the motions, briefs and affidavits on file and having
considered the arguments of counsel, took the matters under advisement for a written decision.

1

For the reasons set forth below the Court need not address the motion to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7),
since that motion is moot based on the decision of this court on summary judgment.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action concerns a claim of damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief arising
out of flooding of the plaintiffs real property which is alleged to have occurred in February,
2017. The plaintiff and defendant reside in the Sunnyside Acres Subdivision (Subdivision),
located in Jerome County, Idaho. The Subdivision Plat was recorded June 27, 1978. (Exhibit
"A", Plaintiffs Complaint)
The plaintiff, Lora K. Roberts (Roberts) resides on Lot 5, Block 1 of the Subdivision
which is commonly known as 46 Sunnyside Drive. Roberts purchased her Lot in 2001. The
defendants Thomas and Deanna Jensen (together the Jensen's) reside on Lot 35, Block 2 of the
Subdivision which is commonly known as 51 Sunnyside Drive. The Jensen's purchased their Lot
in 2010. Robert's Lot is north/east of Jensen's Lot which is south/west of Roberts Lot and the
two Lots are separated by a county road known as Sunnyside Drive (Sunnyside). There is no
dispute that Sunnyside is a county road.
The subdivision plat reflects that there is a 10 foot easement for a waste water ditch
(ditch) that extends from the north/east to the south/west through Lots 4 and 5 of Block 1 and
Lots 35, 34, and 33 of Block 2. The ditch appears to terminate at a second county road still
farther south of the Jensen's property on the plat (Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, ,r 8.). 2 There is
evidence in this record that there is a culvert under the second county road and that the water
from the waste water ditch is deposited onto some farm ground south of that second county road.
2

On June 5, 2018 the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that referenced Exhibit "A", however it is not attached
to the Amended Complaint. The Court will rely upon Exhibit "A" attached to the Complaint filed on January 29,
2018.
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It is clear that Sunnyside Drive is a barrier or obstruction to the flow of water. The ditch

extends under Sunnyside Drive by means of a metal culvert. The culvert is 12 inches in diameter,
and there appears to be no dispute that the culvert was 50% obstructed with sediment.
(Supplemental Affidavit of Charles G. Brockway, Exhibit "A"). While the culvert pipe was
intended to be 12 inches in diameter, the condition of the opening of the culvert on the Roberts'
side and the Jensen side indicates that the opening to accept the flow of water is significantly
reduced. (Declaration of Deanna Jensen, ,r 12, Exhibits B & C)
There is also no dispute that at the time Roberts acquired her property that the waste
water ditch depicted on the subdivision plat north of Sunnyside Drive was for the most part
"obliterated" and can best be described as a shallow swale. (Affidavit of Lora Roberts, ,r 3.;
Affidavit of Ken Crane, ,r 4.)
Roberts in her complaint admits that the culvert "is not large enough to handle all water
that naturally drains from upstream properties" and that prior to the Jensen's acquiring their
property, that "significant events of rainfall coupled with spring snow melt" would fill the
culvert and that water would back up north of Sunnyside Drive until the water would overflow
Sunnyside Drive. (Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, ,r's 10.-11.) There appears to be no dispute
that this condition would occur prior to 2013. There is no evidence of claim of flooding between
the years of 2014 and 2016.
Roberts alleges in her complaint that Jensen at some point in time prior to February, 2017
filled in portions of the ditch, which she alleges created an impediment to the flow water
resulting from rain or snow melt. (Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, ,r 12.) The Jensens' admit that
they filled in the ditch on their property with fill or soil in 2013. (Declaration of Denna Jensen,
22.)
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Roberts alleges that in February 2017 there was a significant flood event "caused by
rainfall and rapid snow melt" and that the "dam or berm created by the fill in the ditch on the
Jensen Property caused water to backup" into her crawl space, barn and corral.
Roberts seeks to recover damages to her property based on a theory of trespass;
injunctive relief on the basis of nuisance and a declaratory judgment that she holds a dominant
estate in the easement.
On June 26, 2018 Jensen filed their Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. The
Jensen's in their Counterclaim seek equitable relief "[I]n the event the Court finds that Roberts
has an interest in any portion of the Waste Ditch". (Counterclaim, irs 23 & 29).
On June 22, 2018 Roberts filed a Motion for Summary Judgment together with a
Memorandum in Support and Affidavits. On July 30, 2018 Jensen filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment together with a Memorandum in Support and Affidavits. Jensen has also filed a
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7). Both parties have also filed Motions to Strike
portions of the Affidavits filed in support of their respective motions. Both parties have filed
their respective briefs in opposition of the others motion for summary judgment.
II.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate only when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally
construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,
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517, 808 P.2d 851 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154
(Ct. App. 1994). "[T]he motion must be denied if evidence is such that conflicting inferences
may be drawn there from, and if reasonable people might reach different conclusions" unless the
trial court is to be the ultimate fact finder, in which case the court itself may resolve the
conflicting inferences. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990).
However, a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to
withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
reasonably return a verdict for the party opposing summary judgment.

Corbridge v. Clark

Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92

Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). Further, our courts have repeatedly held that "issues
considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141
Idaho 440, 443, 111 P.3d 125 (2005 (citing Beco Const. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho
859, 865, 865 P.2d 950 (1993)).

III.
MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Each party has filed motions to strike certain affidavits filed in support of or in opposition
to the respective summary judgment motions. I.R.C.P. 56(e) governs affidavits in summary
judgment proceedings. Such affidavits, to be considered by the court, must be based on (1)
personal knowledge of the affiant; (2) set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence;
and (3) show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
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A. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike

On August 13, 2018 plaintiff filed a motion to strike paragraphs 7(a) and (b) of the
Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings, however at the hearing counsel for the plaintiff withdrew
the objection and therefore the motion to strike by plaintiff is moot.
B. Defendant's Motion to Strike

On August 13, 2018 defendants filed a motion to strike Affidavit of Lora Roberts;
Affidavit of Greg Thain; Affidavit of Charles G. Brockway; Affidavit of Ken Crane; Affidavit of
Mark Dekruyf; Affidavit of John Root; and the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Lora Roberts.
The objections asserted are based on relevancy, hearsay or foundation for expert testimony.
1. Roberts Affidavit, filed April 11, 2018

The defendants seek to have this court strike portions of the Roberts Affidavit on the
basis of relevancy (i1's 3-5; 7-8; 12); lack of foundation for expert testimony (i1's 9 and 11 ); and
hearsay (Exhibit "D"). As to any claim of relevancy the court declines to strike the portions of
the affidavit as identified but to the extent that any statements of Roberts are not relevant to an
issue in the motion for summary judgment such statements would not necessarily be considered
by the court in its decision. To the extent that Roberts has expressed any opinion as to the "cause
or causation" of her 201 7 flooding, those opinion will be excluded and not considered by the
court as she is not competent to testify as to the issue of causation and there is no foundation for
her opinions as to causation. Further, Exhibit "D" is hearsay and will be excluded by the court.
2. Thain Affidavit, filed April 11, 2018

The defendants seek to have the court strike portions of the Thain Affidavit pursuant to
Rule 12(f) (16); on the basis of relevancy (1's 3-4) and lack of foundation for expert testimony
(1's 2 and 5).
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The request to strike paragraph 6 pursuant to Rule 12(f) is denied, since the rule only
applies to "pleadings" and an affidavit is not defined to be a "pleading". However, the court
would agree that this paragraph has no bearing on any issue presented for purposes of summary
judgment. As to any claim of relevancy the court declines to strike the portions of the affidavit as
identified but to the extent that any statements of Thain are not relevant to an issue in the motion
for summary judgment such statements would not necessarily be considered by the court in its
decision. To the extent that Thain has expressed any opinion as to the "cause or causation" of the
2017 flooding of Roberts' property, those opinion will be excluded and not considered by the
court as he is not competent to testify as to the issue of causation and there is no foundation for
his opinions as to causation.
3. Brockway Affidavit, filed April 11, 2018

The opinion testimony of Dr. Brockway is addressed in Section IV., below.
4. Crane Affidavit, filed April 17, 2018

The defendants seek to have the court strike portions of the Crane Affidavit based on
relevancy (i1's 4-7). As to any claim of relevancy the court declines to strike the portions of the
affidavit as identified but to the extent that any statements of Crane are not relevant to an issue in
the motion for summary judgment such statements would not necessarily be considered by the
court in its decision.
5. Dekruyf Affidavit, filed June 22, 2018

The defendants seek to have the court strike portions of the Dekruyf Affidavit based on
relevancy (i1's 3-4) and lack of foundation for expert testimony (i-f 5). As to any claim of
relevancy the court declines to strike the portions of the affidavit as identified but to the extent
that any statements of Crane are not relevant to an issue in the motion for summary judgment
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such statements would not necessarily be considered by the court in its decision. To the extent
that Dekruyf has expressed any opinion as to the "cause or causation" of the 2017 flooding of
Roberts' property, those opinion will be excluded and not considered by the court as he is not
competent to testify as to the issue of causation and there is no foundation for his opinions as to
causation.
6. Root Affidavit, filed June 22, 2018

The defendants seek to have the court strike portions of the Root Affidavit based on
relevancy (i1's 2-5). As to any claim of relevancy the court declines to strike the portions of the
affidavit as identified but to the extent that any statements of Root are not relevant to an issue in
the motion for summary judgment such statements would not necessarily be considered by the
court in its decision.
7. Roberts 2nd Supplemental Affidavit, filed July 30, 2018

The defendants seek to strike the Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roberts which
attaches as Exhibits letters from defendants' prior counsel to plaintiffs counsel on the basis that
the letters from counsel are not relevant and are otherwise privileged pursuant to I.R.E. 408. The
unverified opinion of counsel is not admissible evidence and the letters are nothing more than an
attempt to resolve the issues between the parties and are privileged pursuant to Rule 408. This
affidavit will be stricken and not considered by the court.
IV.
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Roberts in her motion for summary judgment appears to argue that she is entitled to
summary judgment on her claims for trespass, nuisance and declaratory judgment.
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Roberts asserts that she has a "natural servitude" and as such Jensen's could not obstruct
the flow of water from her property to the Jensen property. Lemhi County v. Moulton, 163 Idaho
404, 414 P.3d 226 (2018); Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974); and
Smith v. King Creek Grazing Assoc., 105 Idaho 644, 671 P.2d 1107 (Ct. App. 1983). As such she
claims a right to discharge the flow of water onto the Jensen property.
As for her claim of trespass, she alleges that Jensen committed trespass upon her property
by filling in the waste water ditch which she claims caused water to be impounded on her
property. She relies upon a federal district court case to support her claim of trespass. As for her
claim of nuisance she relies upon LC. § 42-1207 and 52-101 to assert that Jensen's obstruction of
the waste water ditch has interfered with the use of her property. Lastly she seeks to have this
court declare that she has a dominant estate interest in the waste water ditch and as such her
property is the dominant estate and that the Jensen property is the servient estate. 3
The defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment assert that as a matter of law
there is no "natural servitude" because the water in question does not discharge into a natural
water course. They also assert that there is no trespass because the defendants did not invade or
intrude in any way onto the plaintiffs property. They also assert that the statute [LC. § 42-1207]
relied upon by the plaintiff does not form the basis of a nuisance claim and that as to plaintiffs
claim of declaratory judgment she does not have standing to assert that she is a dominant estate
and that she has no legal interest in the waste water ditch easement. They also assert the defense
of Act of God.
1. Expert Testimony

Both of the parties have submitted to the Court affidavits with reports attached from their
respective experts. The plaintiff relies upon the opinions of Dr. Charles Brockway and a land
3

The plaintiff has made no claim that she has obtained a prescriptive easement.
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surveyor, Douglas Schwarz. The plaintiffs experts opme on the drainage, hydraulic and
elevation analysis of the Sunnyside subdivision. It is the opinion of plaintiffs experts that the
filling in of the waste water ditch by Jensen created what is characterized as a "dam", although
the experts describe the current ditch to be a "swale" on the Jensen property and they assumed
that the culvert under Sunnyside Drive was approximately filled 50% with sedimentation and
that the condition of the culvert may have contributed to the flooding.
The defendants rely upon the opinions of Dr. Ryan Christensen which challenges the
methodology used by Dr. Brockway and the foundation upon which his opinions are based.
The information provided by the parties to the Court overall, suggest that the waste water
ditch had not been maintained since Roberts purchased her property in 2001. That the "ditch" as
described in the subdivision plat north of Sunnyside Drive had been obliterated and was nothing
more than a swale. The Court has been provided no information as to how the contours of the
subdivision land may have changed after 1978 when the subdivision was developed. Roberts
acknowledges that prior to 2013 there were episodes of flooding to some degree where the
culvert was inadequate to handle the flow of water and the water would flow over Sunnyside
Drive. It is clear that once the subdivision was developed that Sunnyside Drive was and is an
obstruction to the flow of water. There can be no dispute that in 2017 there was an extraordinary
event of snow accumulation; rain; and rapid snow melt that had not been seen for years.
Flooding was common throughout the Magic Valley and other areas.
The parties and the experts have provided no information to the Court as to the amount of
snow accumulation and rain that had occurred in February, 2017 and the amount of water
generated by the rain and rapid snow melt. The experts have not analyzed the ability of the
culvert to pass water through it based on the sedimentation in the culvert as well as the restricted
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openings of the culvert at each end of the culvert. The experts have not calculated the cubic feet
per second (cfs) that the culvert could accommodate in its condition as it existed at the time of
the flooding event. The photos of the culvert clearly show that the openings of the culvert are
significantly restricted to allow water in and out of the culvert.
Expert opinion that is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated by facts in the record
does not assist the jury and is for that reason inadmissible. Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 538,
348 P.3d 145, 153 (2014). Testimony is "speculative when it "theorizes about a matter as to
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge". Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565,
97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004). This Court may exclude expert testimony that merely suggests
possibilities because it would only invite conjecture. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979
P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).
For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the opinions of both experts are
speculative and do not assist the trier of fact, i.e. the Court, when the evidence indicates that the
culvert under Sunnyside Drive is unable to adequately convey water off of the Roberts' property
when there is excessive rain fall or snow or snow melt.
2. Natural Servitude
The plaintiff claims to have a natural servitude across the Jensen property. The evidence
presented in support of and in opposition to the respective motions for summary judgment
indicates that prior to the platting of the Sunnyside Subdivision that the land was primarily
agricultural and that a waste water ditch had been established prior to the development of the
subdivision and that this ditch extended from the northeast of the subdivision to the southwest of
the subdivision. This ditch was described on the subdivision plat as a 10 foot easement 1 foot
bottom Waste Ditch. There is no dispute that at the time of creation of the plat there was
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agricultural land north of the subdivision and it is reasonable to assume that the waste ditch was
used to dispose of unused irrigation water or waste water from those agricultural lands. Our
courts have generally recognized that,
Waste water has been defined as "(1) water purposely discharged from the project works
because of operation of necessities, (2) water leading from ditches and other works, and
(3) excess water flowing from irrigated lands, either on the surface or seeping under it."
A&B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 751, 118
P.3d 78, 83 (2005)

There is no dispute that Idaho has adopted the "civil law rule" for the natural drainage of
surface water, which "recognizes a natural servitude of natural drainage between adjoining land
owners so that the lower owner must accept the 'surface' water which naturally drains onto his
land." Lemhi County v. Moulton, supra. In Smith v. King Creek Grazing Ass 'n., 105 Idaho 644,
646-647, 671 P.2d 1107, 1109-1110 (1983) summarized the case law on the subject of "natural
servitude" as follows:
Elements of the "civil law" rule first appeared in Teeter v. Nampa &
Meridian Irr. Dist., 19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8 (1911). The dispute in that case
was between a canal company, which had collected surface water from
land above its canal, discharging it upon other land on the lower side of
the canal, and the lower landowner who claimed that the concentrated
discharge caused his property greater injury than had the more dispersed
natural flow. The Supreme Court held that the canal company could not
discharge the concentrated water upon the lower land except within "the
accustomed channels" crossing the lower property. Id. at 359, 114 P. at 9.
In Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393 (1945), t e Supreme

Court expressly embraced the "civil law" rule. The Court held that an
upper landowner had an easement of drainage across the land of a lower
proprietor, to the extent of water naturally flowing from the higher ground
to the lower tract, but that this servitude could not be augmented by acts of
the upper landowner. In Harper v. Johannesen, 84 Idaho 278, 371 P.2d
842 (1962), the Supreme Court reiterated the "civil law" rule. Most
recently, in Dayley v. City of Burley, supra, the Court again endorsed the
"civil law" rule. However, the Court acknowledged authority that, even in
cases governed by the "civil law" rule, an upper proprietor is entitled to
alter the natural flow of surface water by collecting and concentrating it,
so long as it is carried across the lower proprietor's property within the
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confines of a natural watercourse. E.g., Teeter v. Nampa & Meridian Irr.
Dist., supra. A majority of the Dayley court sustained a trial judge's
finding that no natural watercourse existed. Accordingly, the majority held
that an upper proprietor, the City of Burley, was not entitled to collect
surface water through its storm drainage system and to discharge it across
privately owned lands below. A dissenting opinion argued for a contrary
result upon the premise that a natural watercourse did, in fact, exist.
Dayley demonstrates that the "civil law" rule may apply differently to
surface water drainage within a natural watercourse than to drainage
outside such a watercourse. If a natural watercourse exists, the upper
landowner may alter the natural flow so long as it remains within the
watercourse. This exception to the "civil law" rule has been acknowledged
in many other "civil law" jurisdictions. E.g., Youngblood v. City of Los
Angeles, 160 Cal.App.2d 481, 325 P.2d 587 (1958); Wellman v. Kelley,
197 Or. 553, 252 P.2d 816 (1953); see generally Kinyon & McClure,
supra, at 920-25.
The defense alleges that "a natural servitude exists (a) between adjoining lands (b) where the
lower land owner must accept the surface water, (c) that naturally drains (d) through a natural
watercourse, (e) while the upper landowner can accumulate water, but not in unnatural
concentrations that cause additional damage to the lower land". The defense asserts that the parties
are not adjoining land owners, however, the decision in Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho 376, 304
P.2d 1104 (1957) suggests otherwise. The mere fact that their property is separated by a road
does not suggest they are not adjoining landowners. The defense also suggests that the surface
water must naturally drain through a natural watercourse however the issue of a natural
watercourse is an "exception" to the civil law rule. This exception allows an upper landowner to
change the natural drainage by accumulating water and then discharge the accumulated water
into a natural watercourse, so long as the upper landowner does not increase the burden upon the
lower landowner.
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The Affidavit of Larry Boss indicates that that surface water would naturally flow to the
low point of the Roberts property. 4 It is clear from the evidence that the development of
Sunnyside Drive and the failure to maintain the culvert under Sunnyside Drive has caused water
to accumulate on the Roberts property during time of excessive snow, snow melt and rain. The
development of Sunnyside Drive has altered the natural drainage of the property. All of the cases
cited by the parties that discuss a "natural servitude" concern a situation where the lower
landowner is seeking damages for flooding or seeking to enjoin the discharge of water on to their
property by the upper landowner. In this case the Jensen's have not sought to enjoin the
discharge of water onto their property.
A natural servitude for surface water is separate and distinct from an easement for the
conveyance of waste water. When water is conveyed through ditches or canals, these means of
conveyance of water have been recognized as "artificial channels". Kunz v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 117 Idaho 901, 903, 792 P.2d 926, 928 (1990). By contrast a "natural water course" or

"natural drainage" has been defined as follows:
[A] water course is a stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and
sides or banks, and discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. The flow
of water need not be constant, but must be more than mere surface drainage occasioned
by extraordinary causes; there must be substantial indications of the existence of a
stream, which is ordinarily a moving body of water.
Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 481, 162 P.2d 393, 398 (1945) (quoting Hutchinson v.
Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484,488, 101 P. 1059, 1061 (1909) ). See, Lemhi
County v. Moulton, 163 Idaho 404,414 P.3d 226,233 (2018).

Prior to the development of the Sunnyside Subdivision, the Waste Ditch extended
unobstructed through what is now a subdivision. The ditch became obstructed with the
construction of a county road, Sunnyside Drive. A 12 inch diameter metal culvert was placed

4

If Mr. Boss is currently the
he would have been
or younger when he assisted his father in
farming the property prior to the creation of the subdivision plat and development of the subdivision.
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under Sunnyside Drive to allow water to pass through the obstruction. It is obvious from the
condition of the metal culvert that the culvert is in such a condition as to reduce or obstruct the
flow of water by reason of the buildup of sediment and the reduction of the opening on each side
of the culvert. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence that either party has measured the
flow of water through the culvert at any time. Since the parties do not dispute that Sunnyside
Drive is a county road, it would appear that the county has a duty to maintain the culvert.
It is undisputed that prior to 2013 Roberts had experienced the impoundment of water on

her property as a result of rain and snow melt and one could only conclude that the culvert was
inadequate to convey water off of her property. In fact the water would flow over Sunnyside
Drive prior to 2013 by at least 4 inches in depth. It is clear that the county road and culvert is a
substantial factor as concerns the inability of water to leave the Roberts property.
It is also undisputed based on the Affidavits of Roberts and Crane who own the

properties north of Sunnyside Drive that the Waste Ditch on their respective properties were
essentially "obliterated". 5 The natural drainage of the Roberts property has been altered by
Sunnyside Drive and the failure to maintain the culvert. Sunnyside Drive is an obstruction to the
natural drainage of water from the Roberts property which has resulted in the accumulation of
water on the Roberts' property. Further, the water discharged by the culvert, which is an artificial
structure, is not discharged into a watercourse and originally was discharged into a waste ditch
which is an artificial channel. Therefore, the doctrine of natural servitude does not apply to this
case.

5

In their affidavits they both describe the ditch on their respective properties as a depression or swale. (Crane
Affidavit ,r 4; Roberts Affidavit ,r 3.)
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3. Trespass

Roberts claims that the Jensen's filling of the Waste Water Ditch on their property and the
inability of water to flow off of the Roberts property amounts to a trespass. Roberts relies in part
upon Mock v. Potlatch Corporation, 786 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Idaho 1992) to support her claim of
trespass. The issue in Mock is whether excessive noise created by the defendant was sufficient to
support a trespass claim. The conclusion was noise is not a basis for trespass. The court referred to
the statutory trespass provisions of I.C. § 6-202 and 6-202A as well as the common law trespass. The
statutory provisions for trespass as set forth in section 6-202, requires that the real property be posted
"No Trespassing". In this case there is no such allegation of such a posting, therefore the court
examines common law trespass. The court in Mock observed that,
The traditional common law requirements for recovery for trespass to land
include (1) an invasion (2) which interferes with the right of exclusive possession
of the land, and (3) which is a direct result of some act committed by the
defendant.2 Historically, an invasion must constitute an interference with
possession in order to be actionable as a trespass.
Generally, an interference with the exclusive right of possession involves an entry
onto the land. An entry may take the form of the defendant personally intruding
on the land, causing another to intrude upon the land, or causing some tangible
thing to intrude upon the land. See Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 158(a) (1965).
Id. 876 F.Supp. at 1548

The plaintiff also relies upon Mueller v. Hill, 158 Idaho 208, 345 P.3d 998 (2015) which
is another case dealing with a claim of trespass and in Mueller the Court observed that,
Blasting rocks and debris onto the property, dumping dirt and rocks on it, and
causing increased water runoff onto it while Mr. Mueller was in possession of it
under a claim of right constituted a trespass quare clausum fregit because it was
an injury to his possession of the land. Mulchanock v. Whitehall Cement Mfg. Co.,
253 Pa. 262,263, 98 A. 554,554 (1916) (blasting rocks); Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431,
443 (1853) (blasting rocks); Cooper v. Horn, 248 Va. 417, 423, 448 S.E.2d 403,
406 (1994) ("Any physical entry upon the surface of the land constitutes such an
invasion, whether the entry is 'a walking upon it, flooding it with water, casting
objects upon it, or otherwise.' ") (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and

16- MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Page 708

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 13, at 70 (5th ed.1984)); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass§§
41 , 43 (2007).
Id. 158 Idaho at 213, 345 P.3d at 1003
While the plaintiff has correctly identified the elements of common law trespass, the facts of this
case do not establish that the Jensen's "invaded" or "caused an invasion" of the Roberts property.
This is not a case where Jensen discharged water onto the plaintiffs property or caused water to
intrude on the plaintiffs property. 6 In this case, the water was already on Roberts' property but
was not able to flow off her property without flooding. This is not a case where the defendant
caused water to "intrude" upon the plaintiffs property, it is only that the alleged conduct of the
defendant prevented or impaired the ability of the water to flow off of plaintiffs property. In fact
before the Jensen's did anything to the ditch, Roberts herself admits that the culvert was deficient
to handle the flow of water from her property and that the water would flow over and flood
Sunnyside Drive. 7 Without an intrusion or invasion on the part of the defendant there can be no
trespass. The claim of trespass must be dismissed as a matter oflaw.
4. Nuisance
Roberts alleges that the conduct of Jensen by filling the Waste Ditch has created a private
nuisance and is in violation ofl.C. § 42-1207. The claim is that Jensen's alleged "blockage of the
Waste Ditch" was an "obstruction to the free use of her property" and that Jensen violated LC.§
42-1207 when they filled in the ditch on their property. First, the plaintiff has no interest to assert
in the waste ditch easement. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 137 P.3d 456
(2006) Second, the plaintiff states that the ditch on her property has been "obliterated" from the
time she purchased the property and further describes it as a "swale". Plaintiffs expert Dr.

6

The plaintiff admitted that the water did not come from the Jensen property. (Plaintiffs Response to Request for
Admission No. 20)
7
Amended Complaint, ,r 10.
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Brockway describes the ditch on the Jensen property after they brought in the fill as a "swale". 8
Lastly, it is clear from the evidence provided that the flow of water from the Roberts property to
the Jensen property was significantly obstructed by Sunnyside Drive and the condition of the
culvert.
The purpose of the ditch was the conveyance of "waste water" which has a defined
meaning which does not include general surface water from snow melt or rain fall. A & B
Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho at 751, 118 P.3d at

83. It is clear that the purpose of the easement for the ditch was only for the conveyance of waste
water. The ditch easement was not for the purpose of conveying surface waters. As the court
noted in Mc Vicars v. Christensen, 156 Idaho 58, 62, 320 P.3d 948, 952 (2014):

Generally, "every man may regulate, improve, and control his own property, may make
such erections as his own judgment, taste, or interest may suggest, and be master of his
own without dictation or interference by his neighbors, so long as the use to which he
devotes his property is not in violation of the rights of others, however much damage they
may sustain therefrom." White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 669-70, 241 P. 367, 368
(1925).
It is clear that the ditch was never intended to convey surface water generated from rainfall or

snowmelt. Assuming that the ditch had not previously been abandoned, at best the Jensen's had
no right to impede the flow of waste water on their property but again only the dominant estate
would have standing to assert such a cause of action. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143
Idaho at 73, 137 P.3d at 460. Therefore, it is only the owner of the ditch that has any right to
enforce the easement.

8

While not raised by the parties there is a significant issue as to whether the easement described on the plat has been
abandoned, since there is no evidence that the owner has done anything to maintain the easement. Weaver v.
Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 8 P.3d 1234 (2000).
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The plaintiff relies in part on the holding in Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho 376, 304 P.2d
1104 (1957). Plaintiff opines that Langley is factually identical however that is not the case. In
Langley the Court observed that,

The lands of both the plaintiffs and the defendants have a general slope downward
from east to west, and there is a natural drain that runs westerly underneath the
highway and railroad, and crosses the southern portion of defendants' lands in a
westerly direction. This natural drain is sufficient to carry all surface run-off
water and waste irrigation water from plaintiffs' property, and would do so if it
were not for the obstruction defendants have placed across the drain in the nature
of a private driveway. (Italics added)
Id. 78 Idaho at 377-378, 304 P.2d at 1105.

It is clear from the facts of this case that the alleged natural drain and the condition of the culvert
under Sunnyside Drive is not sufficient to carry all of the surface run-off water from the Roberts'
property. In this case unlike the facts in Langley the alleged natural drain from the Roberts
property is not sufficient to carry all surface water runoff. The facts presented to the court
indicate that the condition of the culvert was a substantial factor in restricting the ability of water
to flow off of the Robert's property prior to 2013. Further, in Langley there was evidence that
water from a pumping pond on the defendant's property would backup onto the plaintiffs
pasture property. Roberts has admitted that the water on her property did not come from the
Jensen property. Therefore, the decision in Langley does not support the Roberts position in this
case.
Our courts have long recognized that when the flooding of adjacent property is the result
of the condition of or the discharge of water from an "artificial channel", such as a waste water
ditch, that a claim of trespass or nuisance is not recognized. Instead such a claim can only
proceed on a theory of negligence. Stotts by and through Dougall v. Finney, 130 Idaho 894, 950
P.2d 709 (1997); Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 792 P.2d 926 (1990).
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Assuming arguendo that Jensen's filling in of the ditch created a "dam" as alleged by the
plaintiff the issue would be whether Jensen was negligent by filling in the ditch. The plaintiff has
not alleged a claim of negligence.
The plaintiff alleges that the filling of the waste ditch by Jensen violates the provisions of
LC. § 42-1207. As a matter of law section 42-1207 does not give rise to a claim of nuisance and
may only give rise to a claim of negligence which has not been pled and again it is only the
owner of the ditch who would have standing. For the purposes of section 42-1207, there must be
proof of causation to invoke the statute which provides that the change in irrigation ditch must be
made in such a manner as not to impede flow of water therein. Allen v. Burggraf Construction

Co., 106 Idaho 451, 453, 680 P.2d 1289, 1291(1984). The evidence suggests that the condition of
the culvert is a substantial factor in the cause of the accumulation of water on the Roberts
property. Section 42-1207 defines the rights and duties of the owner of the ditch (the dominant
estate) and the owner of the land that is subject to a ditch easement (servient estate). Roberts
does not own the ditch and therefore she has no standing to seek relief under LC. § 42-1207. 9
Therefore, a claim of nuisance would fail as a matter of law.

5. Declaratory Judgment
The plaintiff seeks to have this court declare the plaintiff as the dominant estate in the
platted ditch easement. There is no allegation in the complaint and no admissible evidence before
the court as to who owns the Waste Water Ditch Easement. The plaintiff lacks standing with
respect to the relief she seeks.
"In order to demonstrate that it has standing to bring the present action it is not enough
for Tungsten to show that it owns property in the vicinity of an existing easement. To
have standing to enforce the dominant estate's rights over the servient estate, Tungsten
must demonstrate that it is the owner of that dominant estate. Beach Lateral Water Users
9

Further, under LC.§ 42-1204 the owner or constructors of a ditch have a duty to prevent damage to others and are
only liable under a theory of negligence and not negligence per se. Stotts by and through Dougall v. Finney, supra.
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Ass'n., 142 Idaho at 604, 130 P.3d at 1142; see Christensen, 142 Idaho at 136, 124 P.3d
at 1012."
Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006)

The plaintiff herein is not the owner of the Waste Ditch. Other than citing to LC. § 101201 et seq. the plaintiff has not provided any authority for this court to declare Roberts to be a
dominant estate in the ditch easement as to the Jensen property. The court will not consider a
claim of relief that is not supported with legal argument and authority. The cause of action for
declaratory relief should be dismissed as a matter of law.
V.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED
and the Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff. Since the Court has not found that Roberts has any interest in the Waste
Ditch Easement, the Counterclaim is moot. Therefore, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice and the Counterclaim is hereby dismissed as moot. 10
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Signed: 9/26/2018 02:44 PM

JohnK~

10

September 28, 2018 is the observance of National Good Neighbor Day.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record ( or self-represented party, if
any) On
Signed: 9/27/2018 09:05 AM

Via Email
Gary D. Slette
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
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Filed: 09/27/2018 09:03:37
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Creek, Shelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
)
JENSEN, husband and wife,
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D_eu_e_n_da_n_t_s._ _ _ )
LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

Case No. CV27-18-00098

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff and the
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice;
2. The Counterclaim is dismissed as moot.

DATED:

Signed: 9/26/2018 02:45 PM

John K. Butler, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
any) On
Signed: 9/27/2018 09:04 AM

Via Email

Gary D. Slette
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Deputlerk
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Electronically Filed
10/11/2018 12:03 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Sandra Peterson, Deputy Clerk

1
2
3

4
5

Gary D. Slette
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Telephone: (208) 933-0700
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
ISB # 3 I 98
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
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7

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

9

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

10

******

11
)

12

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual

13
14

Plaintiff,
V.

15

16
17
18
19

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants.

____________ __

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV27-l 8-00098

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

20
21

COMES NOW the Plaintiff above-named ("Roberts"), by and through her attorney of

22

record, Gary D. Slette, and, pursuant to IRCP Rule l l .2(b)( 1), moves this court for a

23

reconsideration of its decision dated September 27, 2018, denying Roberts' Motion for Summary

24

Judgment as to the issue of private nuisance, and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the

25
26

Defendants. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration
submitted contemporaneously herewith.
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1

Oral argument is requested.
2

3

4

DATED this

\l

dayofOctober,2018.

5

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

6

7

By:

8

<f))x~A ~~.,,--, ___

oa>;;!Jii~

9

10

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

12
13
14

15
16
17
18

The undersigned ce11ifies that on the

)I

day of October, 2018, he caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following
manner:
Robert L. HaiTis
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x]

19
20

21
22
23

24
25
26

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2
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Hand Deliver
U.S.Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission - 208-523-9518
Efile - iCourt
rharris(a),holdcnlcga I.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Electronically Filed
10/11/2018 12:03 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Sandra Peterson, Deputy Clerk

1
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Gary D. Slette
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Telephone: (208) 933-0700
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
ISB # 3198
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

2
3

4
5

8
9

10

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

11

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

12

****** ***

13

14
15

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

16
17

V.

)

18
19

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,

20

21

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants/
Counterclaimants.

Case No. CV27-l 8-00098

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

22

23

24
25

COMES NOW Plaintiff, LORA K. ROBERTS ("Robe,ts"), and respectfully requests that
this court reconsider its decision entered on September 27, 2018.

26
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II

1
ARGUMENT

2
3

A.

Private Nuisance

4

In Paragraph 25 of her Amended Complaint, Roberts alleged that the fill material placed
5

6

in the ditch by the Jensens was an obstruction which resulted in the creation of a private nuisance

7

under Idaho Code § 52-101 , et seq. In written and oral arguments, counsel for Roberts expressly

8

advanced the argument that the fill placed in the ditch created a private nuisance under that

9

statute given the increased backwater pond it created on the Robe1ts' Property. The Defendants

10

argued that although the term "private nuisance" had been alleged in the Amended Complaint,

11

the failure to specifically identify the statutory provision by code number somehow precluded
12
13

14

Roberts from advancing the argument based upon the nuisance statute. Counsel for Roberts
argued that under Idaho's notice pleading requirements, the reference to the term "private

15

nuisance" had sufficiently raised the issue. To further bolster Robert's argument in that regard,

16

reference is made to a case decided by the Idaho Supreme Court less than three months ago. In

17

Hodge v. Waggoner, Op. No. 45336, (ID. Sup. Ct., July 27, 2018), the Idaho Supreme Court

18

stated:
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26

Pleadings must be " [c]oncise and [d]irect[,]" and allegations
likewise "must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical
form is required. "Id 8(d)(l); accord id. 8(e) ('Pleadings must
be construed so as to do justice."). These rules comport with
Idaho 's notice-pleading requirement, which inquires whether a
pleading suffices to put the adverse party "on notice of the
claims brought against it." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148
Idaho 802, 807, 229, P.3d 1164, 11 69 (2010) (quoting Gibson
v. Ada Cnty. Sherrif's Dep 't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72, P.3d 845, 849,
(2003)). Notice pleading does not mandate that a pleading
particularly "identify the statutory basis for relief'; rather,
it mandates that the pleading provide "some indication" of the
basis for relief. Id. (Emphasis added).
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1

At page 9 of the court's Memorandum Decision, specific reference is made to Roberts'

2

reliance upon Idaho Code§ 52-101 , et seq., to support her claim of a private nuisance, but that is

3

the last reference to that particular statute in the court's analysis. It is for this reason that Roberts

4

respectfully asks the Court to reconsider its decision on the belief that the law pertaining to

5

private nuisance, and the facts of this case, should result in a vacation of the Court's decision

6
7
8

with summary judgment granted in favor of Roberts. [In Robe1ts' Amended Complaint, she
alleged in Paragraph 23 that the Jensens' filling in of the ditch across their property was

9

statutorily impermissible under Idaho Code § 42-1207. That statute provides that any change to

10

any ditch must be made in a manner not to as to impede the flow of the water therein or to

11

12

otherwise injure any persons interested in such ditch. Roberts is clearly "interested" in that ditch,
because it has always been the means by which water that drained from the basin above her was

13
14
15

allowed to drain across and leave her property. That statute is not a "private nuisance" statute
such as that which is codified in Idaho Code § 52-101. The reference that Roberts made to Idaho

16

Code § 42-1207 was made for the purposes of establishing a violation of a specific statute

17

pertaining to a change of a ditch, as opposed to a "private nuisance" under Idaho Code § 52-101 ,

18

et seq.] In Exhibit "A" attached to his Affidavit, Dr. Charles G. Brockway observed that the ditch

19

through the Sunnyside Acres Subdivision was a natural drainage for the natural basin which

20
includes a portion of the subdivision, as well as land lying to the northeast of the subdivision.

21
22
23

24
25
26

The size and extent of the basin was delineated by using topographic data prepared by the U.S
Geological Survey and was estimated to be 282 acres in size.
Idaho Code § 52-101 provides:
NUISANCE DEFINED. Anything which is injurious to health
or morals, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with
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1
2

the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of
any navigable lake, or river, stream, canal, or basin, or any
public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.

3

4
5

Idaho Code § 52-107 provides:
PRIVATE NUISANCE. Every nuisance not defined by law as
a public nuisance or a moral nuisance, is private.

6

Idaho Code § 52-111 provides:
7

8
9

10
11
12
13

ACTIONS FOR NUISANCE. Anything which is injurious to
health or morals, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and
the subject of an action. In the case of a moral nuisance, the
action may be brought by any resident citizen of the county; in
all other cases the action may be brought by any person whose
property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is
lessened by the nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance
may be enjoined or abated, as well as damages recovered.

14

Based upon a fair reading of the nuisance statutes, Roberts contends that an analysis of

15

Idaho Code § 52-101, et seq., and the facts of this case should lead to a determination that the

16
placement of fill in the ditch by the Defendants resulted in the obstruction of her use of her
17
property, and that the increased backwater and protracted ponding created by the fill interfered
18
19

with the comfortable enjoyment of her property. Roberts further contends that the fill obstructed

20

the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of the basin described by Dr. Brockway. The

21

ditch which drains the natural basin is certainly a part of the basin. History shows that in prior

22

years, the flood water rose to a maximum depth of approximately 4 inches on Sunnyside Drive

23

before accumulated it ultimately drained through the ditch across the Jensens' Property. See

24
Paragraph 5 of Lora Roberts Affidavit. That depth of water on Sunnyside Drive meant that
25
26

backwater pond never extended as far north on the Robe11s' Prope1ty as it did in 2017. Instead of
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1

being allowed to drain in 2017, the Jensens' fill material worked as a dam or a weir which

2

resulted in water being contained and ponding on the Roberts' Property for approximately two

3

weeks until the frost left the ground and the water infiltrated in the soil. See Paragraph 9 of Lora

4
5

Roberts Affidavit. That dam or weir became the new control mechanism. Figure 3 at page 5 of
Exhibit "A" to Dr. Brockway's Supplemental Affidavit clearly shows an elevated water surface

6

due to the fill on the Jensens' Property. Instead of rising to a depth of only 4 inches, the water on
7

8
9

10
11

12

Sunnyside Drive rose to a depth of approximately 18 inches resulting in the backwater extending
much farther to the north on the Roberts' Property than it ever had done historically, and to the
point where it flooded her barn and corral, and intruded into the crawl space of her home.
Roberts has acknowledged that the culvert under Sunnyside Drive is insufficient to carry
all the flood waters that accumulated in 201 7 and in two prior years. As a result, the water crested

13
on Sunnyside Drive to a depth of 4 inches before draining through the ditch on the Jensens'

14
15

Property. That resulted in water ponding for a limited distance or area on the Roberts property,

16

but never as far no11h as her barn, her corrals or the crawlspace of her home. See Paragraph 5 of

17

Roberts Affidavit. The water never ponded and remained on her property for an extended period

18

of time as it did in 2017. That was because the ditch had been filled, which resulted in the

19

elevation of the ground just south of the culvert being 8 to 10 inches higher than the top of the

20
culvert. See Paragraph 11 of Lora Roberts Affidavit. See also page 4 of Exhibit "A" to the

21
22

23
24

25
26

Supplemental Affidavit of Charles G. Brockway which states:
Regardless of the magnitude of the runoff flow, once water has
ponded, it cannot drain because the fill on the Jensens'
Property acts as a dam.
Although 2017 may have been a wet spring in Jerome County, the amount of the inflow
made no difference because the accumulated water from the basin above could not flow away
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1

from the Roberts' Property due to the obstruction in the ditch. Dr. Brockway further indicated

2

that if the fill had not been placed, standing water would not persist on the Roberts' Property

3

after the runoff had ceased. See page 4 of Exhibit " A" to Brockway Affidavit.

4

See also

Paragraph 3(1) of Lora Roberts Supplemental Affidavit which references a photo showing that

5

the inflow to her property had ceased, but that water was still ponded up to her house, barn and
6

7
8
9

corrals on February 11, 2017.
At page 18 of its Memorandum Decision, the court stated:

It is clear that the ditch was never intended to convey surface
water generated from rainfall or snowmelt.

10
11

Roberts respectfully disagrees with the court's conclusion. That is certainly not consistent

12

with Dr. Brockway's repo1t indicating that the ditch was a natural drainage for the entire 282 acre

13

basin as shown on USGS data. Prior to about 1905, the North Side Canal Company did not exist

14

so as to provide surface water irrigation in the basin. However, events of rainfall and melting

15

snow clearly predated the time that man began to irrigate areas in that basin. In his affidavit,

16
Larry Bos indicated that he had observed where natural drainage from rain and snowmelt flowed

17
18
19

into the channel where the culvert is now located under Sunnyside Drive. See Paragraph 4 of Bos
Affidavit. [As noted by the comt in footnote 4, Mr. Bos would have been

or

20

younger when he helped his father farm the property prior to the time that the plat was recorded

21

for the Sunnyside Acres Subdivision. The court ' s math is correct, and any farm kid growing up in

22
23

Idaho will tell you that he or she is generally assisting on the farm by the time they are
and can drive a tractor by the time they are 10.] In any event, it is clear that the basin

24
drainage channel predated the platting of the subdivision, and the ditch easement was only

25
26

depicted on the plat in the same area where the natural drainage existed.
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1

Although the Court has stated its belief that the decision in Langley v. Deshazer, 78 Idaho

2
376, 304 P.2d 1104 (1957) does not supp011 the position of Roberts, Roberts respectfully
3

4

disagrees, and asks the Court to reconsider the issue of private nuisance on the same basis as the

5

Com1 did in Langley. In the instant case, the control factor which dictated the extent of the

6

backwater on the Roberts' Property allowed water to accumulate to a maximum depth of 4 inches

7

on Sunnyside Drive. Water could only back up on the Roberts' Property to an elevation that was

8

nowhere near her barn, corrals or the crawl space of her home before the water drained away.

9

The new control factor was the fill placed by the Defendants which Dr. Brockway indicates is 3.0
10
11
12

feet higher then the invert of the Sunnyside Drive culvert at its outlet, and 2.5 feet higher then the
invert of the original ditch at that same point. See Exhibit "A" at page 2 of Dr. Brockway' s

13

Supplemental Affidavit. As Dr. Brockway indicated in his report, the magnitude of the runoff

14

flow doesn't make any difference, because once water has ponded on the Roberts' Property, it

15
16

cannot drain due to the Jensens' fill material which acts as a dam. That fill created the nuisance.
Just as the Court found that the raising of the private driveway in Langley constituted a

17
nuisance because it did not carry off all of the accumulated water which was backed up on the
18
19

plaintiffs' property, the same determination should result in this case. The trial court found that

20

the Deshazers' actions created a nuisance, and ordered an abatement of the nuisance and awarded

21

damages. Finding no reversible error, the judgment was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Com1.

22
23

Roberts respectfully contends that this situation is analogous to a reservoir which
perennially floods an adjacent landowner's property for a lineal distance of 50 feet before water

24
is discharged through a spillway or over the dam. If the owner of the reservoir increases the
25
26

height of the dam and spillway so that water now backs up for I 00 feet on the adjacent
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1

landowner's property, that would certainly constitute a nuisance under Idaho Code§ 52-101 , et

2
seq. Just as in the instant case, that increased obstruction would interfere with the free use and
3

4

comfortable enjoyment of the landowner's prope11y. Just because Roberts' Property had flooded

5

to a limited extent on occasions prior to 2017 for a lineal distance of "x" number of feet does not

6

mean that that the Jensens were entitled to block the ditch that drained the basin so that five

7

times "x" of her property would now be inundated.

8

Just as the Court found that the Defendants' actions in Langley, supra, constituted a

9

nuisance by creating a levee and dike which created a backwater pond on the Langleys' property

10
11

12

the com1 is urged to find that a nuisance exists, and that it must be abated in accordance with
Idaho Code § 52-111.

13

The case of Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,213 P.2d 911 (1950) provides an analogous

14

fact situation, although inverse condemnation by the state of Idaho was the substance of that

15

action. In Renninger, the state replaced an old bridge. The construction of the new bridge caused

16
a rise in the road grade which acted as a dam that obstructed water flow causing it to back up on

17
18
19

the plaintiffs' property. The Court held that the backwater flooding created by the raise in the
road grade acted as dam. Obviously, this case does not involve a condemnation action by a

20

governmental entity, but the analogy is clear. A nuisance exists in the instant case by virtue of

21

impairment and obstruction of the customary passage of water in the basin. As such, the court is

22

respectfully urged to apply the law of nuisance and find that it fits squarely within the holding of

23

the Langley case, and is at least analogous to the fact situation in Renninger.

24
Roberts has reviewed the court's decision at Paragraph 19 relative to a discharge of water

25
26

from an " artificial channel" related to a negligence claim. The two cases cited by the court at
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18

1

page 19 both involve a discharge of water from a dam to downstream property as opposed to the

2
fact situation in the instant case where the "dam" has resulted in water being impounded on an
3

4

upstream owner's prope11y. The channel referenced in Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117

5

Idaho 901, 792 P.2d 926 (1990) was discharged into a natural stream channel which flooded the

6

plaintiffs' downstream prope11y.

7

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16

The Kunz court distinguished two lines of cases in Idaho relating to flood damage,
stating:
The Court of Appeals described another line of our cases which
involve situations where a natural channel is altered or
obstructed through the placement of barriers which diminish
the ability of the channel to carry its natural volume thereby
causing flood damage to another riparian landowner. Under
these factual circumstances the injured riparian landowner may
not be limited to a " negligence only" cause of action." See e.g.,
Campion v. Simpson, 104 Idaho 413, 659 P.2d 766 (1983);
Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 406 P.2d 113
(1965); Boise Development Company, Ltd. V Boise City, 30
Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032 (1917); and Fischer v. Davis, 19 Idaho
493, 116 P. 412 (1911). Id. , 117 Idaho at 903 , 792 P.2d at 928
(emphasis in the original).

17

Campion v. Simpson , cited by the Kunz Court, is particularly instructive with regard to the

18

present matter. In that case the defendant had obstructed a stream which resulted in flooding

19

upon neighboring property. The trial court had held that because there were other potentially

20

contributing causes to the flooding, such as an act of God, and alterations to the river by other

21
22

parties, the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of establishing that the defendant was the sole

23

and proximate cause of the damage. The Campion court held that " neither of those reasons

24

constitute a bar to Campion receiving full compensation against the tortfeasor he has sued."

25

Campion v. Simpson, 104 Idaho 413 , 416, 659 P .2d 766, 769 (1983). Similarly, in this matter the

26

extreme precipitation event of 2017, and other blockages such as the Sunnyside Drive culvert do
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1

not serve to alleviate the Jensens of their responsibility for creating the flooding upon Robe1ts'

2
property.
3

4

B. Negligence

5

While Roberts contends that her claim of private nuisance is a valid claim not unlike that

6

advanced in Langley, if this court believes that a negligence theory should be advanced, Roberts

7

respectfully requests that the decision and judgment be vacated or modified to allow her to asse11

8

such facts pursuant to IRCP Rule 56 (e)(l) by being provided an opportunity to support or

9

address such factual matters. Just as this court found that Roberts would not be prejudiced when

10
11

the Defendants' new counsel was substituted in this case, and the new counsel was allowed to

12

entirely amend the previous answer of Mr. Rolig, Roberts should be afforded an opportunity to

13

advance a negligence cause of action consistent with the court's belief of its applicability.

14

However, Roberts' counsel stands by the propriety of its nuisance cause of action as pied, but is

15

certainly prepared to proceed based upon a negligence theo1y as an alternative basis for relief.

16
C. Natural Servitude

17
In Paragraph 31 of her Amended Complaint, Roberts sought a declaratory judgment that

18
19

she had a natural servitude or easement through the Jensens ' Property for the drainage of water
This comt disagreed and

20

that naturally flowed onto her property from the basin above her.

21

declined to find that such a servitude existed. In other words, this court must therefore believe

22

that Roberts is obligated to accept all the natural drainage in the basin that comes down onto her

23

property without any means to have it pass through her prope1ty as has historically been the case.

24
The law on natural servitudes has previously been recited to the court, and this court is requested

25
26

to reconsider its decision in light of the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in Merrill v. Penrod,
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1

2
3

4
5
6

7

8
9

10
11

12

109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (app. 1985). In a case with a somewhat similar fact situation to the
instant case, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
Water, that most precious of compounds, can be at once man' s
friend and his natural enemy. So it proved to be in this case, as
neighbor turned against neighbor in the quest for harmony with
nature. The plaintiffs, Don and Florence Merrill, Mary
Thompson and Fero) Adams, brought this action to establish
their rights to easements across the property of the defendants,
Paul and Alta Penrod. The Merrills claimed easements for the
purpose of diverting surface water and irritation waste water
from their property and Adams' prope11y onto the Penrods'
property. They also sought damages for injuries to their land
caused by the Penrods' interference with the man-made ditch
used to divert the water and they requested an injunction to
prevent further interference.
704 P.2d at 952-3
Much was made about the issue of the ditch not being a natural water course in the instant

13
case, but it is apparent that the ditch in the Merrill case was a man-made ditch. The Penrods took

14
15
16

it upon themselves to dam the ditch which carried both natural surface water and irrigation waste
water. As a result, water in the ditch backed up behind the dam and overflowed the banks

17

flooding approximately 8 acres of pasture land. 704 P.2d at 954. According to the Idaho Court of

18

Appeals, the trial court specifically reached a conclusion that Adams, one of the plaintiffs in the

19

case, had a natural servitude for the purpose of draining surface water directly onto the Penrod

20
parcel, a conclusion that was not challenged on appeal by the Penrods. Id.

21
Just as the trial court in Merrill found that a natural servitude existed in that case, the
22

23

court in the instant case should reach a similar conclusion. The basin above Roberts discharges

24

all of the natural occurring surface water through the Crane Property onto the Roberts Property,

25

and the law implies a servitude on the downstream property in order to allow it to escape the

26

Roberts Property. Clearly, the dam created by the Jensens constitutes an impediment to the
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1

2

natural servitude, and for that reason, this court should declare that such natural servitude or
easement exists as expressly sought in Roberts Amended Complaint.

3

CONCLUSION

4
5
6

Roberts respectfully requests that the court reconsider its decision and vacate its prior
Judgement on the basis set forth herein.

7

8

9

DATED this

\\

day of October, 2018.

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

10
11

By ~

12

GaryilSltte

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

The undersigned ce11ifies that on the
3

4

\\

day of October, 2018, he caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following
manner:

5
6

7

Robert L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

8

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

~tV

Hand Deliver
U.S. Mail
Overnight Courier
Facsimile Transmission - 208-523-9518
Efile - iCourt
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawl ings@holdenlegal.com

9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23

24
25
26
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Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

JENSENS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants/Counterclaimants.
Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants
herein (the "Jensens"), by and through their attorneys of record, Robert L. Harris and D. Andrew
Rawlings of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit Jensens' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Lora Roberts ("Roberts") brought this case against her
neighbors, the Jensens, claiming three causes of action: trespass, nuisance, and declaratory
judgment. (See, generally, Amended Complaint (filed June 5, 2018) (the "Complaint")). These
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causes of action arise out of flooding that occurred in or about February 2017 on property Roberts
owns (described in detail in Complaint, ,-r 1, and referred to herein as the "Roberts Property") and
out of the Jensens' actions filling in a ditch on their property (which property is described in detail
in Complaint, ,-r 2, and referred to herein as the "Jensen Property"). The ditch on the Jensen
Property is part of a ditch that crosses the Jensen Property, the Roberts Property, a public street,
and three other lots in the Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the full ditch is referred to herein as the
"Waste Ditch").
Upon considering cross motions for summary judgment, filed by the parties, the Court
dismissed each of Roberts' claims. The Court found that "the doctrine of natural servitude does
not apply to this case" (Memorandum Decision and Order ("Decision"), p. 15 (filed September 27,
2018) ); that there could be no trespass because "the facts of this case do not establish that the
Jensens 'invaded' or 'caused an invasion' of the Roberts property" (Decision, p. 17); that (among
other problems with Roberts' nuisance claim) "[a]s a matter oflaw section 42-1207 does not give
rise to a claim of nuisance" (Decision, p. 20); and that Roberts "is not the owner of the Waste
Ditch" and has made "no allegation in the complaint and [presented] no admissible evidence"
regarding who the owner of the Waste Ditch may be (Decision, pp. 20-21 ). Based on these
findings, the Court entered Judgment accordingly on September 27, 2018.
On October 11, 2018, Roberts filed Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (the
"Reconsideration Motion") and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
("Reconsideration Memo"). Roberts asks the Court to reconsider the Decision (Reconsideration
Motion, p. 1), at times seeking just the vacation of the Decision (Reconsideration Memo, p. 12)

and at other times seeking summary judgment in her favor (Reconsideration Memo, p. 3).
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II. INTRODUCTION
Roberts now seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Decision as to her nuisance claim and
her claim to a natural servitude. But Roberts presents no new facts and no legal basis for the Court
to change its Decision in any respect. Roberts has no interest in a natural servitude across the
Jensen Property. Roberts has shown no basis to revive or revise her nuisance claim. In sum, the
Court’s Decision should remain unchanged and the Reconsideration Motion should be denied.
III. ARGUMENT
Roberts’ Reconsideration Motion ultimately seeks only partial reconsideration, as not all
of the Court’s Decision is challenged. As to Roberts’ claims, the Reconsideration Motion does
not ask the Court to reconsider its Decision with respect to the dismissal of Roberts’ First Cause
of Action for Trespass or Roberts’ Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment, at least as to
Roberts’ formerly-claimed interest in the Waste Ditch easement. Thus, because the deadline for
seeking reconsideration of the Decision is past, the Court’s determinations in these respects are
final for purposes of Roberts’ Reconsideration Motion.
Additionally, Roberts has not challenged any of the Court’s rulings with respect to any of
the cross motions to strike. (Decision, pp. 6-8). The Court struck the portion of Paragraph 9 of
the Roberts Affidavit (filed April 11, 2018) relating to any opinion as to the cause of causation of
her 2017 flooding. (Decision, p. 6). Yet despite this fact, Roberts cites to that paragraph to
describe how “the Jensens’ fill material worked as a dam or a weir” and supposedly caused the
flooding at issue. (Reconsideration Memo, pp. 4-5). Accordingly, the Court must continue to
disregard Roberts’ unqualified expert opinions, which it has already struck.
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Roberts has presented no new evidence and Roberts’ legal arguments fail to demonstrate
any error in what the Court has decided.
A. The Court correctly determined that Roberts has no interest in the Waste Ditch and there
is no natural servitude.
The Court found that “prior to the platting of the Sunnyside Subdivision that the land was
primarily agricultural and that a waste water ditch had been established prior to the development
of the subdivision.” (Decision, p. 11). The “doctrine of natural servitude does not apply to this
case” because of the facts—which remain undisputed on reconsideration—that the “natural
drainage of the Roberts property has been altered by Sunnyside Drive and the failure to maintain
the culvert,” Sunnyside Drive itself has caused an obstruction of any natural drainage that once
occurred, and because “the water discharged by the culvert, which is an artificial structure, is not
discharged into a watercourse and originally was discharged into a waste ditch which is an artificial
channel.” (Decision, p. 15).
Roberts’ entire challenge to the Court’s Decision in this regard is based solely on
Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985). (Reconsideration Memo, pp. 1012). However, neither Merrill nor Roberts’ argument based on it provide any reason for the Court
to reconsider its Decision.
First, the Reconsideration Memo itself points out the key fact in Merrill that distinguishes
it: “the trial court specifically reached a conclusion that Adams, one of the plaintiffs in the case,
has a natural servitude for the purpose of draining surface water directly onto the Penrod parcel, a
conclusion that was not challenged on appeal by the Penrods.” (Reconsideration Memo, p. 11
(emphasis added)). Thus, Merrill does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited by Roberts.
Roberts’ attempt to cite to Merrill only uses points that are dicta and were not at issue before the
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Idaho Court of Appeals. That failure to cite to actual authority is fatal to Roberts' Reconsideration
Motion.

Second, Roberts attempts to use this dicta from Merrill to show that a "man-made ditch"
can still bear a natural servitude even though it is not "a natural water course." (Reconsideration
Memo, p. 11 ). However, the cited dicta of the Merrill case does not even support that assertion.

The Merrill Court noted that the trial court found that "Adams has a natural servitude for the
purpose of draining surface water directly onto the Penrod parcel (this is not challenged on
appeal)." Merrill, 109 Idaho at 50, 704 P.2d at 954 (emphasis added). The facts recited make
clear that the Adams property released water onto the Penrod property in two ways:
Water run-off from the Adams parcel, both natural surface water and
irrigation waste water, is collected in the community ditch on the Merrills'
parcel and, together with the water diverted from the Vaughn Canal, finds
its way to the Penrod parcel. The Penrod parcel also receives water run-off
directly from the Adams parcel. This general state of affairs has existed for
over twenty years.
Id. 1 The uncontested natural servitude relates to the second source (i.e., "water run-off directly

from the Adams parcel") that has absolutely no relation to the man-made ditch. Id. Contrary to
Roberts argument, the man-made ditch at issue in Merrill could not be the conduit of a natural
servitude, and the Merrill Court had to find a basis for an easement relating to the ditch.

The Merrill decision also contains a map of the parcels, showing the two avenues water is released from the
Adams property onto the Penrod property:

l.lWtS

,.'

: //
Merrill, 109 Idaho at 53, 704 P.2d at 957.
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The Court clarified that “a dominant landowner [benefitting from a natural servitude] may
not increase the burden upon servient lands by accumulating surface waters with man-made
structures and discharging those accumulated waters, through an artificial channel, onto the lower
lands.” Id. at 53, 704 P.2d at 957 (citing Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073
(1974) and Teeter v. Nampa and Meridian Irrigation Dist., 19 Idaho 355, 114 P. 8 (1911)). That
is precisely why—as to the man-made ditch—Adams had to “establish an easement, by
prescription or agreement, to discharge the altered flow,” which Adams did. Merrill, 109 Idaho at
54, 704 P.2d at 958. Thus, even taken for whatever precedential value it may have, Merrill
supports the Court’s Decision and undermines Roberts’ argument. A man-made ditch alters a
natural drainage and vitiates a natural servitude. As a result, in this respect, the Court must deny
Roberts’ Reconsideration Motion; neither Roberts nor the Roberts Property has a natural servitude
onto, over, or across the Jensen Property because the “doctrine of natural servitude does not apply
to this case.” (Decision, p. 11).
B. The Court correctly dismissed Roberts’ Second Cause of Action for Nuisance.
To reiterate a point the Jensens have previously made and the Court noted, the starting
point in the nuisance analysis is the recognition that
Generally, “every man may regulate, improve, and control his own
property, may make such erections as his own judgment, taste, or interest
may suggest, and be master of his own without dictation or interference by
his neighbors, so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in
violation of the rights of others, however much damage they may
sustain therefrom.”
McVicars v. Christensen, 156 Idaho 58, 62, 320 P.3d 948, 952 (2014), as corrected (Feb. 20, 2014)
(quoting White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 669–70, 241 P. 367, 368 (1925)) (emphasis added).
This is significant because the Court correctly found that Roberts “has no interest to assert in the
Page 6
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waste ditch easement.” (Decision, p. 17 (citing Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69,
137 P.2d 456 (2006) (indicating that without ownership of a dominant estate, a plaintiff lacks
standing to claim rights to an easement))).
Additionally, the Court dismissed Roberts’ claim for nuisance based on the facts that
Roberts “obliterated” the portion of the Waste Ditch on the Roberts Property, the possible
abandonment of the Waste Ditch easement, the obstruction caused by Sunnyside Drive, and the
purpose of the Waste Ditch easement (which is to carry “waste water” and never to convey
“general surface water from snow melt or rain fall”), and the lack of any natural drainage sufficient
to carry all of the surface run-off water from the Roberts Property. (Decision, pp. 18-19).
Roberts still makes no attempt to address or state the elements of nuisance. In fact, her
Reconsideration Memo, Roberts continues to claim a cause of action pursuant to Idaho Code § 421207 and is now making the new assertion—never before raised in any of Roberts’ memoranda
supporting her two motions for summary judgment filed in this case—that she has stated a cause
of action for a “private nuisance” pursuant to Idaho Code § 52-101. (Reconsideration Memo,
pp. 2-3). However, neither of these assertions overcomes all of the reasons explained in the
Court’s Decision to dismiss Roberts’ claims.
1. Roberts has no valid nuisance claim under Idaho Code § 42-1207.
Idaho Code § 42-1207 protects persons with a legal interest in a ditch. Roberts argues that,
in line with Idaho Code § 42-1207, she “is clearly ‘interested’ in [the Waste Ditch] because it has
always been the means by which water that drained from the basin above her was allowed to drain
across and leave her property.” (Reconsideration Memo, p. 3). However, Roberts’ argument is
insufficient for at least two reasons.
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First, as the Court correctly found, “Roberts has no basis to claim any interest—by
easement or natural servitude—in the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property.” (Decision, p. 13).
The Reconsideration Memo only claims an “interest” in the Waste Ditch on the basis of what she
is used to. (See Reconsideration Memo, p. 3). That is not a legal interest that is protected by Idaho
Code § 42-1207. (See Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss, pp. 911 (filed April 30, 2018)).
Second, Idaho Code § 42-1207, by its terms, relates exclusively to ditches. Roberts has no
interest in the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property. Ditch rights and water rights across another’s
property, while both are real property interests, are separate and distinct from each other. See
Mullinix v. Killgore’s Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269, 277, 346 P.3d 286, 294 (2015).
Roberts has not sought reconsideration relating to her easement theory, but only contests the
Court’s finding relating to a natural servitude. A natural servitude can grant the right to convey
water across another’s property—but a natural servitude cannot grant any legal interest in a ditch,
that is to say, a natural servitude cannot create a ditch right or ditch easement. For that reason,
Roberts cannot have a claim under Idaho Code § 42-1207, because she cannot have a legal interest
in the Waste Ditch.
2. Roberts’ Complaint does not provide notice of a nuisance claim based on Idaho
Code § 52-101, et seq.
In a desperate attempt to revive her Complaint, Roberts relies on Idaho’s liberal notice
pleading standard to again pivot away from a defeated claim and morph it into something entirely
different. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). The pleading “must be simple,
concise, and direct.” Hodge for & on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner, 164 Idaho 89, ___, 425 P.3d
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1232, 1239 (2018), reh 'g denied (Oct. 1, 2018) (citations omitted). Indeed, "[p]leadings must be
construed so as to do justice." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e). The key inquiry is "whether a
pleading suffices to put the adverse party on notice of the claims brought against it." Waggoner,
164 Idaho at_, 425 P.3d at 1239 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The Second Cause of Action in Roberts' Complaint alleges in full:
. ECOND CAUSF. OF ACTION

l

_ uisance

2

22, Roberts rcallegcs the allegations sci fo11h in all of the above paragraphs as if set forth
in full herein_

4

23 . Pur~uatll to Idaho Cod~ § 42-1207 , a ~hange uf a vis ible

the person or persons O\Jio11ing or controlli.ng

t

itch may only be made by

c land upon which the ditch is located, but sucll

change must be made in such a manner as. not to impede the flow of the water tbeniin, or to

cit·hcrwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such ditch, canal, lateral

7

01·

drai11 or buried h·rigation condaif. (Emphasis o.dded).

24. The Jensens' placement of fill in the ditch and within 1he nat\1ra servitude

9

as

itnpeded the flow of water the ·ein which has led to the damages cl.aimed by Robe11s.

10

25. The Jensens' con ·nuing obstmclion to tht: free use of the Roberts Properly has cre.ated

11

a pr 'vate nuisance, a d Roberts is cntitl,ed to an injunction enjoining or abating the confnued

12

blocka.ge of the waste ditch and/or the natural .servitud e on the- Je11.'>en Property which impedes
I

ul

th~ discrrnrge of ll<1hm1! f]ows ac.:rQs«: lht: J~nsen Prope11y, log~'l11er wi th an ordt:r l:Otnpelling. the

14.

Jcnscm to restore !he ditch lo is previous condition.

1

(Complaint, p. 4). Roberts points to paragraph 25, and its singular mention in passing of"a private
nuisance," as the basis for her new theory of her nuisance claim. (Reconsideration Memo, p. 3).
Roberts now claims that "[t]he reference Roberts made to Idaho Code § 42-1207 was made for
purposes of establishing a violation of a specific statute pertaining to a change of a ditch, as
opposed to a 'private nuisance' under Idaho Code § 52-101, et seq." (Reconsideration Memo,
p. 3). This is implausible. This requires believing that Roberts, through counsel, would draft a
complaint (twice, as Roberts filed a complaint and an amended complaint) that that lists three
causes of action, but actually contains two separate and distinct causes of action within what is
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listed as the “SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION” and despite the presence of a Third Cause of Action
seeking a declaratory judgment. As the Court has already correctly once held, the Complaint
provided only notice of a nuisance claim based on Idaho Code § 42-1207. Roberts failed to plead
any other basis for her nuisance claim.
Additionally, issues must be timely raised.

This principle applies to all pleadings,

including causes of action in complaints, affirmative defenses in answers, etc. Waggoner, 164
Idaho at ___, 425 P.3d at 1239. Claims and affirmative defenses are not waived “so long as [they
are] raised before trial and the opposing party has time to respond in briefing and oral argument.”
Navo v. Bingham Mem’l Hosp., 160 Idaho 363, 374, 373 P.3d 681, 692 (2016), reh’g denied (June
9, 2016) (citing Patterson v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 316, 256 P.3d 718,
724 (2011)).
Here, Roberts never raised Idaho Code § 52-101, et seq., until now—after judgment has
been entered against Roberts. Thus, it has not been “raised before trial,” as the matter has been
decided on summary judgment and judgment has been entered. This has also deprived the Jensens
opportunity to “respond in briefing and oral argument.”
Further, Roberts is judicially estopped from changing tack at this late date to transform her
nuisance claim into something it has never before been. Adopted in Idaho in 1954:
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one
position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible
with the first. A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12,
14 (2005). The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect “the integrity of
the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and
having regard for the dignity of the judicial proceeding.” Id. at 685, 116
P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101,
952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct.App.1998)). Broadly accepted, it is intended to
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system. Id.; see
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also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 186 (2012). Judicial estoppel protects
the integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants; therefore, it is not
necessary to demonstrate individual prejudice. Wood, 141 Idaho at 686, 116
P.3d at 16 (citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778
(9th Cir.2001)).
McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013). Roberts’ desperate attempt
to re-fashion her nuisance claim into something it has never been after having lost at the summary
judgment stage undermines the integrity of the judicial system, the orderly administration of
justice, and the dignity of the judicial proceeding.
While Roberts’ new private nuisance allegation is itself legally insufficient, as described
in Section III.B.3., infra, Roberts should not be allowed to advance this new allegation because
her Complaint provided no notice of it (that is, it does not contain a private nuisance claim based
on Idaho Code § 52-101, et seq.) and, because it has been untimely raised after judgment, it has
been waived or, alternatively, Roberts is estopped from raising the issue now.
3. Roberts’ nuisance claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 52-101, et seq., are legally
insufficient and should not be countenanced by the Court.
Even if the Court, for whatever reason, were to consider Roberts’ claim under Idaho Code
§ 52-101, et seq., it cannot withstand the scrutiny of a summary judgment review. Regardless of
how much damage may be caused to others, a landowner may “regulate, improve, and control his
own property … so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in violation of the
rights of others.” McVicars, 156 Idaho at 62, 320 P.3d at 952 (quoting White, 41 Idaho at 669–
70, 241 P. at 368) (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of whatever damage occurred on the Roberts
Property, Roberts has no claim against the Jensens for nuisance without a property interest on the
Jensen Property. Roberts no longer claims an easement interest and her natural servitude interest
continues to be invalid, see Section III.A., supra, meaning Roberts has absolutely no interest in
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the Jensen Property. For that reason. Roberts lacks standing and has no basis to assert a nuisance
claim against the Jensens.
C. The Court should not allow Roberts to change theories again and present additional
evidence regarding negligence.
Roberts included a section in her Reconsideration Memo, under the heading “Negligence,”
that seems to seek an opportunity to change theories again and, having been unsuccessful at the
summary judgment stage under her current theories, is an attempt to once more pivot beyond the
scope of her Amended Complaint. (Reconsideration Memo, p. 10). While Roberts does not seek
leave to (again) amend her complaint and has not filed any motion pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 15; Roberts only asks the Court to vacate its Judgment in order to “allow her to assert
such facts pursuant to IRCP Rule 56 (e)(1) [sic].” (Reconsideration Memo, p. 10).
Rule 56(e)(1) does not apply to this situation. That rule provides that “[i]f a party fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact
as required by Rule 56(c), the court may … give an opportunity to properly support or address the
fact.” Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1). However, Roberts is not discussing merely
unsupported factual assertions—Roberts seeks to assert a whole new claim (negligence). In fact,
Roberts claims that:
Just as this court [sic] found that Roberts would not be prejudiced when the
Defendants’ new counsel was substituted in this case, and the new counsel
was allowed to entirely amend the previous answer of Mr. Rolig, Roberts
should be afforded an opportunity to advance a negligence cause of action
consistent with the court’s [sic] belief of its applicability.
(Reconsideration Memo, p. 10). However, this line of argument cannot be seriously countenanced.
The difference between the Jensens’ prior amendment (and also the prior amendment filed by
Roberts with the stipulation of Jensens’ counsel) and what Roberts now proposes is the entry of
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Judgment. It is obviously prejudicial to the Jensens to vacate a judgment entered in their favor in
order to allow Roberts to present yet another theory now that all of her actual claims have been
definitively defeated.

IV. CONCLUSION
Roberts presents no new facts and insufficient legal argumentation to show any error in the
Court's Decision. The Court correctly determined that that Roberts has no interest in the natural
servitude and that all of her claims (including the nuisance claim) must be dismissed. The Jensens
are entitled to judgment in their favor. Roberts' Reconsideration Motion presents no basis to
reconsider the Decision, and so it must be denied.

DATED this 9th day of November, 2018.

D.MJ~?lings,

Esq.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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1

ARGUMENT

2

In this case, both paiiies stipulated to Roberts' amendment of her Complaint to include

3

Paragraph 25 which asse1ied a claim based on private nuisance. Abatement of the nuisance through

4

an injunction as contemplated in Idaho Code § 52-110 was sought. At page 9 of its Memorandum

5

Decision, the comi expressly referenced that nuisance statute as the basis for one of Roberts'
6

7

claims. Idaho Code § 43-1207 was never cited as the basis for an allegation of nuisance, but rather,

8

was cited for the statutory prohibition of a change or obstruction of a ditch in a manner that

9

impeded the flow of water therein. Such change in a ditch, according to that statute, could not be

10

made in a manner as to injure a person who was "interested" in such ditch. As the outlet for the

11

basin above her property, it is apparent that Roberts was acutely interested in the ditch.

12

The private nuisance aspect of the claim was specifically pied in the Amended Complaint,
13
14

contrary to the Jensens' argument on Page 8 of their Memorandum. Robe1is' pleading was "simple,

15

concise and direct", i.e., the term, "private nuisance" was expressly alleged in no unce1iain terms.

16

Other than Title 52, the only other references to a "private nuisance" contained in the entire Idaho

17

Code are found in LC. §§ 67-9103 & 67-9104 relating to outdoor sport shooting ranges, and LC.§

18

22-4505 relating to agricultural operations. There could have been no misunderstanding by the

19

Jensens as to the basis for Robe1is' claim of a "private nuisance" in the case. The Idaho Supreme

20

Court's holding in Hodge v. Wagner, Op. No. 45336 (ID. Sup. Ct., July 27, 2018), stands for the
21
22

proposition that notice pleading does not require that a party specifically identify the statutory basis

23

for relief if there is "some indication" of the basis for relief. The use of the specific words "private

24

nuisance" certainly constituted a clear indication of the basis for Roberts' claim for relief.

25

26

Jensens have erroneously suggested to this court that Robe1is never raised I.C. § 52-101., et

seq., until after the Judgment was entered in this case. That is facially inconect. The Amended
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1

Complaint raised the issue of "private nuisance". Roberts' Reply Memorandum filed on August 20

2

specifically identified LC. §§ 52-101 & 52-107 relative to her "private nuisance" claim. If memo1y

3

is correct, these statutory provisions were expressly addressed by both parties in oral argument on

4

August 27, and the court referenced that code section in its Memorandum Decision. Jensens'

5

suggestion that this is a "new private nuisance allegation" that was not raised until after entry of the
6
7

comt's Judgment is not suppo1ted by the record. LC. § 52-111 clearly contemplated that an action

8

for nuisance could be maintained by Roberts pmsuant to LC. § 52-101, et seq., all as more

9

specifically advanced in Robe1ts' Memorandum in Suppo1t of Motion for Reconsideration.

10
11

12

It is notewo1thy that the USGS information attached as Exhibit "D" to the Declaration of
Andrew Rawlings actually supp01ts the "basin" or "watershed" argument advanced by Roberts,
and as expressly confirmed by Dr. Brockway in his repo1t attached to his Supplemental Affidavit.

13
14
15

The land area above the Roberts prope1ty is a defined basin or watershed consisting of 282 acres
that contributes smface runoff from rain and snowmelt by funneling that water to a point. That

16

point then discharges water downstream through the basin which prevents its prolonged ponding or

17

accumulation on anyone's property in the basin area above. Until the Jensens obstructed the flow

18

and free passage of water from the basin, water would drain and exit the basin tlu·ough the Robe1ts

19

prope1ty, the Jensen property and the prope1ty to the south, and then ultimately passing under 500

20
South Road. Roberts has never disputed that discrete amounts of water ponded temporarily on her

21
22

prope1ty upstream of Sunnyside Drive for a lineal distance of approximately 50 feet, but which

23

never intruded anywhere near her house or barn. The backwater pond that ensued as a result as a

24

result of the Jensens' fill or obstruction of the basin caused water to back up for a period of 2-3

25

weeks for a lineal distance of more than 200 feet which reached as far as her barn and crawl space.

26

It is that cause and effect which generated the private nuisance claim advanced by Robe1ts.
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1

Roberts has raised the analogy of an existing irrigation dam which, when raised to its

2

maximum height, creates a backwater that floods an acre of an upstream landowner's prope11y

3

pursuant to some so1i of easement, prescriptive or otherwise. If the height of the dam were to be

4

raised by five feet, and the resultant backwater flooded an additional thirty acres of that landowner's

5

prope11y, that would ce1iainly create a nuisance or trespass cause of action for the upstream
6
7

landowner. Just because the dam operator had flooded one acre doesn't mean that there would be

8

any legal ability or right to flood more than that. Nothing in the law of Idaho justifies turning the

9

Roberts property into a holding pond for all of the rain and snowmelt that comes down from the

10

natural basin above her prope11y. The ditch on the Jensen Property is as much a part of the natural

11

basin as the area of drainage itself.

12

Another analogy might be a simple wash basin. Assume the hot spigot is rainfall and the
13

14
15

cold spigot is snow melt. The stopper at the bottom of the sink is the equivalent of Sunnyside Drive,
but the stopper seal allows a ce1iain amount of water to pass through it not unlike the culve1i under

16

Sunnyside Drive. If one spigot is turned on, the basin will fill slowly until it reaches the overflow

17

opening at the top of the wash basin. If both spigots are turned on, the basin will fill more quickly,

18

but the flow rate doesn't matter because the results are the same regardless of flow. The water will

19

rise and drain down the overflow opening at the top of the basin. If the overflow opening at the top

20
of the basin is plugged, equivalent to the Jensens placement of fill in the ditch in the natural basin
21
22

in this case, flooding will necessarily result. If the lip of the sink in front is higher than the

23

backsplash of the wash basin, a backwater would be created not unlike what occmTed in the instant

24

case. That would clearly constitute an obstruction of the passage of water in the basin. Under either

25

analogy, the results are the same. The obstruction of the flow creates backwater resulting in

26

flooding.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Page 749

Page 14

1

CONCLUSION

2

Robe1is stands by all of her arguments advanced in her Memorandum in Suppoti of

3

Reconsideration, but felt the need to rebut the facially erroneous claim of the Jensens that the

4
5

private nuisance theory, and Idaho Code§ 52-101, et seq., were not raised until after the Judgment
was entered. The Jensens obstructed the free passage of the basin when they placed fill in the ditch

6

that drained the entire 282 acres basin above the Robe1is property. That action constituted a private
7

8

nuisance, and injunction should issue to abate such nuisance.

9
10

DATED this J.Le__day ofNovember, 2018.

11
12

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

13
14

By

~ GaryDSlet

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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5
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6

7
8
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PO Box 50130
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9
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Filed: 11/30/2018 10:37:30
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Brandebourg, Traci

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D_eu_e_nd_a_n_ts_._ _ _ )

Case No. CV27-18-00098

DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS (1) FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND (2) TO DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

On October 11, 2018 the plaintiff filed her Motion for Reconsideration of the
Memorandum Decision and Judgment entered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff also filed
a Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs requested by the defendants. The Court has
considered the memorandums of the parties in support of and in opposition to the motions as
wells as the plaintiffs reply brief.
The Court on November 13, 2018 provided Notice to the parties that oral argument was
not necessary and that the matter would be submitted for decision without oral argument.
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I.
STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration.

The party moving for reconsideration has the burden of presenting to the court new or
additional facts or arguments upon which reconsideration should be granted. Devil Creek Ranch,
Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202,205 , 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994).

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), "[a] motion for reconsideration of any order of
the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14)
days from the entry of such order.. .. " This Court has explained that "[w]hen
considering a motion of this type, the trial court should take into account any new
facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the
interlocutory order." Johnson v. N. Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928,
932 (2012) (quoting Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho,
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B)
"does not expressly contain a new evidence requirement." Id. This Court has
explained that "[a] motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the
court-when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are
applied to previously presented law, or any combination thereof-to reconsider
the correctness of an interlocutory order." Id.
International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465, 468

(2014).
Further, whether to grant reconsideration is a matter of discretion for the trial court and
the court should apply the same standard as it did under I.R.C.P. Rule 56. Westby v. Schaefer,
157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014).
B. Attorney Fees and Costs.

When there has been a timely request for attorney fees and costs and a motion to disallow
such attorney fees and costs, the court must first determine whether there was a prevailing party,
which is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538539, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127-1128 (2010).
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Once the court has determined that the party requesting attorney fees and costs is in fact
the prevailing party, the court has the discretion to determine the reasonable amount of costs and
attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e). However, a prevailing
party is only entitled to an award of attorney fees provided that there is a statute or contract that
allows such an award. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
II.

ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Reconsideration.
The plaintiff seeks to have the court reconsider the dismissal of her causes of action for
nuisance and declaratory relief. 1 The plaintiff in her memorandum in support of reconsideration
"requests that the decision and judgment be vacated or modified to allow her to assert such facts
pursuant to IRCP 56(e)(1) ... ". However, since a claim of negligence was not pied in the
plaintiffs amended complaint it is not now an issue that can be raised on reconsideration. Our
courts have repeatedly held that "issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the
pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440,443, 111 P.3d 125 (2005 (citing Beco Const. Co.

v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950 (1993)). Since the plaintiff never
alleged a claim of negligence it is not a basis for reconsideration especially since the plaintiff has
not sought to amend her pleadings to allege such a claim.
As concerns the claims of nuisance and declaratory relief the plaintiff has not presented
and new or additional facts or evidence. The plaintiff merely reargues the same facts originally
presented to the court. This case concerned the Jensens filling of a waste ditch that was an 10
feet wide easement and 1foot in depth. The evidence is clear that the waste water ditch at issue is

1

The plaintiff has not sought reconsideration of the dismissal of her cause of action for trespass nor has she sought
reconsideration of the evidentiary rulings of the court.
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and was an artificial channel and the plaintiff admits that for the most part it had been obliterated
over time. Dr. Brockway characterizes the "basin" within which the subdivision was developed
as "generally flat" with less than a 1% slope. The evidence also supported the conclusion that
2017 was an exceptional year for snow accumulation and extreme snow melt. The photographic
evidence provided by both parties depicts extensive buildup of snow on the ground together with
extensive snow melt. The resulting flooding in 2017 in Jerome County and other areas was
common as compared to prior snow years.
The plaintiff with respect to her claim of nuisance cites to an inverse condemnation case,

Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P .2d 911 (1950) for the proposition that a " ... nuisance
exists in the instant case by virtue of impairment and obstruction of the customary passage of
water in the basin." (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, pg. 8). First the

Renninger does not concern or relate to a claim of nuisance, it is a claim of inverse
condemnation. Second, it is clear from the evidence presented to the court, that it was the
construction and placement of Sunnyside Drive and the failure to maintain the culvert that exists
under Sunnyside Drive that is the "obstruction of the customary passage of water" in the
Sunnyside Subdivision. There is no dispute that the culvert is in such a condition that culvert
could not handle the conveyance of water as may have been intended and that water would
customarily pond on the plaintiffs property and flow over Sunnyside Drive in years prior to the
ditch being filled in by Jensen. The extreme snow accumulation in 2017 clearly attributed to the
increase in flooding. The plaintiff has also cited to the court Campion v. Simpson, 104 Idaho 413,
659 P.2d 766 (1983) which concerned "public nuisance" concerning obstructions of a natural
watercourse or stream, i.e. the Wood River. There is no "natural watercourse" in the area in
question as that term has been defined by our courts.
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The evidence is clear that there were years prior to the waste ditch being filled that water
would pond on the plaintiffs property and would subsequently flow over Sunnyside Drive onto
the Jensen property. This condition would clearly be exacerbated in years of excessive rain and
snow. It has long been held and our courts have stated as a general proposition, ". . . that every
man has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, and if while lawfully in
such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to
his neighbor, it is 'damnum absque injuria,' for the rightful use of one's own land may cause
damage to another without any legal wrong." City of Bellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1036,
1038 (1908). A landowner's artificial accumulation of water on their property and damages to an
adjoining landowner is the subject of a claim of negligence, which has not been pled in this
action. Stott by and through Dougal v. Finney, 130 Idaho 894, 950 P.2d 709 (1997). Proof of
causation is essential to prove that the Jensen's conduct diminished the flow of water from the
plaintiffs property, which is an element of a claim of negligence. Allen v. Burggraf Construction
Co., 106 Idaho 451, 680 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1984). It is clear from the evidence presented that

the condition of the culvert under Sunnyside Drive is a substantial factor in the reduction of the
flow of water from the plaintiffs property to the defendant's property. There is no evidence that
the defendant's obstructed the flow of the water where the culvert enters their property. The
Jensens as the owner of their land had the right to lawfully use their property, including that
portion of the property that included the waste ditch easement and they had the right to alter the
condition of the ditch pursuant to I. C. §§ 42-1207. It is clear that they could only be liable to an
adjoining landowner if they were negligent in any alteration of the ditch, which has not been pled
in this action. The additional cases cited by the plaintiff do not apply to the set of facts in this
case. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration of the claim of nuisance is DENIED.
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The plaintiff in her claim of declaratory relief sought to have the court declare that she
was the dominant estate as concerns the waste water ditch easement and that the Jensens were
the servient estate. The court set forth the law as concerns easements for ditches. The plaintiff
cites to Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (1985) on reconsideration of her claim for
declaratory relief. The decision in Merrill concerned the establishment of an "easement by
prescription" for the discharge of irrigation waste water and the accumulation and discharge of
surface waters onto the land of another. The plaintiff herein has not alleged nor has she sought to
establish that she is the dominant estate and the Jensen's are the servient estate by way of a
prescriptive easement. She has sought only to have this court declare that she is a dominant
estate as concerns the "waste ditch easement". Plaintiff has presented no evidence that she is the
owner of the waste ditch easement. The plaintiff has provided no authority that she has any legal
interest in the easement for the waste ditch or that she is an owner of the waste water ditch. The
claims of the plaintiff only relate to the placement of fill by Jensen in a 10 foot easement and the
plaintiff has no interest to assert in that waste ditch easement. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake,
143 Idaho 69, 137 P.3d 456 (2006). Since the plaintiff has no legal interest in the subject
easement she has no standing to have the court declare any such interest. Therefore, the motion
to reconsider the dismissal of her claim for declaratory relief is DENIED.
B. Attorney Fees and Costs.
1. Prevailing Party and Costs.

The plaintiff has sought to have the court disallow the defendant's request for attorney
fees and costs. As noted above the Court must first determine the issue of prevailing party. The
Court by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and having found the
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defendants' counterclaim to be moot, there can be no dispute that the defendants are the
prevailing party.
In terms of costs, the defendants seek costs as a matter of right in the sum of $140.08 for
filing fees and discretionary costs in the sum of $3,257.87. The defendants as the prevailing party
should be awarded costs as a matter of right for their filing fee in the sum of $140.08. I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l )(c)(i).
The discretionary costs consist of the expense of a title report; counsel's travel expenses;
cost of historic aerial photos of the area; and the cost of an expert witness report. Discretionary
costs may only be awarded in the discretion of the trial court when they are shown to be
"necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). When making a determination as to
whether to grant or deny discretionary costs, the trial court must "make express findings" as to
the allowance or disallowance of such costs.
The defendants' seek discretionary costs for counsel's travel expense to attend court
hearings. These costs are not exceptional. The defendants chose to retain counsel from eastern
Idaho that they knew or should have known that they could incur such expenses. Originally the
defendants had local counsel but it was their choice to retain other counsel. There are equally
competent counsel locally whereby the defendants would not have had to incur such an added
expense. As such travel time is not exceptional and an award of those costs is denied.
As for the Title Policy expense when dealing with real property issues and easements it is
not uncommon to have to obtain a title policy. The defendants argue they could have obtained
this information through discovery but they obtained the information by "exceptional means".
The question for this court is whether such an expense is exceptional. The title policy at best
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provided some historical perspective as to the chain of title but was not particularly necessary for
purposes of the summary judgment motion. As to the waste ditch easement it was the burden of
the plaintiff to establish an ownership interest in the ditch and therefore the court would find that
the cost of the title policy, while perhaps necessary from the perspective of the defendant, it was
not exceptional. Therefore, an award of that cost is denied.
As for the aerial photographs, these were obtained by the defendants from the
Department of Agriculture. These were obtained to dispel any evidence of a "natural
watercourse". The photographs were not particularly necessary since again it was the burden of
the plaintiff to prove the existence of a "natural watercourse" and the plaintiff herself in her
affidavits as well as the affidavits of others confirmed that the ditch was "obliterated". Again
while the defendant may have rightly observed the photographs to be necessary, they are not
exceptional. Therefore, the award of that cost is denied. 2
Lastly, the defendants retained an expert to review and prepare a report in response to Dr.
Brockway' s report. Clearly, such would be necessary to rebut the conclusions of Dr. Brockway.
However, in cases of this nature it is not uncommon to have some expert opinion testimony or
evidence. The mere retention of an expert is not an exceptional expense. The rules define which
expert expenses are recoverable as a matter of right and this is not such an expense. One would
expect that an expert retained by a party would prepare reports for that party so such an expense
is not exceptional. Therefore, the award of that cost is denied.
Therefore, the award of costs to the defendants is limited to the sum of$140.08.

2. Attorney Fees.
The defendants as the prevailing party seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to LC. §§
12-120(1) and 12-121.
2

The defendant could have but did not claim this expense as a matter ofright pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(vii).
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Section 12-120(1) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party "in any
action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less ... ". Our courts
have found that the pleading of the amount of damages of $35,000 or less is mandatory to be
entitled to an award of fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(1).
Pleading damages in an amount that is not less than a specified sum is not
the same as pleading damages in the amount of $25,000 or less. Pancoast
v. Indian Cove Irr. Dist., 121 Idaho 984 829 P.2d 1333 (1992) (pleading
damages in "an amount in excess of $10,000" did not comply with the
requirements of Idaho Code § 12-120(1)). Therefore, the Defendants are
not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12- 120(1 ).
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 142 Idaho 671, 675, 132 P.3d 428,
432 (2006)
The plaintiff only prayed for "damages in an amount to be proven at trial". The plaintiff
did not limit her damages to $35,000 or less . Therefore, defendant is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(1).
The defendants also seek attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121. They argue that the
action was pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." The basis of this
argument from the defendant is that the court dismissed each of the plaintiffs claims; that
Roberts raised additional claims that "complicated" the matter; that the plaintiff had no basis in
pursuing the claims; and that plaintiff was "persistent" in pursuing claims which were
"unreasonable" and "without foundation". However, the mere fact that the court ultimately has
dismissed the claims of a plaintiff does not mean that they were frivolous or without foundation,
even when the court has determined they were without merit as a matter of law. As the court held
in Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011):
A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it
fails as a matter of law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams,
107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, "[a]
misperception of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself,

9 - DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS (1) FOR RECONSIDERATION AND (2) TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Page 760

unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only
incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous ,
unreasonable, or without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950
P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The court does not find that the defendant claims were "plainly fallacious". The court
does find that the plaintiff presented good faith arguments and it could be said that some of the
claims were fairly debatable based on the facts of this case. Id. Therefore the court declines to
award attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121.

III.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above,
1. The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED;

2. The Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The Defendants are granted costs as a matter of right in the
sum of $140.08 and the Court denies the award of discretionary costs and
attorney fees;
3. The Court will accordingly enter an Amended Judgment consistent with this
Decision and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Signed: 11/28/2018 05:45 AM
c,~ e,oUR7; J~/4!
-o0~

~

S

~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _i

John K. Butler, District Judge

10 DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS (1) FOR RECONSIDERATION AND (2) TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Page 761

'>c>

.:tfiftb
3fubicinl
:;District

- o-

~

g

~

&"'I'

¾s o0~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
any) On
Signed: 11/30/201810:38AM

Via Email
Gary D. Slette
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

~~~~b~
Deputy Clerk
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Filed: 11/30/2018 10:39:08
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Brandebourg, Traci

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D_eu_e_n_da_n_t_s._ _ _ )

Case No. CV27-18-00098

AMENDED JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff and the
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice;
2. The Counterclaim is dismissed as moot;
3. The Defendants are awarded costs in the sum of $140.08 against the Plaintiff.

11/28/2018 09:31 AM
DATED: - - Signed:
---------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
any) On
Signed: 11/30/201810:39AM

Via Email

Gary D. Slette
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
rharris@holdenlegal.com
araw lings@holdenlegal.com

~
~bBUU..
uty Clerk
6
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Electronically Filed
12/7/2018 9:59 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Shelly Creek, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
Court eService:
efiling@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-2018-0098

LORA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of One Hundred Forty and 08/100 Dollars
($140.08), lawful money of the United States of America, paid to Thomas Jensen and Deanna
Jensen, husband and wife (the "Jensens") by and on behalf of Lora Roberts in the above-entitled
action, the Jensens hereby state that certain Amended Judgment rendered in the Fifth Judicial
District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Jerome, on the 30th day ofNovember, 2018,
in favor of the Jensens in the sum of One Hundred Forty and 08/100 Dollars ($140.08) is satisfied.
D. Andrew Rawlings, attorney for the Jensens, hereby authorizes and requests the Clerk of

1l

said Court to enter this Satisfaction of Judgment for the reason that the same has been fully paid.
th

Dated this 7 day of December, 2018.

D. Andre~

lings, Esq.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of December, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of
the following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by
the method indicated.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
Gary D. Slette

□ Mail

ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D Email

P.O. Box 1906
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906
Facsimile: (208) 933-0701
Email:
gslette@rsidaholaw.com

IZI Electronic Filing/Service

D.~ J ~lings, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

\\Law\data\WPDATA\RLH\20028-000 Jensen, Thomas & Deanna\Pleadings\Satisfaction of Judgment.docx
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Electronically Filed
1/7/2019 9:21 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Karen Wood, Deputy Clerk

Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168
Jonas A. Reagan, ISB #10566
Nicole L. Swafford, ISB #10642
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Telephone: (208) 733-0700
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com

Attorneys for PlaintiffLora K. Roberts

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

Case No. CV27-18-00098

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Fee Category L.4 - $129.00

vs.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, THE PARTIES'
COUNSEL OF RECORD IDENTIFIED ON THE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE;
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED DISTRICT COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Plaintiff-Appellant, LORA K. ROBERTS ("Appellant")

appeals against the above named Defendants-Respondents THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: (1)

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; (3)

1
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Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits; (4) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavits; (5)
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) (filed September 26, 2018); and the Decision
and Order re: Plaintiff's Motions (1) For Reconsideration and (2) To Disallow Attorney Fees
and Costs (filed November 30, 2018), entered in the above-entitled action by the Honorable John
K. Butler, District Judge, presiding. Judge Butler entered an Amended Judgment pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(a) on November 30, 2018.
2.

The above named Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and

the judgment and orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders pursuant to Rule 1 l(a),
I.A.R.
3.

The Appellant's preliminary statement of issues it intends to assert on appeal,

which under I.A.R. 17, does not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues, is as follows:
a.
Whether the District Court erred by refusing to consider relevant expert
testimony set forth in the affidavits of Dr. Charles G. Brockway.
b.
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by striking the Second
Supplemental Affidavit ofLora K. Roberts.
c.
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by failing to apply
Idaho's well-established natural servitude doctrine.
d.
as a matter of law.

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellant's trespass claim

e.
as a matter of law.

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellant's nuisance claim

f.
summary judgment.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Respondents' motion for

g.
Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellant's amended
complaint with prejudice.
4.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

2

Page 768

5.

The Appellant requests that a copy of the transcript, in electronic format, from the

following hearing be included:
a.

August 27, 2018 - the court hearing regarding the parties' motions to

strike and motions for summary judgment.
b.
6.

No other transcripts are requested.

The Appellant requests that all pleadings, motions, memoranda, affidavits,

exhibits, attachments, stipulations, orders, decisions, and any other document filed in this case
along with all other documents in the clerk's record automatically included under I.A.R. 28 be
made part of the record in chronological order and copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
Appellant has attached hereto as Exhibit A a copy of the Odyssey iCourt Portal Report that
should list all of the documents filed in this case.
7.

I certify:

a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address listed below:
1.

b.

Name and Address:

Denise Schloder
Jerome County Court Reporter
Judicial Annex
233 W. Main St.
Jerome, Idaho 83338

That the estimated fee required for the preparation of the reporter's transcript has

been paid.
c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellant filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties to be served pursuant to Rule 20.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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DATED this 7th day of January, 2018.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP

Travis L. Thompson

Attorneys for PlaintiffLora K. Roberts
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of January, 2018, the within and foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed electronically using the Court's e-file system, and upon such
filing the following parties were served electronically:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
araw lings@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants

/s/
Jessica Nielsen
Jessica Nielsen,
Assistant for Travis L. Thompson
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in Support
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Motion for
for Summary
Summary Judgment
Judgment
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06/22/2018
Affidavit •
06/22/2018 Affidavit
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of Larry
Larry Bos
Bos in
in Support
Support of
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Motion for
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Summary Judgment
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06/22/2018 Affidavit
Affidavit •▼
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John Root
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j
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•
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!
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and Counterclaims
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Notice of
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Motion for
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of Service
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K. Roberts
Roberts Supplemental
Supplemental Answers
to Jensens'
Jensens' First
First Set
Set of
of
Discovery
Requests
&
Request
for
Production
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of Service
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Set of
of Discovery
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and Request
Request for
for
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Production to
to Thomas
Thomas Jensen
Jensen and
and Deanna
Deanna Jensen
Jensen

07/30/2018
07/30/2018 Motion
Motion for
for Summary
Summary Judgment
Judgment ..,.
▼
Judicial
Judicial Officer
Officer
Butler,
John
Butler, John K.
K.

i

Hearing
Hearing Time
Time
1:30
PM
1:30 PM

!
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:
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Cancel Reason
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Vacated
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i

L

07/30/2018
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▼
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Of Jensens'
Jensens' Motion
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for Summary
Summary Judgment
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Jensens
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▼
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Andrew Rawlings
Second
Second Declaration
Declaration of
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▼
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Second
Second Supplemental
Supplemental Affidavit
Affidavit of
of Lora
Lora Roberts
Roberts
07/30/2018
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Affidavit of
Supplemental Affidavit
of Dr.
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G. Brockway
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Affidavit
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08/13/2018 Motion
Motion..,.
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Jensens'
Affidavits
Jensens’ Renewed
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to Strike
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▼
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Supporting
Supporting Jensens'
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to Strike
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Motion ..,.
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Rule 12(b)(7)
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Supporting Jensens'
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08/27/2018
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Summary Judgment
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Judicial
Judicial Officer
Officer
Butler,
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John K.
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Hearing
Hearing Time
Time
1:30
1:30 PM
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Result
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Parties
...
Parties Present
Present-*
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Roberts, Lora
Lora K
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Defendant:
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Jensen, Thomas
Thomas
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Jensen, Deanna
Deanna
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08/27/2018
08/27/2018 Motion
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to Strike
Strike ..,.
▼
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John K.
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Plaintiff's
Plaintiffs
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08/27/2018 Motion
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to Dismiss..,.
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K
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Electronically Filed
1/29/2019 9:19 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Traci Brandebourg, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
Court eService:
efiling@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
LORA K. ROBERTS,

Case No. CV27-18-00098
Supreme Court No. 46675-2019

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

Fee Category L.4. - $129.00

Defendants-Respondents/Cross-Appellants.
TO:

THE
ABOVE-NAMED
LORA K. ROBERTS;

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT,

THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT'S
ATTORNEYS,
TRAVIS L. THOMPSON, JONAS A. REAGAN, AND NICOLE L. SWAFFORD OF
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP, P.O. BOX 63, TWIN FALLS, IDAHO
83303-0063, TELEPHONE (208) 733-0700, TLT@IDAHOWATERS.COM,
JREAGAN@IDAHOWATERS.COM, AND NLS@IDAHOWATERS.COM; AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendants-Respondents/Cross-Appellants, Thomas Jensen and Deanna
Jensen, husband and wife, by and through their counsel of record, appeal against the abovenamed Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, Lora K. Roberts, to the Idaho Supreme

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
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Court from the Decision and Order re: Plaintiff’s Motions (a) for Reconsideration and
(b) to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs (filed November 30, 2018); and the Amended
Judgment (filed November 30, 2018), entered in the above-entitled action by the Honorable
John K. Butler, District Judge, presiding. A copy of the judgment and orders being
appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

The Cross-Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment
and orders described in paragraph 1, above, are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rules 11(a)(1) and 11(a)(7), Idaho Appellate Rules.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Cross-Appellants intend to assert
in the appeal (which does not prevent the Appellants from asserting other issues) is as
follows:
a.

Did the District Court fail to apply the correct legal standard in considering
the decision to award the Jensens their reasonable attorney fees?

b.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in partly granting Ms. Roberts’
motion to disallow attorney fees and costs?

c.

Should the District Court have awarded the Jensens all or part of the
requested attorney fees?

4.

The Cross-Appellants request that a copy of the transcript from the following hearings:
a.

Is additional reporter’s transcript requested? No.

b.

The Cross-Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of
the reporter’s transcript: None.

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
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5.

The Cross-Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and those designated by
the Appellant in the initial notice of appeal: None.

6.

The Cross-Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition to those
requested in the original notice of appeal: None.

7.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional
transcript have been served on the reporter.

b.

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents
requested in the cross-appeal.

c.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this

29th day of January, 2019.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of January, 2019, I served a true and correct copy
of the following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below
by the method indicated.

Document Served:

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Travis L. Thompson
Jonas A. Reagan
Nicole L. Swafford
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Fax: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com
Court Reporter:
Denise Schloder
Jerome County Court Reporter
Judicial Annex
233 W. Main St.
Jerome, Idaho 83338

~ Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D Email
'M'Electronic Filing/Service

J'Mail

D
D
D
D

Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Email
Electronic Filing/Service

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

\\Law\data\WPDATA\RLH\20028-000 Jensen, Thomas & Deanna\_01 APPEAL\Pleadings\Notice ofCrossAppeal.docx
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Filed: 11/30/2018 10:37:30
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Brandebourg, Traci

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D_eu_e_nd_a_n_ts_._ _ _ )

Case No. CV27-18-00098

DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS (1) FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND (2) TO DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

On October 11, 2018 the plaintiff filed her Motion for Reconsideration of the
Memorandum Decision and Judgment entered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff also filed
a Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs requested by the defendants. The Court has
considered the memorandums of the parties in support of and in opposition to the motions as
wells as the plaintiffs reply brief.
The Court on November 13, 2018 provided Notice to the parties that oral argument was
not necessary and that the matter would be submitted for decision without oral argument.

1 - DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS (1) FOR RECONSIDERATION AND (2) TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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I.
STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration.

The party moving for reconsideration has the burden of presenting to the court new or
additional facts or arguments upon which reconsideration should be granted. Devil Creek Ranch,
Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202,205 , 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994).

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), "[a] motion for reconsideration of any order of
the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14)
days from the entry of such order.. .. " This Court has explained that "[w]hen
considering a motion of this type, the trial court should take into account any new
facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the
interlocutory order." Johnson v. N. Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928,
932 (2012) (quoting Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho,
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B)
"does not expressly contain a new evidence requirement." Id. This Court has
explained that "[a] motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the
court-when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are
applied to previously presented law, or any combination thereof-to reconsider
the correctness of an interlocutory order." Id.
International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465, 468

(2014).
Further, whether to grant reconsideration is a matter of discretion for the trial court and
the court should apply the same standard as it did under I.R.C.P. Rule 56. Westby v. Schaefer,
157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014).
B. Attorney Fees and Costs.

When there has been a timely request for attorney fees and costs and a motion to disallow
such attorney fees and costs, the court must first determine whether there was a prevailing party,
which is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538539, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127-1128 (2010).
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Once the court has determined that the party requesting attorney fees and costs is in fact
the prevailing party, the court has the discretion to determine the reasonable amount of costs and
attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e). However, a prevailing
party is only entitled to an award of attorney fees provided that there is a statute or contract that
allows such an award. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
II.

ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Reconsideration.
The plaintiff seeks to have the court reconsider the dismissal of her causes of action for
nuisance and declaratory relief. 1 The plaintiff in her memorandum in support of reconsideration
"requests that the decision and judgment be vacated or modified to allow her to assert such facts
pursuant to IRCP 56(e)(1) ... ". However, since a claim of negligence was not pied in the
plaintiffs amended complaint it is not now an issue that can be raised on reconsideration. Our
courts have repeatedly held that "issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the
pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440,443, 111 P.3d 125 (2005 (citing Beco Const. Co.

v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950 (1993)). Since the plaintiff never
alleged a claim of negligence it is not a basis for reconsideration especially since the plaintiff has
not sought to amend her pleadings to allege such a claim.
As concerns the claims of nuisance and declaratory relief the plaintiff has not presented
and new or additional facts or evidence. The plaintiff merely reargues the same facts originally
presented to the court. This case concerned the Jensens filling of a waste ditch that was an 10
feet wide easement and 1foot in depth. The evidence is clear that the waste water ditch at issue is

1

The plaintiff has not sought reconsideration of the dismissal of her cause of action for trespass nor has she sought
reconsideration of the evidentiary rulings of the court.
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and was an artificial channel and the plaintiff admits that for the most part it had been obliterated
over time. Dr. Brockway characterizes the "basin" within which the subdivision was developed
as "generally flat" with less than a 1% slope. The evidence also supported the conclusion that
2017 was an exceptional year for snow accumulation and extreme snow melt. The photographic
evidence provided by both parties depicts extensive buildup of snow on the ground together with
extensive snow melt. The resulting flooding in 2017 in Jerome County and other areas was
common as compared to prior snow years.
The plaintiff with respect to her claim of nuisance cites to an inverse condemnation case,

Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P .2d 911 (1950) for the proposition that a " ... nuisance
exists in the instant case by virtue of impairment and obstruction of the customary passage of
water in the basin." (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, pg. 8). First the

Renninger does not concern or relate to a claim of nuisance, it is a claim of inverse
condemnation. Second, it is clear from the evidence presented to the court, that it was the
construction and placement of Sunnyside Drive and the failure to maintain the culvert that exists
under Sunnyside Drive that is the "obstruction of the customary passage of water" in the
Sunnyside Subdivision. There is no dispute that the culvert is in such a condition that culvert
could not handle the conveyance of water as may have been intended and that water would
customarily pond on the plaintiffs property and flow over Sunnyside Drive in years prior to the
ditch being filled in by Jensen. The extreme snow accumulation in 2017 clearly attributed to the
increase in flooding. The plaintiff has also cited to the court Campion v. Simpson, 104 Idaho 413,
659 P.2d 766 (1983) which concerned "public nuisance" concerning obstructions of a natural
watercourse or stream, i.e. the Wood River. There is no "natural watercourse" in the area in
question as that term has been defined by our courts.
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The evidence is clear that there were years prior to the waste ditch being filled that water
would pond on the plaintiffs property and would subsequently flow over Sunnyside Drive onto
the Jensen property. This condition would clearly be exacerbated in years of excessive rain and
snow. It has long been held and our courts have stated as a general proposition, ". . . that every
man has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, and if while lawfully in
such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to
his neighbor, it is 'damnum absque injuria,' for the rightful use of one's own land may cause
damage to another without any legal wrong." City of Bellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1036,
1038 (1908). A landowner's artificial accumulation of water on their property and damages to an
adjoining landowner is the subject of a claim of negligence, which has not been pled in this
action. Stott by and through Dougal v. Finney, 130 Idaho 894, 950 P.2d 709 (1997). Proof of
causation is essential to prove that the Jensen's conduct diminished the flow of water from the
plaintiffs property, which is an element of a claim of negligence. Allen v. Burggraf Construction
Co., 106 Idaho 451, 680 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1984). It is clear from the evidence presented that

the condition of the culvert under Sunnyside Drive is a substantial factor in the reduction of the
flow of water from the plaintiffs property to the defendant's property. There is no evidence that
the defendant's obstructed the flow of the water where the culvert enters their property. The
Jensens as the owner of their land had the right to lawfully use their property, including that
portion of the property that included the waste ditch easement and they had the right to alter the
condition of the ditch pursuant to I. C. §§ 42-1207. It is clear that they could only be liable to an
adjoining landowner if they were negligent in any alteration of the ditch, which has not been pled
in this action. The additional cases cited by the plaintiff do not apply to the set of facts in this
case. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration of the claim of nuisance is DENIED.
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The plaintiff in her claim of declaratory relief sought to have the court declare that she
was the dominant estate as concerns the waste water ditch easement and that the Jensens were
the servient estate. The court set forth the law as concerns easements for ditches. The plaintiff
cites to Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (1985) on reconsideration of her claim for
declaratory relief. The decision in Merrill concerned the establishment of an "easement by
prescription" for the discharge of irrigation waste water and the accumulation and discharge of
surface waters onto the land of another. The plaintiff herein has not alleged nor has she sought to
establish that she is the dominant estate and the Jensen's are the servient estate by way of a
prescriptive easement. She has sought only to have this court declare that she is a dominant
estate as concerns the "waste ditch easement". Plaintiff has presented no evidence that she is the
owner of the waste ditch easement. The plaintiff has provided no authority that she has any legal
interest in the easement for the waste ditch or that she is an owner of the waste water ditch. The
claims of the plaintiff only relate to the placement of fill by Jensen in a 10 foot easement and the
plaintiff has no interest to assert in that waste ditch easement. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake,
143 Idaho 69, 137 P.3d 456 (2006). Since the plaintiff has no legal interest in the subject
easement she has no standing to have the court declare any such interest. Therefore, the motion
to reconsider the dismissal of her claim for declaratory relief is DENIED.
B. Attorney Fees and Costs.
1. Prevailing Party and Costs.

The plaintiff has sought to have the court disallow the defendant's request for attorney
fees and costs. As noted above the Court must first determine the issue of prevailing party. The
Court by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and having found the
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defendants' counterclaim to be moot, there can be no dispute that the defendants are the
prevailing party.
In terms of costs, the defendants seek costs as a matter of right in the sum of $140.08 for
filing fees and discretionary costs in the sum of $3,257.87. The defendants as the prevailing party
should be awarded costs as a matter of right for their filing fee in the sum of $140.08. I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l )(c)(i).
The discretionary costs consist of the expense of a title report; counsel's travel expenses;
cost of historic aerial photos of the area; and the cost of an expert witness report. Discretionary
costs may only be awarded in the discretion of the trial court when they are shown to be
"necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). When making a determination as to
whether to grant or deny discretionary costs, the trial court must "make express findings" as to
the allowance or disallowance of such costs.
The defendants' seek discretionary costs for counsel's travel expense to attend court
hearings. These costs are not exceptional. The defendants chose to retain counsel from eastern
Idaho that they knew or should have known that they could incur such expenses. Originally the
defendants had local counsel but it was their choice to retain other counsel. There are equally
competent counsel locally whereby the defendants would not have had to incur such an added
expense. As such travel time is not exceptional and an award of those costs is denied.
As for the Title Policy expense when dealing with real property issues and easements it is
not uncommon to have to obtain a title policy. The defendants argue they could have obtained
this information through discovery but they obtained the information by "exceptional means".
The question for this court is whether such an expense is exceptional. The title policy at best
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provided some historical perspective as to the chain of title but was not particularly necessary for
purposes of the summary judgment motion. As to the waste ditch easement it was the burden of
the plaintiff to establish an ownership interest in the ditch and therefore the court would find that
the cost of the title policy, while perhaps necessary from the perspective of the defendant, it was
not exceptional. Therefore, an award of that cost is denied.
As for the aerial photographs, these were obtained by the defendants from the
Department of Agriculture. These were obtained to dispel any evidence of a "natural
watercourse". The photographs were not particularly necessary since again it was the burden of
the plaintiff to prove the existence of a "natural watercourse" and the plaintiff herself in her
affidavits as well as the affidavits of others confirmed that the ditch was "obliterated". Again
while the defendant may have rightly observed the photographs to be necessary, they are not
exceptional. Therefore, the award of that cost is denied. 2
Lastly, the defendants retained an expert to review and prepare a report in response to Dr.
Brockway' s report. Clearly, such would be necessary to rebut the conclusions of Dr. Brockway.
However, in cases of this nature it is not uncommon to have some expert opinion testimony or
evidence. The mere retention of an expert is not an exceptional expense. The rules define which
expert expenses are recoverable as a matter of right and this is not such an expense. One would
expect that an expert retained by a party would prepare reports for that party so such an expense
is not exceptional. Therefore, the award of that cost is denied.
Therefore, the award of costs to the defendants is limited to the sum of$140.08.

2. Attorney Fees.
The defendants as the prevailing party seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to LC. §§
12-120(1) and 12-121.
2

The defendant could have but did not claim this expense as a matter ofright pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(vii).
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Section 12-120(1) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party "in any
action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less ... ". Our courts
have found that the pleading of the amount of damages of $35,000 or less is mandatory to be
entitled to an award of fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(1).
Pleading damages in an amount that is not less than a specified sum is not
the same as pleading damages in the amount of $25,000 or less. Pancoast
v. Indian Cove Irr. Dist., 121 Idaho 984 829 P.2d 1333 (1992) (pleading
damages in "an amount in excess of $10,000" did not comply with the
requirements of Idaho Code § 12-120(1)). Therefore, the Defendants are
not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12- 120(1 ).
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 142 Idaho 671, 675, 132 P.3d 428,
432 (2006)
The plaintiff only prayed for "damages in an amount to be proven at trial". The plaintiff
did not limit her damages to $35,000 or less . Therefore, defendant is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(1).
The defendants also seek attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121. They argue that the
action was pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." The basis of this
argument from the defendant is that the court dismissed each of the plaintiffs claims; that
Roberts raised additional claims that "complicated" the matter; that the plaintiff had no basis in
pursuing the claims; and that plaintiff was "persistent" in pursuing claims which were
"unreasonable" and "without foundation". However, the mere fact that the court ultimately has
dismissed the claims of a plaintiff does not mean that they were frivolous or without foundation,
even when the court has determined they were without merit as a matter of law. As the court held
in Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011):
A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it
fails as a matter of law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams,
107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, "[a]
misperception of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself,
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unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only
incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous ,
unreasonable, or without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950
P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The court does not find that the defendant claims were "plainly fallacious". The court
does find that the plaintiff presented good faith arguments and it could be said that some of the
claims were fairly debatable based on the facts of this case. Id. Therefore the court declines to
award attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121.

III.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above,
1. The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED;

2. The Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The Defendants are granted costs as a matter of right in the
sum of $140.08 and the Court denies the award of discretionary costs and
attorney fees;
3. The Court will accordingly enter an Amended Judgment consistent with this
Decision and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Signed: 11/28/2018 05:45 AM
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _i

John K. Butler, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
any) On
Signed: 11/30/201810:38AM

Via Email
Gary D. Slette
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

~~~~b~
Deputy Clerk
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Filed: 11/30/2018 10:39:08
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Brandebourg, Traci

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA
JENSEN, husband and wife,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D_eu_e_n_da_n_t_s._ _ _ )

Case No. CV27-18-00098

AMENDED JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff and the
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice;
2. The Counterclaim is dismissed as moot;
3. The Defendants are awarded costs in the sum of $140.08 against the Plaintiff.

11/28/2018 09:31 AM
DATED: - - Signed:
---------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document has been served as shown below on counsel of record (or self-represented party, if
any) On
Signed: 11/30/201810:39AM

Via Email

Gary D. Slette
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
gslette@rsidaholaw.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants
rharris@holdenlegal.com
araw lings@holdenlegal.com

~
~bBUU..
uty Clerk
6
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Filed: 01/31/2019 02:52 47
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Creek, Shelly

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Order Conditionally
Dismissing Cross Appeal

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

Docket No. 46675-2019
Jerome County District Court
CV27-18-00098

Defendants-Res ondents.

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on January 7, 2019. An Amended
Judgment was entered by District Judge John K. Butler and filed on November 30, 2018. The
Reporter's Transcript is due to be lodged by February 13, 2019, with the due date for Clerk's
Record and Reporter's Transcript set for March 20, 2019. Idaho Appellate Rule 15(b) requires
that a Notice of Cross Appeal be filed within forty-two (42) days from the date of entry of a final,
District Court judgment or order or, within twenty (21) days after the filing of the original Notice
of Appeal, whichever is later. It appears the Notice of Cross Appeal was not filed in the District
Court within forty-two (42) days from the date of entry of the Amended Judgment filed on
November 30, 2019, nor, was it filed within twenty-one (21) days after the date of filing of the
Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2019; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Notice of Cross Appeal be, and hereby is,
conditionally dismissed as it does not appear to have been timely filed from the Amended
Judgment filed on November 30, 2018. Further, the Notice of Cross Appeal does not appear to
have been timely filed from the Notice of Appeal filed on January 7, 2019; however,
Respondents may file a Response with this Court on or before twenty-one (21) days from the
date of this Order as to why this cross appeal should not be dismissed.
DATED this

31st

day of January, 2019.
For the Supreme Court
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Filed: 02/11/2019 16:54:41
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Creek, Shelly

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

Order Dismissing Cross Appeal

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Docket No. 46675-2019
Jerome County District Court
CV27-18-00098

V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Res ondents.
This Court issued an ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING CROSS APPEAL on January 31, 2019,
allowing Respondents to file a RESPONSE within twenty-one (21) days from the date of the Order or the
cross appeal would be dismissed as having been untimely filed.

Counsel for Respondents filed a

RESPONSE TO ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING CROSS APPEAL on February 6, 2019. Thereafter, a
REPLY TO RESPONSE TO ORDER CONSITIONALLY DISMISSING CROSS APPEAL was filed by counsel for
Appellant on February 11, 2019. Therefore, after due consideration,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this cross appeal be, and is hereby, DISMISSED as the Notice of
Cross Appeal was not timely filed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal shall REMAIN SUSPENDED pending further Order from
this Court.

Dated 02/11/2019.
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Filed: 03/12/2019 12:48:27
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Creek, Shelly

TO:

Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101
208-334-2616
Fax:

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

DOCKET NO. 46675-2019

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
Husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on March 11, 2019,
I lodged one transcript of 62 pages in length for the
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
the County of Jerome in the Fifth Judicial District.
Appeal transcript consisting of the following
transcript:

August 27, 2018, Motions.

Notice is hereby given that on March 11, 2019, I
also e-mailed a copy of the transcript in pdf format to the
Supreme Court, sctfilings@idcourts.net.

DENISE K. SCHLODER, CSR NO. 652
March 11, 2019
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Electronically Filed
3/27/2019 4:08 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Angie Bridge, Deputy Clerk

Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168
Jonas A. Reagan, ISB #10566
Nicole L. Swafford, ISB #10642
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Telephone: (208) 733-0700
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Lora K. Roberts

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

Case No. CV27-18-00098

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD, AND THE
CLERK OF THE COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME.
COMES NOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, LORA K. ROBERTS ("Roberts"), by and through

her counsel of record, Barker Rosholt & Simpson LLP, and pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a) hereby
objects to the clerk's record filed in this matter on March 21, 2019. Petitioner requests the clerk
to add the following documents to the clerk's record:

1
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l. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (4/11/2018)
2. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (4/11/2018)
3. Affidavit ofLora Roberts in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (4/11/2018)
4. Affidavit of Greg Thain in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(4/11/2018)
5. Affidavit ofDr. Charles G. Brockway (4/11/2018)
6. Supplemental Affidavit in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment - Lora Roberts
(4/16/2018)
7. Affidavit ofKen Crane in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (4/17/2018)
8. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (5/7/2018)
9. Stipulation to Amend Complaint (6/5/2018)
10. Motion for Summary Judgment (6/22/2018)
11. Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (6/22/2018)
12. Affidavit ofMark Dekruyf in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (6/22/2018)
13. Affidavit ofLarry Bos in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment (6/22/2018)
14. Affidavit ofJohn Root (6/22/2018)
15. Second Supplemental Affidavit ofLora Roberts (7/30/2018)
16. Supplemental Affidavit ofDr. Charles G. Brockway (7/30/2018)
17. Affidavit ofDouglas J. Schwarz (7/30/2018)
18. Lora Roberts Response Brief in Opposition to Jensens 'Motion for Summary
Judgment (8/13/2018)

19. Motion to Strike (8/13/2018)

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
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20. Memorandum in Reply to Jensens' Opposition to Roberts' Motion for Summary
Judgment (8/20/2018)
21. Memorandum in Opposition to Jensens 'Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits
(8/20/2018)
22. Memorandum in Opposition to Jensens 'Rule 12 (b)(7) Motion (8/20/2018)
23. Affidavit ofLora Roberts in Opposition to Jensens' Renewed Rule 12(b)(7) Motion
(8/20/2018)

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff-Appellant will call up her objection to be heard
before the Court on Monday April 22, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. (Mountain Time), at the Jerome
County District Court, 233 W. Main St., Jerome, Idaho 83338.
DATED this 2ih day of March, 2019.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP

Travis L. Thompson
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Lora K. Roberts

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2?1h day of March, 2019, the within and foregoing
OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD AND NOTICE OF HEARING was filed
electronically using the Court's e-file system, and upon such filing the following parties were
served electronically:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
Richard L. Harris
araw lings@holdenlegal.com
D. Andrew Rawlings
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants

/s/
Jessica Nielsen,
Assistant for Travis L. Thompson

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
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Electronically Filed
3/27/2019 4:08 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Angie Bridge, Deputy Clerk

Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168
Jonas A. Reagan, ISB #10566
Nicole L. Swafford, ISB #10642
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Telephone: (208) 733-0700
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com

Attorneys for PlaintiffLora K. Roberts

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

Case No. CV27-18-00098
MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff-Appellant LORA K. ROBERTS, by and through her attorney,
TRAVIS L. THOMPSON, of the firm, BARKER, ROSHOLT & SIMPSON, LLP, in the above
entitled matter, and moves the Court for an Order to Appear Telephonically at the hearing
regarding the Objection to the Clerk's Record, before the Honorable Judge Rosemary Emory, on
April 22 nd 2019, at 1:30 p.m.
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DATED this 2ih day of March, 2019.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP

Travis L. Thompson

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Lora K. Roberts
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of March, 2019, the within and foregoing
MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY was filed electronically using the Court's efile system, and upon such filing the following parties were served electronically:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
Richard L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
araw lings@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants

/s/
Jessica Nielsen,
Assistant for Travis L. Thompson

MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY
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Filed: April 11, 2019 at 9:56 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Tv(i{,C,V13V~
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

Lora Roberts
Plaintiff,
vs.
Thomas Jensen, Deanna Jensen
Defendant.

Case No. CV27-18-00098
Notice of Reassignment

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the
Honorable Rosemary Emory.

Dated: 4/11/2019
Michelle Emerson
Clerk of the District Court

By: Traci 13randehourg
Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to:

D Andrew Rawlings
efiling@holdenlegal.com

[ X] By e-mail

Travis Lee Thompson
tlt@idahowaters.com

[ X] By e-mail

Dated: 411112019

By:

Traci 13randehourg
Deputy Clerk

Alternate Judges: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to utilize the
provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(a)(6). Notice is also given that if there are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 40(a) is subject to a prior determination under I.R.C.P. 40(a)(2). The panel of alternate judges consists of
the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Brody, Butler, Cluff, Copsey,
Emory, Harris, Huskey, Ryan, Shindurling, St. Clair, Stephens Tribe, Wildman, N. Williamson, Wilper, and Wood.
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Electronically Filed
4/11/2019 2:59 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Shelly Creek, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
Court eService:
efiling@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
LORA K. ROBERTS,

Case No. CV27-18-00098
Supreme Court No. 46675-2019

Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

OBJECTION TO AMENDED
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Defendants-Respondents.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, LORA K. ROBERTS;
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ATTORNEYS, TRAVIS L. THOMPSON,
JONAS A. REAGAN, AND NICOLE L. SWAFFORD OF BARKER ROSHOLT &
SIMPSON LLP; AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
Defendants-Respondents, Thomas and Deanna Jensen (the "Jensens"), by and through their

counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 29(a) hereby objects to the Amended Clerk's Record on Appeal filed in this matter on
March 28, 2019. The Jensens request that the clerk add the following documents to the clerk's
record:

I. Notice of Substitution of Counsel (filed 3/27/2018)
OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL AND NOTICE OF HEARING
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2. Jensens’ Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed 4/30/2018)
3. Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed 4/30/2018)
4. Jensens’ Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (filed 4/30/2018)
5. Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (filed
4/30/2018)
6. Jensens’ Motion to Continue Proceedings on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed 4/30/2018)
7. Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Motion to Continue Proceedings on Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (filed 4/30/2018)
8. Declaration of Robert L. Harris in Support of Jensens’ Motion to Continue
Proceedings on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (filed 4/30/2018)
9. Jensens’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(filed 4/30/2018)
10. Declaration of Deanna Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed 4/30/2018)
11. Declaration of Thomas Jensen in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed 4/30/2018)
12. Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (filed 4/30/2018)
13. Jensens’ Motion for Leave to File Jensens’ Amended Answer to Counterclaim (filed
4/30/2018)
14. Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Motion for Leave to File Jensens’ Amended
Answer to Counterclaim (filed 4/30/2018)
15. Reply in Support of Jensens’ Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (filed 4/10/2018)
16. Jensens’ Motion for Summary Judgment (filed 7/30/2018)
17. Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
7/30/2018)
18. Second Declaration of D. Andrew Rawlings (filed 7/30/2018)
19. Jensens’ Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed 8/13/2018)
20. Memorandum in Support of Jensens’ Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed
8/13/2018)
OBJECTION TO CLERK’S RECORD
ON APPEAL AND NOTICE OF HEARING
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21. Jensens' Renewed Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join
Indispensable Parties (filed 8/13/2018)
22. Memorandum in Support ofJensens 'Renewed Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Join Indispensable Parties (filed 8/13/2018)
23. Jensens' Memorandum in Opposition to Roberts' Motion for Summary Judgment
(filed 8/13/2018)
24. Declaration ofDr. Ryan T Christensen (filed 8/13/2018)
25. Reply Memorandum in Support of Jensens' Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
8/20/2018)
26. Jensens 'Memorandum in Opposition to Roberts' Motion to Strike (filed 8/20/2018)
27. Reply in Support ofJensens 'Renewed Motion to Strike Affidavits (filed 8/24/2018)
28. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (filed 10/11/2018)
29. Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration (filed 10/11/2018)
30. Jensens' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
(filed 11/9/2018)
31. Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration (filed 11/16/2018)

FURTHER, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Jensens will call up their objection to
be heard before the Court on Monday, April 22, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. (Mountain Time), at the

Jerome County District Court, 233 W. Main St., Jerome, Idaho 83338.

DATED this 11 th day of April, 2019.

D/ & f b-lings_ _ __
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL AND NOTICE OF HEARING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11 th day of April, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by the
method indicated.

Document Served:

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Travis L. Thompson
Jonas A. Reagan
Nicole L. Swafford
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Fax: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com

□ Mail

D
D
D
IZI

Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Email
Electronic Filing/Service

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

\\Law\data\WPDATA\RLH\20028-000 Jensen, Thomas & Deanna\_01 APPEAL\Pleadings\Objection to Amended Clerk's Record.docx

OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL AND NOTICE OF HEARING
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Electronically Filed
4/11/2019 2:59 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Shelly Creek, Deputy Clerk

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq. (ISB No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Tel.: (208)523-0620
Fax: (208) 523-9518
Email: rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
Court eService:
efiling@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
Case No. CV27-18-00098

LORA K. ROBERTS,

Supreme Court No. 46675-2019

Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,

MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY

Defendants-Respondents.
Defendants-Respondents, Thomas and Deanna Jensen (the "Jensens"), by and through their
counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., move the Court for an Order
allowing the J ensens' counsel to appear telephonically at the hearing regarding the J ensens'
Objection to Amended Clerk's Record on Appeal, before the Honorable Judge Rosemary Emory,
on April 22, 2019, at 1:30 p.m.

DATED this 11 th day of April, 2019.

Jte~ lings

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen
MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALL Y
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11 th day of April, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by the
method indicated.

Document Served:

MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Travis L. Thompson
Jonas A. Reagan
Nicole L. Swafford
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Fax: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com

□ Mail

D
D
D
IZI

Hand Delivery
Facsimile
Email
Electronic Filing/Service

D / !e~

----aw~lin_g_s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys for Thomas and Deanna Jensen

\\Law\data\WPDATA\RLH\20028-000 Jensen, Thomas & Deanna\ 01 APPEAL\Pleadings\Objection to Amended Clerk's Record telephonic.docx

MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALL Y
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Electronically Filed
4/15/2019 8:52 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Michelle Emerson, Clerk of the Court
By: Karen Wood, Deputy Clerk

Travis L. Thompson, ISB #6168
Jonas A. Reagan, ISB #10566
Nicole L. Swafford, ISB #10642
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0063
Telephone: (208) 733-0700
Facsimile: (208) 735-2444
Email: tlt@idahowaters.com
jreagan@idahowaters.com
nls@idahowaters.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Lora K. Roberts

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

LORA K. ROBERTS, an individual,

Case No. CV27-18-00098

Plaintiff-Appellant,

WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION TO
CLERK'S RECORD

vs.
THOMAS JENSEN and DEANNA JENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff-Appellant, LORA K. ROBERTS ("Roberts"), by and through
her counsel of record, Barker Rosholt & Simpson LLP, and hereby withdraws her objection to
the clerk's record filed in this matter on March 21, 2019. The clerk submitted an Amended

Clerk's Record on Appeal on March 28, 2019 which supersedes the previously filed clerk's
record. The documents Roberts sought to add to the original clerk's record are now included.
Therefore, the objection to prior clerk's record is moot and is hereby withdrawn.

WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
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DATED this 15th day of April, 2019.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP

Travis L. Thompson
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Lora K. Roberts

WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 th day of April, 2019, the within and foregoing
WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD was filed electronically using
the Court's e-file system, and upon such filing the following parties were served electronically:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
Robert L. Harris
D. Andrew Rawlings
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimants efiling@holdenlegal.com

/s/
Jessica Nielsen,
Assistant for Travis L. Thompson

WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME

Lora Roberts
Plaintiff,

Supreme Court No. #46675-2019
Case No. CV27- 18~00098

vs .

Second Amended Clerk's Certificate of Service

Thomas Jensen 1 Deanna Jensen
Defendant.

I, Shelly Creek, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Jerome, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record
in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript to
each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:There were no exhibits offered for
identification or admitted into evidence during the course of this action.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on April 17, 2019, I served a copy of the attached to:

X By U.S. Mail

BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON, LLP
163 Second Ave. West
P.O. Box 63
Twin Falls. ID 83303-0063

X] By U.S. Mail
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, PLLC
P.O. Box50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Michelle Emerson
Clerk of the Court
By:

Slie{{y Creek

Deputy Clerk

Clerk's Certificate of Service - Revised 07/01/2018
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